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Dynamic Games and Applications

Erschienen in:

27.07.2020

Upper and Lower Values in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Information

verfasst von: Dhruva Kartik, Ashutosh Nayyar

Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications | Ausgabe 2/2021

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Abstract

A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player’s information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain conditions on the evolution of the common and private information, a dynamic programming characterization of the value of the game (if it exists) is presented. If the value of the zero-sum game does not exist, then the dynamic program provides bounds on the upper and lower values of the game.

Vorheriger Artikel Bargaining, Reference Points, and Limited Influence

Nächster Artikel Correction to: Upper and Lower Values in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Information

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Titel: Upper and Lower Values in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Information
verfasst von: Dhruva Kartik
Ashutosh Nayyar
Publikationsdatum: 27.07.2020
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Dynamic Games and Applications / Ausgabe 2/2021
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Elektronische ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-020-00364-x

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