Violence in the Borderlands of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin: Regional Integration Without ECOWAS

The border region spanning Malanville in northern Benin, Gaya in southern Niger, and adjacent eastern Burkina Faso stands today as one of the most strategically significant and institutionally contested spaces in West Africa. Once regarded as peripheral to both national decision-making and formal regional integration, this corridor is home to a complex tapestry of ethnic groups, trade routes, and religious traditions. Malanville, a bustling market town on the banks of the Niger River, and Gaya, Niger’s key gateway to the south, serve as commercial and migratory crossroads, sustaining populations that have grown steadily over the past decade. These borderlands, long characterized by the interplay of informal commerce and cross-border kinship, have recently taken on new geopolitical importance amid the shifting landscape of regional alliances and security threats.

The departure of Niger and Burkina Faso from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2023 and the subsequent creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) mark a critical rupture in the architecture of West African cooperation. ECOWAS, founded in 1975, has aspired to promote economic integration, conflict prevention, and the free movement of people and goods across national boundaries. However, for much of the tri-border area, these ambitions have often existed more in theory than in practice. Statutory frameworks and regional protocols, while rhetorically powerful, have repeatedly proven difficult to enforce, and the lived experience of borderland populations has been shaped more by the fluid realities of insecurity, migration, and pragmatic adaptation than by official policy (Bassey, Etefia, and Ebong 2024; ECOWAS Communiqué 2024; International Crisis Group 2024). The recent fragmentation of regional institutions has thus exposed both the limits of supranational authority and the enduring gap between elite-driven regionalism and everyday governance at the margins.

In the wake of partial or complete withdrawal by state and regional authorities, local actors across the Malanville–Gaya corridor have not simply confronted a governance vacuum. Instead, they have mobilized traditional leadership, market associations, religious figures, women’s collectives, and informal security networks to sustain social order and manage cross-border challenges. These adaptive strategies that are rooted in historical memory, kinship ties, and creative negotiation often surpass formal interventions in both effectiveness and legitimacy, especially under conditions of crisis or disruption (Radil et al. 2022; Nugent 2019).

Against this background, the article poses a core question: How do borderland communities in the Sahel respond to the retreat of formal authority, and what can these responses teach us about regional security and integration beyond the state and supranational organizations? By shifting analytical focus from elite diplomacy and institutional design to the “micro-geopolitics” of everyday borderland life, this study advances the argument that the Malanville–Gaya corridor represents an active site where the future of security and legitimacy is being forged from below (Fregonese 2021; Dittmer 2018; McGregor and Chatelard 2022).

To address this question, the article draws on original qualitative fieldwork, oral histories, and social network analysis conducted in the Malanville–Gaya borderlands. Theoretically, it engages with and synthesizes insights from borderland studies, subaltern security studies, and micro-geopolitics by bridging macro-institutional accounts with the granular realities of West Africa’s most vulnerable and innovative spaces. By centering the agency and informal practices of everyday actors, the analysis foregrounds their decisive role in shaping the emerging trajectory of regional security and integration in the Sahel.

The recent institutional ruptures within the ECOWAS and the parallel formation of the AES have not merely exposed the fragility of supranational organizations; they have thrown into sharp relief the enduring, if often overlooked, significance of informal regional integration. Conventional paradigms of regionalism in Africa, which privilege state-centric and institution-based approaches, are increasingly inadequate for explaining the lived realities in the Malanville–Gaya borderlands, where state authority is frequently intermittent, fragmented, or altogether absent (Bassey, Etefia, and Ebong 2024; Meagher 2021; Grégoire and Labazée 1993). Within this context, our analysis distinguishes between “minimal presence,” characterized by sporadic and selective engagement by state or regional actors, often reactive and short-term, and “strong presence,” which would imply sustained, predictable, and widely legitimate involvement in the ongoing management of security, justice, and economic flows. This conceptual distinction is not only empirical but also analytical (see Fig. 1 for a conceptual map), allowing us to capture the spatial and temporal volatility of governance in the borderlands.

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To move beyond the limitations of state-centric readings, this study draws together four intersecting strands of scholarship, each of which illuminates different dimensions of borderland life: informal regional integration, borderland studies, subaltern security studies, and micro-geopolitics. Their synthesis provides a conceptual toolkit for understanding how security, legitimacy, and cooperation are continuously forged, contested, and renegotiated in conditions of institutional flux.

As the first strand, informal regional integration directs our attention to the social infrastructures and adaptive practices that sustain cross-border life when official frameworks falter. Everyday actors such as market women, religious intermediaries, transport syndicates, and traditional chiefs maintain economic and security networks through trust, kinship, and tacit rules. While scholars often warn that these arrangements can harbor criminal or exclusionary dynamics, recent field research and testimony increasingly recognize their capacity to foster resilience, maintain order, and fill governance gaps (De Bruijn and van Dijk 2020; Lebovich 2020; Boone 2003; Walther and Miles 2018). However, the capacity of these informal networks to mediate crisis is not uniform; they are shaped by local hierarchies, historical memory, and access to social capital, and may thus exclude “outsiders,” women, or stigmatized minorities.

Second, borderland studies disrupt the conventional notion of borders as static or merely peripheral. Instead, borders are viewed as dynamic “zones of circulation” and negotiation (Nugent 2019; Adesina 2019; McDougall and Scheele 2012; Baud and van Schendel 1997). In the Malanville–Gaya context, empirical evidence demonstrates that borderland communities develop their own hybrid governance mechanisms, from market arbitration panels to cross-border security pacts, often operating independently of, or in tension with, formal state apparatus. The literature makes clear that such agency is deeply ambivalent: while borderland actors are often sources of innovation and pragmatic adaptation, they may also reinforce forms of exclusion and deepen existing inequalities of ethnicity, gender, or migration status (Bøås and Strazzari 2020; Boone 2003).

Third, subaltern security studies provide a critical corrective to state-centered security analysis by foregrounding the lived experiences and insecurity dilemmas of populations systematically marginalized in national and regional policymaking (Bilgin 2016). These approaches expose how communities subjected to chronic uncertainty, violence, or legal ambiguity mobilize “hybrid” security assemblages—market committees, vigilante patrols, religious mediation—constituting new forms of legitimacy and everyday authority (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Iocchi and Baldaro 2024; Colona and Jaffe 2016). Still, this literature is attentive to the dark side of such hybridity: exclusion, contestation, and the risk that informal actors may be co-opted by armed groups or criminal networks (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2017; Bargués 2024). The tension between resilience and vulnerability remains central.

Fourth, micro-geopolitics sharpens the analytical focus by examining how everyday practices, seemingly mundane acts of market negotiation, rumor control via WhatsApp, and cross-border funerals or marriages, actively shape and sometimes subvert wider regional dynamics (Dittmer 2018; Fregonese 2021; Cantens 2019). This approach challenges the deficit narratives that depict borderlands as simply “ungoverned spaces,” instead showing how power is constantly performed, negotiated, and reimagined at the micro level. Through the lens of micro-geopolitics, the study can connect the choreography of daily survival to broader questions of order, legitimacy, and regional integration.

These approaches converge in the concept of hybrid governance, which describes the dense, negotiated entanglement of multiple, sometimes competing authorities such as chiefs, imams, market syndicates, and NGOs, who collectively shape the architecture of security and cooperation (Sowale and Ukeje 2025; Bargués 2024; Boone 2003). Hybrid governance is marked by its resilience, adaptability, and proximity to local needs, often outpacing formal institutions in times of crisis. Yet, it is equally susceptible to fragmentation, fragility, and the risk of co-optation or exclusion, particularly under conditions of escalating violence or abrupt policy shifts (Cantens 2019; Chabal and Daloz 1999).

No framework is without risk. An uncritical emphasis on local agency may inadvertently overstate the virtues of informality, potentially overlooking the enduring influence or possible resurgence of formal state and supranational institutions, especially in moments of acute crisis or external intervention. Likewise, the plural and negotiated nature of hybrid governance, while enabling flexibility, can also undermine accountability, justice, and transparency, leaving the most marginalized at risk of exclusion or abuse. Informal arrangements may yield short-term effectiveness but do not necessarily ensure resilience in the face of escalating violence, climate-induced displacement, or transnational crime. Finally, these approaches must take care not to essentialize “the local,” nor to underestimate the complex, recursive relationships between local, national, and transnational processes.

In sum, the synthesis of these frameworks allows for a more nuanced, critical, and empirically grounded analysis of Sahelian borderlands. It situates this paper in current scholarly debates while recognizing both the conceptual contributions and the empirical limitations of research on hybrid order and informal regionalism in contexts of state transformation and regional fragmentation.

Figure 1 shows the intersection of our theoretical approaches. Informal regional integration, borderland studies, and subaltern security studies each offer key insights into the nature of local agency, daily adaptation, and security in West African borderlands. Micro-geopolitics functions as an analytical link, highlighting how everyday practices shape and negotiate power. At its core is the concept of hybrid governance, which combines these frameworks to reflect the layered, negotiated, and dynamic character of order in situations of minimal or fragmented state presence.

This study adopts a multi-method qualitative approach designed to reveal the everyday realities, adaptive practices, and local strategies that underpin security and integration in the Sahel borderlands. Official statistics and top-down policy analysis often prove inadequate for capturing the complexity of frontier spaces; therefore, this research centers on the lived experiences and agency of those most affected by overlapping crises. Data collection was based on purposive and snowball sampling to ensure diverse representation, beginning with local chiefs and traders in Malanville and Gaya, then expanding to include a wide spectrum of actors such as traditional authorities, market actors, transporters, municipal officials, religious leaders, security personnel, and informal actors like vigilante group members. A total of 58 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted in French, Hausa, Dendi, and Fulfulde, with local interpreters facilitating as needed; special care was taken to include women, youth, and pastoralists, as well as marginalized groups. Interviews were guided by protocols that addressed cross-border cooperation, informal security, daily negotiation of legal order, and perceptions of institutional effectiveness. Interview data were thematically coded through deductive and inductive approaches, with interpretations cross-checked against local insights and triangulated with complementary sources to ensure contextual rigor and validity. In addition to conducting interviews, the study also gathered oral histories from elders and established traders to illuminate the long-term evolution of local arrangements and to highlight the enduring influence of historical memory and collective strategy. Participant observation in markets, religious and customary gatherings, and community security meetings allowed for the direct observation of social dynamics, trust-building rituals, and micro-level diplomacy. The centrality of informal networks was further analyzed through social network mapping, which visualized the kinship, digital (e.g., WhatsApp groups), and religious ties structuring information flow and mobilization beyond formal policy channels. Additionally, local media, rumors, and digital communications—ranging from radio broadcasts to digital alert systems—were systematically monitored to track community perceptions of threat, security, and shifting narratives around ECOWAS, AES, and other regional actors. Documentary analysis of institutional sources, including risk management plans, mayoral statements, minutes from security meetings, and communications from border committees, was conducted alongside ECOWAS and AES communiqués and NGO reports to expose gaps between official discourse and lived realities.

Given the sensitivity of the research environment, robust ethical protocols were implemented. Informed consent was obtained verbally or in writing, confidentiality was strictly maintained, and pseudonyms were used throughout. Interviews involving potentially traumatic or sensitive topics were handled with care and flexibility, and all field team members were briefed on ethical practice and participant safety. The researchers’ positionality, as an external academic with prior policy experience but operating as a temporary member of the communities under study, was continually reflected upon through field journals and collaborative debriefings with local assistants. This reflexive practice, together with multilingual teamwork and regular feedback from community advisors, helped mitigate misunderstandings and interpretive bias.

Despite these strengths, several methodological limitations must be acknowledged. Some groups, such as clandestine armed actors or newly arrived migrants, were difficult to access, potentially limiting sample diversity. The use of interpreters, while essential, may have affected the depth or nuance of some interviews. Security concerns periodically constrained the duration and spatial coverage of field visits, and the presence of an external researcher may have influenced participant responses, especially on sensitive topics. While the sample was diverse, it cannot claim full statistical representativity for the entire tri-borderland region. Nonetheless, by foregrounding local actors, networks, and practices, this layered, field-driven methodology provides a robust empirical foundation for understanding the failures of formal frameworks and the emergence of alternative forms of security and integration, while remaining transparent about its own boundaries and ethical responsibilities.

Analysis draws on in-depth interviews, focus groups, participant observation, and digital ethnography, with original cases selected to illustrate the lived complexity of borderland governance, legal pluralism, and everyday security. The findings are organized by analytic focus: people, institutions, and arrangements, with each subsection explicitly tied to the article’s integrated theoretical framework.

The analysis of the Malanville–Gaya corridor and the broader tri-borderlands of Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso demonstrates that the erosion of formal regional frameworks, which is epitomized by the fragmentation of ECOWAS and the rise of the AES, has not resulted in the disappearance of regional cooperation or security management. Rather, what emerges is a mosaic of informal diplomacy, vernacular legalities, and micro-level adaptations that are at once pragmatic, contested, and deeply embedded in local social fabrics. Chiefs, market women, religious authorities, youth groups, and digital activists collectively sustain a functional, if uneven, security order that neither mirrors nor simply substitutes for state-led regionalism.

If ECOWAS or similar supranational institutions were to resume strong, legitimate, and continuous engagement in these borderlands, the nature of regional integration and security management would inevitably change—but not simply through the re-imposition of top-down authority. A robust ECOWAS presence could, in principle, provide more consistent resources, legal protections, and standardized protocols for crisis response. For instance, clearer mechanisms for dispute resolution, greater formal recognition of cross-border markets, and enhanced protection for migrants and minorities might emerge, potentially reducing some of the exclusions, inequalities, and vulnerabilities revealed in this study. Moreover, the symbolic power of an active ECOWAS presence could reinforce the legitimacy of plural institutions, offering a critical bridge between everyday practices and formal governance.

However, this scenario is not without risks. If external intervention were to undermine or sideline locally legitimate arrangements, it could inadvertently weaken the very networks of trust and adaptation that underpin current resilience. Historical experience in the region suggests that attempts to “formalize” or “harmonize” local orders, absent genuine inclusion and sensitivity to context, often reproduce new forms of exclusion, contestation, or bureaucratic inertia. Thus, the most promising policy scenario is not a binary choice between supranational and local orders, but a collaborative, dialogic approach in which ECOWAS (or any regional institution) recognizes, resources, and learns from the complex architectures of hybrid governance already in place.

The empirical findings and theoretical reflections presented here have broader resonance beyond the West African Sahel. They challenge simplistic dichotomies between formal and informal, state and non-state, and center and periphery. Instead, they urge scholars and policymakers to recognize that meaningful regional integration is always a negotiated process—one that relies as much on micro-geopolitics, everyday diplomacy, and plural legal orders as on summit declarations or institutional treaties. For Africa and other regions marked by contested sovereignties and fragmented governance, the “borderland perspective” advanced here offers a valuable corrective: it foregrounds local agency, highlights the creativity (and constraints) of vernacular governance, and insists on the need for multi-layered, inclusive approaches to security and integration.

In conclusion, the tri-borderlands of Benin, Niger, and Burkina Faso are not merely marginal zones of insecurity, but also critical laboratories for rethinking regional order in a time of institutional flux. By moving beyond both deficit-based and celebratory narratives of informality, this study advances an argument for adaptive, contextually grounded strategies that bridge the persistent gap between supranational ambition and the lived realities of those who inhabit Africa’s most dynamic frontiers.