2014 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel
Wait a Minute! A fast, Cross-VM Attack on AES
verfasst von : Gorka Irazoqui, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
Erschienen in: Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
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In cloud computing, efficiencies are reaped by resource sharing such as co-location of computation and deduplication of data. This work exploits resource sharing in virtualization software to build a powerful cache-based attack on AES. We demonstrate the vulnerability by mounting Cross-VM
Flush+Reload
cache attacks in VMware VMs to recover the keys of an AES implementation of
OpenSSL 1.0.1
running inside the victim VM. Furthermore, the attack works in a
realistic setting
where different VMs are located on separate cores. The modified
flush+reload
attack we present, takes only in the order of seconds to minutes to succeed in a cross-VM setting. Therefore long term co-location, as required by other fine grain attacks in the literature, are not needed. The results of this study show that there is a great security risk to
OpenSSL AES
implementation running on VMware cloud services when the deduplication is not disabled.