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Economics of Governance

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27.09.2017 | Original Paper

Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing

verfasst von: Leonid Krasnozhon, John Levendis

Erschienen in: Economics of Governance | Ausgabe 1/2018

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Abstract

This paper studies how reputation enforces socially cooperative behavior in road racing in the New Orleans metro area. We find that reputation mechanisms have a much stronger effect for frequent road racers than for members of the New Orleans Track Club. We find that club membership cuts cheating in half while a runner who has finished at least one-third of the 2013 running season does not cheat. Thus, self-governance eliminates corruption when there is a reputational mechanism in place. Since data on informal running clubs are unavailable, our analysis underestimates the effect of club membership on socially cooperative behavior in road racing.

Vorheriger Artikel The impact of public pension board of trustee composition on state bond ratings

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Online sources: Running USA, http://www.runningusa.org/statistics. Statista, http://www.statista.com/statistics/190303/running-participants-in-the-us-since-2006/.

For a literature review of the contest theory and the economics of cheating in sports, please, see Szymanski (2003).

Powell and Stringham (2009) provides a literature review.

Besides the New Orleans Track Club (NOTC), a dozen informal running clubs exist in the New Orleans metro area. The largest informal clubs are organized by specialty running stores such as the Louisiana Running Company (LRC), the Varsity Sports, and the Southern Runner. For example, the LRC Group Facebook page has 932 members.

For literature review, please, see Powell and Stringham (2009).

Runner’s World, Forum Directory. Online source: http://community.runnersworld.com/forums.

In 2013 two electronically-scored races offered the cash-prize and the spread-prize incentives to perform. One race offered $100 and a pair of New Balance shoes to a winner, $75 to the second place, and $50 to the third place; and $50 to a winner in the male and female masters’ divisions. Another race offers the cash-prize incentive to break the race record in male and female division. A holder of a new record would receive a $500 bonus.

Awards are given for the 1st place in overall open, youth, masters, grandmasters, and seniors; and for the 1st and the 2nd place in the age groups from 10-under through 80 and over. Sometimes winners in the main divisions receive in-kind awards such as gift cards or a pair of running shoes.

In a 5 K race, for example, a runner who starts 5 min later than the start of the race can complete the race faster than another runner who starts at the start of the race if the pace of the former is about 2 min faster than that of the latter. Thus, the official has to rely on circumstantial evidence to detect cheating.

The NOTC owns around 15 races, including two of the oldest races in the United States. The Turkey Day Race dates back to 1907. The Jackson Day race is the oldest race in the South region of the United States.

Running USA, 2013. Online source: http://www.runningusa.org/2014-state-of-the-sport-part-III-us-race-trends.

To our best knowledge, our sample includes all 5 K road races which were held in 2013 in the New Orleans metro area. The sample includes two road races which were organized outside of the New Orleans MSA. We include these road races because the New Orleans Road Race Inc. organized them.

Brian Metlzer “Where to Run Fast: A guide to America’s speediest road races,” Runner’s World, May 1, 2009. Online source: http://www.runnersworld.com/races/where-run-fast?page=single.

Based on authors’ calculations.

According to the Association of Road Racing Statisticians, the 5 K world record finishing time is 12:59.5 min. Online source: http://www.arrs.net/WG_Rec_ENG.htm.

Standard errors increase for all variables when we estimate the model with cluster-robust standard errors. Additional estimation results are available upon request.

In Table 4 from columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, e$^{(-0.101)} -1 = 0.096$, e$^{(-0.0318)} -1 = 0.0312$, and e$^{(-0.0405)} - 1 = 0.0396$, respectively (see Wooldridge 2011).

Additional estimation results are available upon request.

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Titel: Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing
verfasst von: Leonid Krasnozhon
John Levendis
Publikationsdatum: 27.09.2017
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Economics of Governance / Ausgabe 1/2018
Print ISSN: 1435-6104
Elektronische ISSN: 1435-8131
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-017-0199-3