Skip to main content

2019 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. What Arrow’s Information Paradox Says (to Philosophers)

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Arrow’s information paradox features the most radical kind of information asymmetry by diagnosing an inherent conflict between two parties inclined to exchange information. In this paper, we argue that this paradox is more richly textured than generally supposed by current economic discussion on it and that its meaning encroaches on philosophy. In particular, we uncovers the ‘epistemic’ and more genuine version of the paradox, which looms on our cognitive lives like a sort of tax on curiosity. Finally, we sketch the relation between Arrow’s information paradox and the notion of zero-knowledge proofs in cryptography: roughly speaking, zero-knowledge proofs are protocols that enable a prover to convince a verifier that a statement is true, without conveying any additional information.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Fußnoten
1
Arrow also assumes that information is indivisible, i.e. it cannot conveyed in parts that constitute evidence that the information has value.
 
2
As Merges puts it: “Arrow has pointed out in his “paradox of information” without a property right, the licensor is in a pickle” (Merges 1994, p. 2657).
 
3
This situation is realised by the purchase of the content of online newspapers with paywall systems: these display an article title and a few paragraphs (X ) before prompting the reader to pay for X.
 
4
We adapt this definition from the one given for secret in Ganglmair and Tarantino (2014).
 
5
This typical example gives a good intuition to what zero-knowledge proofs look like in the real world. Alice and Bob are playing the game “where is Valdo”: they have to find the real Valdo among a hundred of similar figures on the page of an illustration. How Alice can prove to Bob that she know where Valdo is without revealing his location? All Alice has to do is to take a large piece of cardboard (twice as large as the picture) with a small hole cut in the middle. She has to covers the picture with cardboard with the hole on the top of Valdo (while Bob is not looking), so that Valdo is lying behind the hole (Naor et al. 1999).
 
Literatur
Zurück zum Zitat Akerloff, G. 1970. The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3):488–500.CrossRef Akerloff, G. 1970. The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3):488–500.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Anton, J.J., and D.A. Yao. 2002. The sale of ideas: Strategic disclosure, property rights, and contracting. The Review of Economic Studies 69(3): 513–531.MathSciNetCrossRef Anton, J.J., and D.A. Yao. 2002. The sale of ideas: Strategic disclosure, property rights, and contracting. The Review of Economic Studies 69(3): 513–531.MathSciNetCrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Arrow, K. 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, ed. J. Kenneth, 609–626. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Arrow, K. 1962. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, ed. J. Kenneth, 609–626. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zurück zum Zitat Babai, L. 1985. Trading group theory for randomness. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC’85, 421–429. New York: ACM.CrossRef Babai, L. 1985. Trading group theory for randomness. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC’85, 421–429. New York: ACM.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Blahut, R.E., D. Costello, U. Maurer, and T. Mittelholzer. 1994. Communications and Cryptography: Two Sides of One Tapestry. The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science. Boston: Springer. Blahut, R.E., D. Costello, U. Maurer, and T. Mittelholzer. 1994. Communications and Cryptography: Two Sides of One Tapestry. The Springer International Series in Engineering and Computer Science. Boston: Springer.
Zurück zum Zitat Cook, S.A. 1971. The Complexity of Theorem-Proving Procedures. In Proceedings of the Third Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC’71, 151–158. New York: ACM. Cook, S.A. 1971. The Complexity of Theorem-Proving Procedures. In Proceedings of the Third Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC’71, 151–158. New York: ACM.
Zurück zum Zitat Ganglmair, B., and E. Tarantino. 2014. Conversation with secrets. The RAND Journal of Economics 45(2): 273–302.CrossRef Ganglmair, B., and E. Tarantino. 2014. Conversation with secrets. The RAND Journal of Economics 45(2): 273–302.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Goldwasser, S., S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. 1989. The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems. SIAM Journal on computing 18(1): 186–208.MathSciNetCrossRef Goldwasser, S., S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. 1989. The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems. SIAM Journal on computing 18(1): 186–208.MathSciNetCrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Horner, J., and A. Skrzypacz. 2016. Selling information. Journal of Political Economy 124(6): 1515–1562.CrossRef Horner, J., and A. Skrzypacz. 2016. Selling information. Journal of Political Economy 124(6): 1515–1562.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Jones, S.P., J.-M. Eber, and S. Julian. 2000. Composing contracts: An adventure in financial engineering (functional pearl). ACM SIGPLAN Notices 35(9): 280–292.CrossRef Jones, S.P., J.-M. Eber, and S. Julian. 2000. Composing contracts: An adventure in financial engineering (functional pearl). ACM SIGPLAN Notices 35(9): 280–292.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Merges, R.P. 1994. Of property rules, coase, and intellectual property. Columbia Law Review 94(8): 2655–2673.CrossRef Merges, R.P. 1994. Of property rules, coase, and intellectual property. Columbia Law Review 94(8): 2655–2673.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Naor, M., Y. Naor, and O. Reingold. 1999. Applied kid cryptography or how to convince your children you are not cheating. In Eurocrypt’94: 1–12. Naor, M., Y. Naor, and O. Reingold. 1999. Applied kid cryptography or how to convince your children you are not cheating. In Eurocrypt’94: 1–12.
Zurück zum Zitat Shannon, C.E. 1948. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal 27: 379–423; 623–656.MathSciNetCrossRef Shannon, C.E. 1948. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal 27: 379–423; 623–656.MathSciNetCrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Stiglitz, J.E. 2002. Information and the change in the paradigm in economics. The American Economic Review 92(3): 460–501.CrossRef Stiglitz, J.E. 2002. Information and the change in the paradigm in economics. The American Economic Review 92(3): 460–501.CrossRef
Zurück zum Zitat Thambisetty, S. 2007. Patents as credence goods. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27(4): 707–740.CrossRef Thambisetty, S. 2007. Patents as credence goods. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27(4): 707–740.CrossRef
Metadaten
Titel
What Arrow’s Information Paradox Says (to Philosophers)
verfasst von
Mario Piazza
Marco Pedicini
Copyright-Jahr
2019
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01800-9_5