nach oben

Human Studies

Erschienen in:

07.05.2020 | Theoretical / Philosophical Paper

When Body Image Takes over the Body Schema: The Case of Frantz Fanon

verfasst von: Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka

Erschienen in: Human Studies | Ausgabe 4/2020

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Body image (BI) and body schema (BS) refer to two different yet closely related systems. Whereas BI can be defined as a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body, BS is a system of sensory-motor capacities that functions without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring. Studies have demonstrated that applying the concepts of BI and BS enables us to conceptualize complex pathological phenomena such as anorexia, schizophrenia, and depersonalization. Likewise, it has further been argued that these concepts play a crucial role in our ability to grasp our bodily experiences in the socio-cultural world according to various factors, such as gender, social class, and ethnicity. Referring to the insights of Frantz Fanon, the author of Black Skin, White Masks, this paper suggests that under certain conditions the BI can take over and reshape the BS (or the BI is assimilated into the BS). Based on an examination of Fanon’s writings, the paper suggests that not only the BI can truly remold the BS but that the gaze of the other can directly influence the BI.

Vorheriger Artikel Presence in Digital Spaces. A Phenomenological Concept of Presence in Mediatized Communication

Nächster Artikel Being-in-the-Apple-store: a genetic phenomenological sociology of space

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

There is an ongoing debate regarding whether neglect really demonstrates clear-cut double dissociation between BS and BI (de Vignemont 2018).

The concepts of both BS and BI have a long history. As is well known, the first English translation of Phenomenology of Perception, published in 1962, translated the French term “schéma corporel” as “body image”. This conceptual confusion mainly derives from early twentieth century neurology, in which scholars argued about the nature of neural representation of the body. As Gallagher (1986, 2005) also highlighted, the neurologist Paul Schilder (1935) generated confusion with regard to the use of these concepts. On the one hand Schilder inherited the usage of “body schema” referring to postural cognition from the studies of Head and Holmes (1911), but on the other hand he equated this concept with “the picture of our own body which we form in our mind,” (1935:11) that is, body image.

Ataria, Y. (in press a). Consciousness in flesh. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ataria, Y. (2016a). I am not my body, this is not my body. Human studies, 39(2), 217–229. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-015-9366-0.CrossRef

Ataria, Y. (2016b). When the body becomes the enemy: Disownership toward the body. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 23(1), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2016.0002.CrossRef

Ataria, Y. (2018). Body disownership in complex post-traumatic stress disorder. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef

Ataria, Y. (2019a). Total destruction. In Y. Ataria, A. Kravitz, & E. Pitcovski (Eds.), Jean Améry: Beyond the Minds Limits, (pp. 141–158). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRef

Ataria, Y. (2019b). Becoming nonhuman: The case study of the gulag. Genealogy, 3(2), 27, https://doi.org/10.3390/genealogy3020027 (invited paper).CrossRef

Ataria, Y. (in press b). Investigating the origins of body-disownership : The case study of the gulag. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology.

Ataria, Y., & Somer, E. (2013). Total otherness in dissociative identity disorder. Journal for Otherness, 4(1), 1–25.

Ataria, Y. (2015). Trauma from an enactive perspective: The collapse of the knowing-how structure. Adaptive Behavior, 23(3), 143-154. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712314578542.CrossRef

Ataria, Y. (2019b). When the body stands in the way - Complex posttraumatic stress disorder, depersonalization and schizophrenia. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 26(1), 19–31.CrossRef

Arieli, A., & Ataria, Y. (2018). Helplessness: The inability to know-that you don’t know-how. Philosophical Psychology, 31(6), 948-968.CrossRef

Ataria, Y. (in press c). Primo levi and Ka-Tsetnik: The map and the territory. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ataria, Y., & Horovitz, O. (in press). Complex-PTSD, depersonalization and schizophrenia: Impairments in the minimal self. Philosophical Psychology.

Ataria, Y., & Gallagher, S. (2015). Somatic apathy: Body disownership in the context of torture. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 46(1), 105–122. https://doi.org/10.1163/15691624-12341286.CrossRef

Buxbaum, L. J., & Coslett, B. H. (2001). Specialised structural descriptions for human body parts: Evidence from autotopagnosia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 18(1), 289–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/02643290126172.CrossRef

Buxbaum, L. J., Giovannetti, T., & Libon, D. (2000). The role of the dynamic body schema in praxis: Evidence from primary progressive apraxia. Brain and Cognition, 44(2), 166–191.CrossRef

Cole, J., & Paillard, J. (1995). Living without touch and information about body position and movement. Studies on deafferented subjects. In J. L. Bermúdez, A. Marcel, & N. Eilan (Eds.), The body and the self (pp. 245–266). Cambridge: The MIT Press.

De Preester, H., & Knockaert, V. (2005). Body image and body schema: Interdisciplinary perspectives on the body. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.CrossRef

De Vignemont, F. (2010). Body schema and body image—Pros and cons. Neuropsychologia, 48(3), 669–680. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.09.022.CrossRef

de Vignemont, F. (2018). Mind the body. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Denny-Brown, D., Meyer, J. S., & Horenstein, S. (1952). The significance of perceptual rivalry resulting from parietal lesion. Brain, 4(75), 432–471.CrossRef

Dreyfus, H. L. (2017). Background practices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Fanon, F. (2008). Black skin, white masks (C. L. Markmann, Trans.). London: Pluto Press.

Gallagher, S. (1986). Body image and body schema: A conceptual clarification. Journal of Mind and Behaviour, 7, 541–554.

Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Clarendon.CrossRef

Gallagher, S., & Cole, J. (1995). Body schema and body image in a deafferented subject. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 16, 369–390.

Gallagher, S., & Lindgren, R. (2015). Enactive metaphors: Learning through full-body engagement. Educational Psychology Review, 27(3), 391–404. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10648-015-9327-1.CrossRef

Gallup, G. G. (1970). Chimpanzees: Self recognition. Science, 167(3914), 86–87. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.167.3914.86.CrossRef

Gibson, J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Gibson, J. (1982). In E. Reed, & R. Jones (Eds.), Reasons for realism: Selected essays of James J. Gibson. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Grogan, S. (2008). Body image: Understanding body dissatisfaction in men, women, and children. New York, NY: Routledge.

Head, H., & Holmes, G. (1911). Sensory disturbances from cerebral lesions. Brain, 34(2–3), 102–254.CrossRef

Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany: New York Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge.

Moran, D. (2009). Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on embodiment, touch and the ‘double sensation’. In K. Morris (Ed.), Sartre on the body (pp. 41–66). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Paillard, J. (2005). Vectorial versus configural encoding of body space. In H. De Preester & V. Knockaert (Eds.), Body image and body schema: Interdisciplinary perspectives on the body (Vol. 62, pp. 89–109). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.CrossRef

Pitron, V., Alsmith, A., & de Vignemont, F. (2018). How do the body schema and the body image interact? Consciousness and Cognition, 65, 352–358. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.08.007.CrossRef

Pitron, V., & de Vignemont, F. (2017). Beyond differences between the body schema and the body image: Insights from body hallucinations. Consciousness and Cognition, 53, 115–121. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.06.006.CrossRef

Ratcliffe, M. (2008). Feelings of being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef

Ratcliffe, M. (2009). The phenomenology of mood and the meaning of life. In P. Goldie (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235018.003.0016.CrossRef

Ratcliffe, M. (2015). Experiences of depression. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ratcliffe, M. (2017). Selfhood, schizophrenia, and the interpersonal regulation of experience. In C. Durt, T. Guchs, & C. Tewes (Eds.), Embodiment, enaction, and culture: Investigating the constitution of the shared world (pp. 149–172). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035552.003.0008.CrossRef

Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being and nothingness (H. Barnes, Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library.

Schilder, P. (1935). The image and appearance of the human body. New York: International Universities Press.

Tanaka, S. (2018). Bodily basis of the diverse modes of the self. Human Arenas, 1(3), 223–230.CrossRef

Tsakiris, M., Longo, M., & Haggard, P. (2010). Having a body versus moving your body: Neural signatures of agency and body-ownership. Neuropsychologia, 48(9), 2740–2749.CrossRef

Titel: When Body Image Takes over the Body Schema: The Case of Frantz Fanon
verfasst von: Yochai Ataria
Shogo Tanaka
Publikationsdatum: 07.05.2020
Verlag: Springer Netherlands
Erschienen in: Human Studies / Ausgabe 4/2020
Print ISSN: 0163-8548
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-851X
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-020-09543-6

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 4/2020

Being-in-the-Apple-store: a genetic phenomenological sociology of space

The Mundane Dialectic of Enlightenment: Typification as Everyday Identity Thinking

Body Boundary Work: Praxeological Thoughts on Personal Corporality

The Significance of Mobility in Alfred Schutz’s Theory of Action

Apodictic Evidence in Phenomenology: A Correlative Approach

Phenomenology of Online Spaces: Interpreting Late Modern Spatialities