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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

2. Why Do People Obey Norms?

verfasst von : Shinji Teraji

Erschienen in: Evolving Norms

Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan US

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Abstract

In this chapter presents some reasons why people comply with social norms. First, in large measure, people do what they do because they have learned from those who surround them. The society is sustained by processes favorable to individuals endowed with some docility in following rules. Second, social norms can be sustained if the pecuniary advantage from breaking norms is not sufficient to offset the forgone reputation effect. Third, people comply with norms because the threat of punishment makes it in their interest to do so. Fourth, norms are represented as Nash equilibria of games played by rational agents, and as such they are self-enforcing. Finally, correlated equilibrium allows players’ actions to be statistically dependent on some random signals external to the model.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Foundations

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See also Appendix 1.

In Simon’s work, the canonic concepts of rationality appear under several names: ‘global rationality,’ ‘substantive rationality,’ ‘the rationality of neoclassical theory,’ ‘objective rationality,’ ‘maximization,’ ‘optimization,’ ‘perfect rationality,’ ‘strict rationality,’ and perhaps still others.

In Bernheim’s (1994) model, individuals care about both intrinsic utility and social status. When status is sufficiently important relative to intrinsic utility, many individuals conform to a rigid standard of behavior, despite heterogeneous intrinsic preferences.

In Brekke et al. (2003), sanctioning is influenced by a norm behavior. In their model, sanctioning takes the form of a lower or higher ‘self-image.’ Self-image depends not on one’s perceived ‘type’ as in Bernheim (1994), but in the action taken itself. That is, the more one’s behavior deviates from the norm behavior, the lower is one’s self-image.

Coleman (1990) emphasizes the fact that social rewards are especially important when individual decisions carry externalities and, consequentially, sees positive externalities as a condition for the enforcement of social norms.

Gilbert (1989) criticizes Lewis’s (1969) definition of convention, claiming that conventions are of a normative character. Gilbert defines convention as “a jointly accepted principle of action, a group fiat with respect to how one is to act in certain situations” (Gilbert 1989, p. 377).

Appendix 1 is based on Teraji (2007).

See, for example, Isaac and Walker (1988) and Fehr et al. (1993).

See Rabin (1998, 2002) and Fehr and Falk (2002) for studies on the psychological foundations of economics.

Examples of such exemptions include Akerlof (1980), in which the fear of a loss of reputation by acting differently from norms is discussed, and Mui (1995), in which the fear of inviting envy from others by doing well is introduced.

For a cultural explanation to social preferences, see Bowles (1998) and Bisin and Verdier (2001).

For the fundamental argument concerning increasing returns, see Arthur (1994).

N is an even number in this analysis.

For the following analysis, we assume that |μ ⁻| ≤ 1/(N − 1).

This is also somewhat different from Kandori (2003) because we focus on the evolution of norms through socialization for the formation of preferences.

In Bisin and Verdier (2001), the interior rest point under cultural complementarities is unstable while the other rest points are stable.

Appendix 2 is based on Teraji (2013).

The dictator game in theory gives rise to very inequitable distributions of resources. However, when the game is played for real, fair allocations figure prominently. Many game experiments offer abundant evidence that contradicts the hypothesis that all players are motivated only by their own material interest (see Camerer 2003).

For example, Rabin (1993) examines concerns for fairness.

Building on Akerlof’s (1980) model, Naylor (1989) explains the logic of collective strike action.

Sliwka (2007) considers the notion of trust as a credible signal of a social norm.

Tirole (1996) considers the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations.

See Nowak and Sigmund (1998) for a mathematical model of indirect reciprocity. Their model is based on image scoring; agents develop a positive reputation for cooperating and only cooperate with others whose score is above a threshold (image score).

Engelman and Fischbacher (2009) assess the interplay of indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. When indirect reciprocity is not contaminated by incentives for strategic reputation building, they call this pure indirect reciprocity.

The cost C can be endogenized by assuming that individuals have beliefs about how they are judged for the norm deviation. This allows individuals to hold strong or weak beliefs in the sense that the cost C can be high or low.

Appendix 3 is based on Teraji (2009b).

Bowen (1953) first pointed out that corporate decision-making processes have to consider not only the economic dimension, but the social consequences deriving from their business behavior as well.

The Green Paper identifies four factors, which lie behind the growing success of CSR concept (p. 4): (1) the new concerns and expectations of citizens, consumers, public authorities, and investors in the context of globalization and large-scale industrial change; (2) social criteria, which are increasingly influencing the investment decisions of individuals and institutions both as consumers and as investors; (3) increased concern about the damage caused by economic activity to the environment; (4) transparency of business activities brought about by media and modern information and communication technologies.

Brown and Dacin (1997) support the idea that what consumers think about a company does influence their beliefs and attitudes toward the products of that company. They show that a high CSR grade leads to a higher evaluation of the company and corporate evaluation is positively related to product evaluation. In their experiments, subjects were given a description of a fictitious firm, along with a CSR report card with various grades indicating above and below average community involvement. Subjects were asked to rate products made by the firm as well as the firm itself.

In the ‘gift exchange game,’ Fehr et al. (1993) design competitive goods market experiments that allow for the emergence of reciprocal interactions. Buyers make a ‘gift’ to the sellers by paying prices above the competitive level. Sellers in turn respond reciprocally by choosing quality levels above what is dictated by their pecuniary interests.

Many societies face the problem of how to provide public goods. Free riders are those selfish individuals who take advantage of the benefits provided by cooperators without contributing to those benefits themselves. When people face strong material incentives to free ride, the self-interest model predicts that no one will contribute to the public good. However, if there are individual opportunities to punish others, those who cooperate may be willing to punish free riding, even though this is costly for them and even though they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment activities (Fehr and Gächter 2000).

Eco-labeling is an example of what Baron (2001) calls strategic CSR: attempts to increase profits by attracting ‘green’ consumers.

Khalil (2004) critically examines major attempts by economists to account for altruism as reciprocity, as a source of vicarious satisfaction, or as an evolutionary trait.

Altruism is frequently invoked by economists to explain relations between family members (Barro 1974).

The term ‘corporate citizenship’ is used to connect business activity to broader social accountability and service for mutual benefit, reinforcing the view that a corporation is an entity with status equivalent to a person (Waddell 2000).

In research on public relations and the Internet, the possibility of interactivity between a company and its consumers is an issue of high relevance (Capriotti and Moreno 2007). Various forms of feedback are possible on corporate websites for visitors to ask questions, give opinions, or assess the CSR issues. These allow an assessment of or opinions on any of the issues on CSR.

Friedman (1970) qualified his thesis on the social responsibility of firms by conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in legal rules and ethical codes. Therefore, points (1) and (2) position Friedman’s view on business ethics while point (3) was not seen by Friedman.

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Titel: Why Do People Obey Norms?
verfasst von: Shinji Teraji
Verlag: Palgrave Macmillan US
Buch: Evolving Norms
Print ISBN: 978-1-137-50246-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-1-137-50247-6

Copyright-Jahr: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-50247-6_2