nach oben

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science

Erschienen in:

29.06.2017 | Original Empirical Research

Why do suppliers choose wholesale price contracts? End-of-season payments disincentivize retailer marketing effort

verfasst von: Anna G. Devlin, Wedad Elmaghraby, Rebecca W. Hamilton

Erschienen in: Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science | Ausgabe 2/2018

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

Although theoretical work has shown that end-of-season payment contracts, which allow suppliers and retailers to share the cost of unsold inventory, increase total profit, most suppliers and retailers today still use simple wholesale price contracts. In a series of experimental studies, we show that supplier preferences for wholesale price contracts can be explained by their concern that end-of-season payments contracts will disincentivize retailer marketing effort. Moreover, suppliers’ pessimistic predictions regarding reduced retailer effort are confirmed by retailers’ reduced investment in marketing effort in our experiments. Our results suggest that for suppliers and retailers to benefit from end-of-season payments contracts, retailers should publicize their demand-enhancing marketing practices.

Vorheriger Artikel The impact of a sales team’s perceived entitativity on customer satisfaction

Nächster Artikel Cause marketing and customer profitability

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Nur mit Berechtigung zugänglich

Aiken, D. K., & Boush, D. M. (2006). Trustmakers, objective-source ratings, and implied investments in advertising; investigating online trust and the context-specific nature of internet signals. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 34(3), 308–323.CrossRef

Arya, A., & Mittendorf, B. (2004). Using returns policies to elicit retailer information. RAND Journal of Economics, 35(3), 617–630.CrossRef

Associated Press (2005). Apparel suppliers, retailer at odds. Associated Press. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7592508/#.VbCBtvlViko. Accessed 24 April 2005.

Bagwell, K., & Riordan, M. H. (1991). High and declining prices signal product quality. American Economic Review, 81, 224–239.

Baker, G. (2002). Distortion and risk in incentive contracts. Journal of Human Resources, 37, 728–751.CrossRef

Bandyopadhyay, S., & Paul, A. A. (2010). Equilibrium returns policies in the presence of supplier competition. Marketing Science, 846–857.

Becker-Peth, M., Katok, E., & Thonemann, U. (2014). Designing buyback contracts for irrational but predictable newsvendors. Management Science, 59(8), 1800–1816.

Boulding, W., & Kirmani, A. (1993). A consumer-side experimental examination of signaling theory: Do consumers perceive warranties as signals of quality? Journal of Consumer Research, 20, 111–123.CrossRef

Bruner II, Gordon C. (2013). Marketing Scales Handbook: Multi-item Measures For Consumer Insight Research, Vol 7. GCBII Productions, LLC: Fort Worth.

Byron, E. (2005). Saks sued again for withholding markdown money. The Wall Street Journal, B4, 8.

Cachon, G. P. (2003). Supply chain coordination with contracts. In A.G. de Kok and S.C. Graves (Eds.), Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, Vol 11. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Cachon, G. P. (2006). You say channels, I say supply chains: Shall we get it on, or call the whole thing off? Working paper. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

Collier, J. E., & Sherrell, D. L. (2010). Examining the influence of control and convenience in a self-service setting. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38(4), 490–509.CrossRef

Croson, R. & Karen, D. (2002). Experimental economics and supply chain management. Interfaces, 32(5), 74–82.

Croson, R., Kenneth, S., Enno, S., & Lisa Yeo, M. (2013). Behavioral operations: The state of the field. Journal of Operations Management, 31(1–2), 1–5.

Davis, A., & Leider S. (2015). Contracts and capacity investment in supply chains. Working Paper, Cornell University.

Design Council of the UK (2008). Measuring return on investment in design (ROI). www.designcouncil.org.uk/our-work/Insight/Research/How-businesses-use-design/Design-in-Britain-2008/Measuring-ROI-in-design/

Emmons, H., & Gilbert, S. M. (1998). The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods. Management Science, 44(2), 276–283.CrossRef

Fagerlin, A., Zikmund-Fisher, B. J., Ubdel, P. A., Jankovic, A., Derry, H. A., & Smith, D. M. (2007). Measuring numeracy without math test: Development of the subjective numeracy scale. Medical Decision Making, 27(5), 672–680.CrossRef

Fehr, E. and Gatcher, S. (2000). Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 159–181.

Franco-Watkins, A., Edwards, B. D., & Acuff, R. E. (2013). Effort and fairness in bargaining games. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26, 79–90.CrossRef

Frazier, G. L. (1999). Managing channels of distribution. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 27(2), 226–240.

Gibbons, R. (1998). Incentives in organizations. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), 115–132.

Gilliland, D., & Kim, S. (2014). When do incentives work in channels of distribution? Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 42, 361–379.CrossRef

Granot, D., & Yin, S. (2005). On the effectiveness of returns policies in the price-dependent newsvendor model. Naval Research Logistics, 52(8), 765–779.CrossRef

Gregoire, Y., Laufer, D., & Tripp, T. M. (2010). A comprehensive model of customer direct and indirect revenge: Understanding the effects of perceived greed and customer power. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 38(6), 738–758.CrossRef

Gumus, M., Ray, S., & Yin, S. (2013). Channel returns policies between channel partners for durable products. Marketing Science, 32(4), 622–643.CrossRef

Gurnani, H., & Erkoc, M. (2008). Supply contracts in manufacturer-retailer interactions with manufacturer-quality and retailer effort-induced demand. Naval Research Logistics, 55(3), 200–217.CrossRef

Gurnani, H., Sharma, A., & Grewal, D. (2010). Optimal returns policies under demand uncertainty. Journal of Retailing, 86(2), 137–147.CrossRef

He, Y., Zhao, X., Zhao, L., & He, J. (2009). Coordinating a supply chain with effort and price dependent stochastic demand. Applied Mathematical Modeling, 33, 2777–2790.CrossRef

Ho, T.-H., & Zhang, J. (2008). Designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers: Does the framing of the fixed fee matter? Management Science, 54(4), 686–700.CrossRef

Holstrom, B. & Paul, M. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 24–52.

Iyer, G., & Miguel Villas-Boas, J. (2003). A bargaining theory of distribution channels. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(1), 80–92.CrossRef

Kandel, E. (1996). The right to return. Journal of Law and Economics, 39(1), 329–356.CrossRef

Kashyap, V., Antia, K. D., & Frazier, G. F. (2012). Contracts, extracontractual incentives, and ex post behavior in franchise channel relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 49(2), 260–276.CrossRef

Katok, E. (2011). Laboratory experiments in operations management. In J. Geunes (Ed.), TutORials in operations research (pp. 15–35). Hanover: INFORMS.

Katok, E., & Wu, D. (2009). Contracting in supply chains: A laboratory investigation. Management Science, 55(12), 1953–1968.CrossRef

Keser, C., & Paleologo, G. A. (2004). Experimental investigation of supplier-retailer contracts: The wholesale price contract, Working Paper, IBM T. Yorktown Heights: J. Watson Research Center.

Kirmani, A., & Wright, P. (1989). Money talks: Perceived advertising expense and expected product quality. Journal of Consumer Research, 16(3), 344–353.CrossRef

Kozlenkova, I. V., Samaha, S. A., & Palmatier, R. W. (2014). Resource-based theory in marketing. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 42, 1–21.CrossRef

Krishnan, H., Kapuscinski, R., & Butz, D. A. (2004). Coordinating contracts for decentralized supply chains with retailer promotional effort. Management Science, 50(1), 48–63.CrossRef

Kugler, T., Connolly, T., & Kausel, E. (2009). The effect of consequential thinking on trust game behavior. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22, 101–119.CrossRef

Levy, M., & Weitz, B. A. (2009). Retailing Management (7th ed.). Burr Ridge: Irwin/McGraw-Hill.

Lewis, R. A., & Reiley, D. Jr (2011). Does retail advertising work? Measuring the effects of advertising on sales via a controlled experiment on yahoo! Working paper, yahoo! Research.

Lim, N., & Ho, T.-H. (2007). Designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers: Does the number of blocks matter? Management Science, 26(3), 312–326.

Liu, Y., Su, C., Li, Y., & Liu, T. (2010). Managing opportunism in a developing interfirm relationship: The interrelationship of calculative and loyalty. Industrial Marketing Management, 39(5), 844–852.CrossRef

Lusch, R. F., & Brown, J. R. (1996). Interdependency, contracting, and relational behavior in marketing channels. Journal of Marketing, 60, 19–38.CrossRef

Mantrala, M. K., & Raman, K. (1999). Demand uncertainty and supplier’s returns policies for a multi-store style good retailer. European Journal of Operational Research, 115(2), 270–284.CrossRef

Martin, W. S., & Collins, B. H. (1991). Interactive video technology in sales training: A case study. The Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, 11(3), 61–66.

Marvel, H. P., & Peck, J. (1995). Demand uncertainty and returns policies. International Economic Review, 36(3), 691–714.CrossRef

Marvel, H. P., & Wang, H. (2007). Inventories, manufacturer returns policies, and equilibrium price dispersion. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(4), 1031–1051.CrossRef

Mooi, E. A., & Ghosh, M. (2010). Contract specificity and its performance implications. Journal of Marketing, 74, 105–120.CrossRef

Morales, A. C. (2005). Giving firms an “E” for effort: Consumer responses to high effort firms. Journal of Consumer Research, 31(4), 806–812.CrossRef

Mukhopadhyay, S. R., Xuemei, S., & Ghose, S. (2009). Motivating retail marketing effort: Optimal contract design. Production and Operations Management, 18(2), 197–211.CrossRef

Padmanabhan, V., & Png, I. P. L. (1997). Manufacturer’s returns policies and retail competition. Marketing Science, 16(1), 81–94.CrossRef

Padmanabhan, V., & Png, I. P. L. (2004). Reply to do returns policies intensify retail competition. Marketing Science, 23(4), 614–618.CrossRef

Pasternack, B. A. (1985). Optimal pricing and returns policies for perishable commodities. Marketing Science, 4(2), 166–176.CrossRef

Rokkan, A. I., Heide, J. B., & Wathne, K. H. (2003). Specific investments in marketing relationships: Expropriation and bonding effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(2), 210–224.CrossRef

Rozhon, T. (2005). First the markdown, then the showdown. The New York Times, February 25, 2005.

Sarvary, M., & Padmanabhan, V. (2001). The informational role of manufacturer returns policies: How they can help in learning the demand. Marketing Letters, 12(4), 341–350.CrossRef

Shen, B., Chow, P.-S., & Choi, T.-M. (2014). Supply chain contracts in fashion department stores: Coordination and risk analysis. Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 1–11.

Shen, B., Choi, T.-M., & Lo, C. K.-Y. (2015). Enhancing Economic sustainability by markdown money supply chain contracts in the fashion industry: China vs. USA. Sustainability, 8(31), 1–14.

Song, Y., Ray, S., & Li, S. (2006). Structural properties of buyback contracts for a price-setting newsvendor. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 10(1), 1–18.CrossRef

Stock, J. R., & Mulki, J. P. (2009). Product returns processing: An examination of returns practices of manufacturers, wholesalers/distributors, and retailers. Journal of Business Logistics, 30(1), 33–61.CrossRef

Su, C. T., & Shi, C. S. (2002). A Manufacturer’s optimal quantity discount strategy and return policy through a game-theoretic approach. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 53, 922–926.CrossRef

Taylor, T. (2002). Coordination under channel rebates with sales effort effect. Management Science, 48(8), 992–1007.CrossRef

Tsay, A. (2001). Managing Retail Channel overstock: Markdown money and return Policies. Journal of Retailing, 77, 457–492.CrossRef

Wang, H. (2004). Do returns policies intensify retail competition? Marketing Science, 23(4), 611–613.CrossRef

Wang, Q., Li, J., Ross Jr., W., & Craighead, C. (2013). The interplay of drivers and deterrents of opportunism in buyer-supplier relationships. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 41, 111–131.CrossRef

Wathne, K. H., & Heide, J. B. (2000). Opportunism in interfirm relationships: Forms, outcomes and solutions. Journal of Marketing, 64(4), 36–51.CrossRef

Watson, G., Worm, S., Palmatier, R. W., & Ganesan, S. (2015). The evolution of marketing channels: Trends and research directions. Journal of Retailing, 91(4), 546–568.CrossRef

Weber, E., Blais, A., & Betz, N. (2002). A domain specific risk attitude scale: Measuring risk perceptions and risk behaviors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 15(4), 263–290.CrossRef

Yue, X., & Raghunathan, S. (2007). The impacts of the full returns policy on a supply chain with information asymmetry. Euroean Journal of Operational Research, 180(2), 630–647.CrossRef

Zhang, Y., Donohue, K., & Cui, T. (2015). Contract preferences and performance for the loss averse supplier: Buyback versus revenue sharing. Management Science, 62(6).

Titel: Why do suppliers choose wholesale price contracts? End-of-season payments disincentivize retailer marketing effort
verfasst von: Anna G. Devlin
Wedad Elmaghraby
Rebecca W. Hamilton
Publikationsdatum: 29.06.2017
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science / Ausgabe 2/2018
Print ISSN: 0092-0703
Elektronische ISSN: 1552-7824
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11747-017-0550-9

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Weitere Artikel der Ausgabe 2/2018

Cause marketing and customer profitability

The impact of a sales team’s perceived entitativity on customer satisfaction

Pre-release consumer buzz

The future of the marketing department at business schools

Hey big spender! A golden (color) atmospheric effect on tipping behavior

Understanding the long-term implications of retailer returns in business-to-business relationships