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2021 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

5. WTO Rules on Freedom of Transit

verfasst von : Suhailah Akbari

Erschienen in: The WTO Transit Regime for Landlocked Countries and its Impacts on Members’ Regional Transit Agreements

Verlag: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

The following chapter examines the WTO rules on freedom of transit contained in Article V GATT and Article 11 TFA and discusses the legal status of landlocked members thereunder. It specifically seeks to answer whether, and if so, how the WTO rules on freedom of transit shape the transit relationship between coastal and landlocked members inside and outside of transit agreements. Section I of the chapter assesses provisions of Article V GATT on freedom of transit, Section II the provisions on freedom of transit of Article 11 TFA, Section III the SDT provisions in the TFA and other WTO agreements, Sect. 5.3 tests the relationship of Article V GATT with Article 11 TFA and other WTO relevant rules and Sect. 5.4 concludes the chapter.

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Vorheriges Kapitel Afghanistan’s Transit Regime

Nächstes Kapitel WTO Law and Public International Law: Focus on UNCLOS Rules on Freedom of Transit of Landlocked States

Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restriction on Ports of Entry, WT/DS366/R, para. 7456 (2009) [hereinafter Colombia – Ports of Entry]. The Colombia – Ports of Entry was the first case that provided a definition for some terms under Article V including transit. See also IRU, Principles Governing International Transit – Drawn up by the International Road Transport Union based on the Opinion of a Panel Appointed by the World Trade Organization, https://www.iru.org/apps/cms-filesystemaction?file=Webnews2009/Gatt-transit.pdf; for literature review see Ibarra (2010), p. 3.

IRU, Principles Governing International Transit (note 1), 3.

See Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (2008), 23.

The Revised Kyoto Convention, 2303 U.N.T.S 148/ [2008] ATS 2 / 37 ILM 22 (1999).

Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para 7. 422.

Ibid., para 7. 417.

See IRU, Principles Governing International Transit (note 1), 5.

See ibid.

See ibid., 4.

Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7. 400.

Ibid., para. 7. 387.

For more explanation see for example IRU, Principles Governing International Transit (note 1), 6.

Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R, paras. 7. 157, 7. 164–165 (April 5, 2019) [hereinafter Russia – Traffic in Transit].

Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7. 604.

IRU, Principles Governing International Transit (note 1), 5.

Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7. 592.

Ibid., para 7. 422.

Ibid., para. 7. 400; see also WTO Secretariat, Article V of The GATT 1994 – Scope and Application, Note by the Secretariat, G/C/W/408, 4.

Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, paras. 7. 430–31.

Ibid., para. 7. 402.

Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measures on Farmed Salmon from Norway, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.165 (Nov. 16, 2007) [hereinafter EC – Salmon (Norway)]; see also AB Report, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, para. 164 (2002) [hereinafter US – Line Pipe].

Panel Report, Russia –Traffic in Transit, para. 7. 168.

Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7. 401.

ECOSOC, Report of the Technical Sub-Committee (Ch. 2, note 54), 8.

AB Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 170–171(Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC – Asbestos].

See IRU, Principles Governing International Transit (note 1), 9.

Panel Report, Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R, para. 7 (Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Mexico – Telecommunications Services].

AB Report, United States – Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 84 (Aug. 23, 2001) [hereinafter US – Hot-Rolled Steel].

See IRU, Principles Governing International Transit (note 1), 9.

ECOSOC, Report of the Technical Sub-Committee (Ch. 2, note 54), 9–10, paras. (a), (b) (c) & (d). The Barcelona Statute on Freedom of Transit served as the primary source of consultations for Article V GATT preparatory work. Article V: 3–5 provisions (e.g., permissible charges such as transportation charges, reasonability of charges and MFN obligation) find their roots in Article 3 of the Barcelona Statute.

League of Nations, Treaty Series, VII Publication of Treaties and International Engagements Registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, 1921–1922, 27.

For more explanation see IRU, Principles Governing International Transit (note 1), 10–11.

See for example Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7. 455.

Ibid., para. 7. 447.

Ibid., paras. 7. 450 –51.

Ibid., paras. 7. 457–59.

Ibid., paras. 7. 466, 7. 475.

Ibid., paras. 7. 477.

Ibid., paras. 7. 470.

ECOSOC, Report of the Technical Sub- Committee (Ch. 2, note 54), 11.

See WTO Website, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra157_e.htm; see also EC Website, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1626.

See also WTO Secretariat, Speeding up Trade (Ch.2, note 58), 35.

WTO Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, List of Documents, Note by the Secretariat, TN/TF/W/133/Rev.2/Corr.1 (Oct. 23, 2008). The former Republic of Macedonia, Mongolia, Switzerland and Swaziland presented a proposal for a provision on regional transit agreements that, inter alia, govern choice of route. The proposal stated that “[m]embers shall promote bilateral and regional transit agreements or arrangements with a view to reducing trade barriers and enhance freedom of transit. Members shall take full account of international standards and instruments when designing and applying those agreements or arrangements. In particular Members that are contracting parties to regional transit agreements or arrangements shall strive to: (i) agree on common, simplified documents, or electronic messages, that shall be aligned with international standards; (ii) allow the same set of documents or electronic messages to accompany the consignment from the country of departure to destination; (iii) mutually recognize authorized trader schemes; (iv) define common measures relating to the monitoring of transit, inter alia the appointment of national transit corridors; performance indicators (e.g. target clearance times) or public private partnership to manage and monitor the arrangement; (v) include matters which are relevant beyond customs in the context of transit, such as road and transport issues.” See TN/TF/W/133/Rev.3, para. 20.

See for example IRU, Principles Governing International Transit (note 1), 6.

WTO Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, TN/TF/W/143/Rev.3.

Ibid.; for literature review see Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 182–284.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Glossary of Statistical Terms, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2882.

WTO Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Clarifying and Improving GATT Article V, TN/TF/W/176 (Nov. 7, 2011); for further explanation see Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 284; see also Pogoretskyy (2017), pp. 180–185.

WTO Agreement on Safeguards, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 (June 1, 1995), Art. 11.1(b).

See for example Pogoretskyy (2017), p. 183.

For literature review See for example Serra Ayral, TBT and TFA Agreements: Leveraging Linkage to Reduce Trade Costs, WTO, Working Paper ERSD-2016-02 (June 2016), 12–13.

WTO, European Union and a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS 408/ 1, Request for Consultations by India, WT/DS 409/1 Request for Consultations by Brazil. (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter EU – Generic Drugs in Transit].

WTO, EU – Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS 408/ 1.

Footnote 13 to Article 52 TRIPS Agreement provides that “there shall be no obligation to apply such procedures with regard to goods in transit”.

See Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 146; see also GATT, Protocol Amending the GATT to Introduce part IV on Trade and Development, INT (65)105 (Jan. 1, 1965); WTO, Doha Work Programme: Decisions Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug.1, 2004).

See for example Cherise Valles, Article V GATT, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum, et al., (eds.), WTO – Trade in Goods, vol. 5 (Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, 2011), 193; Ruse-Khan and Jaeger (2009), p. 507.

WTO, EU—Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS 408/ 1; The Economic Times, EU Agrees to Stop Confiscation of India Generic Drugs, The Economic Times (Jul. 29, 2011), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-07-29/news/29829346_1_customs-regulations-indian-generic-drugs-international-intellectualpropertyagreement; for literature review see Baker (2012), http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=research.

For example Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS169/R, paras. 657–60 (July 31, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – Frozen Beef]; AB Report, Korea – Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, paras. 161–162 (December 2000); AB Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 119.

Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 149.

Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para 7. 422.

WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Art. XI:2; Decision on Measures in Favor of Least-developed Countries, WT/COMTD/W/196, preamble (Dec. 11, 1993); for literature review see Melgar (Ch.1, note 1), 23 & 40.

WTO Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, List of Documents (note 43); TN/TF/W/43/Rev.19 (June 30, 2009); TN/TF/W/165 (Dec.14, 2009).

See for example GATT, Protocol Amending the GATT to Introduce part IV (note 55); WTO, Doha Work Programme (note 55); for a summary of GATT 1947 and WTO works on rules related to trade and development see WTO, Special and Differential Treatment for Least-developed Countries, Note by the Secretariat, WT/COMTD/W/135, paras. 3–8 (Oct.5, 2004); see also GATT Analytical Index, Part IV, 1039–51; Doha Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN 01/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001); for literature review see Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 23–55 and 80–104; Hoekman and Kostechi (1997), pp. 230–237; Michael Finger & John Wilson, Implementing a WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation: What Makes Sense? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, WP/S3971 (August 2006), 7.

See GATT Analytical Index, Part IV, 1040–1047.

See Kostechi (note 63) 236; Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 32–33.

GATT, Differential and More Favorable Treatment – Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of 28 November 1979, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979) [hereinafter The Enabling Clause].

Ibid.; WTO Secretariat, Special and Differential Treatment for Least-developed Countries (note 61); see also Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 35–48.

See generally The Enabling Clause (note 66).

See for example EU GSP, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-schemeofpreferences/; for a summary of GSP programs of these countries see Sekkel (2009).

See for example Cook (2015), pp. 326–329; Hamanaka (2014), p. 344.

Hoekman and Kostechi (2001), pp. 390–394.

See WTO Secretariat, Special and Differential Treatment for Least-developed Countries (note 63), para. 1; see generally WTO, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions: Mandatory and Non-Mandatory Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, WT/COMTD/W/77/REV.1/Add.1 (Dec. 21, 2001); see also Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 42; for more examples on each of these provisions see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/s_and_d_eg_e.htm.

WTO, Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions (note 72).

Article 2.18 of the Agreement on Textile and Clothing provides that “a member imposing restrictions on imports shall provide meaningful improvement on market access of imports from developing countries and that the import restrictions on imports from developing country members shall account only for 1.3% or less of the total restrictions imposed by the importing country on imports.” WTO Agreement on Textile and Clothing, 1868 U.N.T.S. 14 (June 1, 1995), Art. 2.18.

Article 10 (1) SPS Agreement provides that WTO members “shall” take into account the special needs of developing countries, particularly the LDCs, as they adopt and apply SPS measures.

Articles 11 and 12 TBT Agreement provide that WTO members “shall” provide SDT treatment to developing countries while applying TBT measures and “shall” provide technical assistance to these countries to enable them carry out their TBT obligations and commitments.

See for example Arts. 1, 13, 21 TFA; for literature review see for example Eliason (2015), p. 645.

AB Report, US – Line Pipe, paras. 133, 263.

For a comprehensive analysis of the Enabling Clause, see AB Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preference to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, paras. 106–141(April 7, 2004) [hereinafter EC – Tariff Preferences].

WTO, EC – Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/1, G/L/521, Consultation by India (Mar. 12, 2002).

Ibid.

AB Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, paras. 80, 81, 90.

Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, paras. 7. 161.

Ibid., paras. 7. 64–65.

Ibid., para. 7. 65.

AB Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 173.

Ibid., paras. 188–189.

WTO, Who Are Developing Countries in the WTO? https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm.

AB Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 175.

Article 24:2 TFA provides that “all provisions of this Agreement are binding on all Members”.

Ibid., Art. 13.

Ibid., Arts. 14–19.

WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN/05/DEC, Annex E, para. 5 (Dec. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Hong Kong Declaration].

For literature review see Nora Neofeld, Implementing the Trade Facilitation Agreement: From Vision to Reality, Working Paper ERSD-2016-14 (WTO, September 2016).

A grace period for a developing country is 2 years and 8 years for an LDC.

Sec II, paras. 5, 7 TFA.

Bindschedler and Bernhardt (1984), p. 468; see also Wilfred (1953), p. 427.

Bindschedler and Bernhardt (1984), p. 468.

Wilfred (1953), p. 426; Marceau (2001), p. 1084.

100

See for example Pauwelyn (2003), pp. 168–69; Vranes (2006), p. 395.

101

Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT.DS27/R, para. 7. 159 (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC – Bananas III]; International Law Commission provides a broad definition of normative conflict as “a situation where two rules or principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem.” International Law Commission (ILC), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006), para. 25.

102

Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226, art 3.2 (1994). Accordingly, Article 19.2 DSU provides that “… the panel and Appellate body cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.”

103

In India – Patents, the AB reiterated the importance of broad context of normative conflict by stating that “the legitimate expectations of the parties to a treaty are related it the language of the treaty itself.” See AB Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS 50/AB/R, para. 45 (Dec. 17, 1997) [hereinafter India – Patents]; see also Pauwelyn (2003), p. 175.

104

Marceau (2001), p. 1090.

105

For relationship between WTO agreements see for example Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para. 227 (Oct. 17, 1996); AB Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Diary Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 74 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Korea – Desiccated Coconut]; for literature review See for example Chase (2012), pp. 793, 796, 809.

106

See for example Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, 3 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, Admissibility, App. No 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R, para. 57 (Dec. 12, 2001); Borgen (2005), pp. 576–579.

107

ILC Report, 58th Sess., GAOR, 61st. Sess. Suppl. 10 (A/61/10, at 408 (August 2006); see also Bernhardt (note 97), 469. This definition provided by ILC is reflected in WTO panel reports. See for example Panel Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, WT/S371/R, para. 7.1047 (Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Thailand – Cigarettes].

108

See for example Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS163/R, para. 7. 96 (May 1, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – Procurement]; for literature review see Wilfred (1953), p. 425; see also Bindschedler and Bernhardt (1984), p. 469.

109

For literature review see for example Cook (2015), pp. 86–92; Chase (2012), pp. 791–99.

110

Art. XVI:3 WTO Agreement.

111

WTO Agreement, general interpretative note to Annex 1A, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/05anx1a_e.htm. The covered agreements under Annex 1A, which all concern trade in goods including GATT are: (1) Agreement on Agriculture Agreement, (2) the SPS Agreement, (3) Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, (4) the TBT Agreement, (5) the TRIMS Agreement, (6) Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT, (7) Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, (8) Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection, (9) Agreement on Rules of Origin, (10) Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, (11) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, (12) Agreement on Safeguards, and (13) the TFA.

112

Annex 1B covers General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

113

Annex 1C covers the TRIPS Agreement.

114

For example, in Korea – Diary, the AB confirmed the panel’s statement that “it is now well established that WTO Agreement is a Single Undertaking” and therefore all WTO obligations are generally cumulative and members must comply with all of them simultaneously”. AB Report, Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Diary Products, WT/DS98/AB/R, para. 74 (Dec. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Korea – Dairy]; see also Chase (2012), p. 796, footnote 7.

115

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Article 31 VCLT on general rules of interpretation provides, inter alia, that: 1) “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Similarly, Article 32 VCLT on supplementary means of treaty interpretation provides that in interpreting a treaty, recourse to supplementary instruments of the treaty in question including its negotiating documents maybe given; for literature review see Cook (2015), pp. 86–92; Chase (2012), pp. 792–93.

116

For a series of these disputes, Cook (2015), pp. 86–92.

117

AB Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 204.

118

For example, in US – Shrimp, by referring to the AB’s approach in EC – bananas III, the panel held that between Articles III:4 and VI GATT, Article VI including its Ad Note dealt with the measure at issue directly and specifically and therefore constituted a lex specialis that would prevail over Article III:4. Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R, para. 7. 159–162 (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter US – Shrimp]; see also Panel Report, United States – Anti-dumping Act of 1916, para. 6. 269 (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter US – 1916 Act].

119

WTO adjudicators have stressed on the importance of effective treaty interpretation. For example, in China – Rare Earths, the AB held that any possible conflict between different WTO provisions should be resolved on a case-by-case basis by giving recourse to terms and conditions of each different provisions. AB Report, China – Measures related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/AB/R, para. 5. 56 (Aug. 4, 2014) [hereinafter China – Rare Earths]; see also Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, para. 14. 28 (July 2, 1998) [hereinafter Indonesia – Autos].

120

Panel Report, European Union – Anti-dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China, WT/DS/405/R, para. 7. 598 & footnote 1210 (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter EU – Footwear]. Similarly, in Indonesia – Autos, the panel dealt with a similar situation and found out, through effective methods of treaty interpretation, that there was no conflict between provisions of the GATT and the SCM Agreement in question. Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14. 28.

121

For literature review see for example Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 146.

122

Ibid.; see also Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 7.160.

123

Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 7. 160.

124

Panel Report, European Communities – Protection of Trademark and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R, paras. 7. 208, 7. 227 & footnote 239 (Mar. 15, 2005) [hereinafter EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications].

125

Ibid.; see also AB Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Import of Footwear, W/DS121/AB/R, para. 81 (Dec. 14, 1999) [Argentina – Footwear (EC)]; Korea – Dairy, para. 74; Panel Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 7. 160.

126

See for example Chase (2012), pp. 817–819.

127

Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R, para. 7. 19 (Sept.5, 1997) [hereinafter India – Patent]; see also See for example Chase (2012), p. 818.

128

Panel Report, India – Patents, para. 7. 22.

129

Art. 31 VCLT.

130

Art. 32 VCLT.

131

Panel Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, para. 255; for more discussion see Cook (2015), supra note 566, at

294–299.

132

See for example Melgar (Ch.1, note 2), 286, 297; Merkouris et al. (2010), pp. 136–140.

133

According to the OECD, cost of trading for landlocked LDCs is two times higher than that for their coastal neighboring countries. See OECD (2015), pp. 133 & 140.

134

See WTO, Fifth Meeting of Trade Ministers of Landlocked Developing Countries (2016).9.

Baker BK (2012) Settlement of India/EU WTO dispute and seizures of in transit medicines: why the proposed EU border regulation isn’t good enough, PIJIP Research Paper, 4. American University of Washington, Washington, http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=research

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Titel: WTO Rules on Freedom of Transit
verfasst von: Suhailah Akbari
Verlag: Springer International Publishing
Buch: The WTO Transit Regime for Landlocked Countries and its Impacts on Members’ Regional Transit Agreements
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-73463-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-73464-0

Copyright-Jahr: 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73464-0_5