Yearbook on Space Policy 2006/2007

The year 2006 and the first half of 2007 was a period of transition. There were visible changes to the economic balance of power with the confirmation of the rise of China and India, and the recovery of Russia, while growth was limited among the major economies. Transnational security threats such as climate change, and particularly global warming, as well as energy security issues and terrorist attacks topped the agenda of leading countries worldwide during this period, and all of these factors undeniably influenced the space context.

A series of major policy and programmatic milestones as well as reinforcing trends were the highlights of the year 2006 and the first half of 2007. These included the increasing internationalization of access to space and space applications as well as the new race to the moon.

In February 2007, Christian Cabal, member of the Assemblée Nationale, and Senator Henri Revol submitted as rapporteurs of the French parliament’s science and technology (S&T) oversight panel, a report to their respective chambers entitled “Space Policy: Daring or Decline”, subtitled “How to make Europe world leader in the space domain”.²⁵² The report provides an analysis and policy recommendations over the next ten years, geared towards the position France and Europe should hope to achieve by the 2020s. In accordance with constitutional practice, the report is referred to under the short name, “Cabal Report”, based on the name of Assembly rapporteur.

How important is space to the United Kingdom? Are existing institutional arrangements for space in the UK Government adequate? Does the UK derive the right benefits from the European Agency (ESA) and the European Union (EU) activities? What roles must public space expenditure play? What is the proper balance between science and applications? How can the innovation and growth potential of the space sector be best realised? While it remains uncertain if a “new UK approach” to space policy exists or is about to materialise within the government, there has certainly been a remarkable, forward-looking debate on these questions in the UK in recent months. This ongoing process of re-evaluation of space policy in the UK should be of interest not only with a view to evolving UK policies, but also for the European space effort as a whole.

The general impression today is that the two European space flagships initiatives, Galileo and the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) programmes, are progressing quite slowly, if not even stalled for the first one, since they were started nearly ten years ago; they are still far from entering an operational mode for delivering the projected services. Indeed, the idea of having a European positioning, navigation and timing system based on a constellation of satellites comparable to GPS (Global Positioning System) was floated in the nineties and pushed by the transport commissioner Neil Kinnock (1995–1999) in 1998 mainly for security and sovereignty needs in Europe. The GMES concept was aired through the Baveno declaration in May 1998, calling for Europe to have its own system for monitoring environment and security worldwide on a 24/7/365 basis. Both initiatives would give Europe the appropriate strategic tools to participate fully in the information revolution that would ensure Europe’s grip on geopolitical issues; economic competitiveness and sustainable development.

The new European Space Policy is the latest step in a long-running process through which advocates have sought to link the potential contributions of the space sector to the broader political, social, economic, and security objectives of the “European project.” As such, it is at a minimum an important symbolic act. In giving their approval to the policy, the members of the European Space Council asserted in their resolution that “the space sector is a strategic asset contributing to the independence, security and prosperity of Europe and its role in the world”.291 Such a statement lays the foundation for an enlarged and more assertive European presence in space.

Later this year, the Czech Republic and Poland will decide whether to host components of the United States missile defence system on their territory. Talks with Washington have been underway since January 2007. The United States would like to station radar on a former military base in the Czech Republic, while Poland would host ten interceptor missiles. The purpose would be to defend the United States mainland and Europe against missiles launched from Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. The Czech and Polish sites would enlarge the architecture of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) protecting the United States. This system currently consists of a network of sensors and missiles stretching from Japan to Alaska.

Despite the relatively short history of the use of space — the 50^th anniversary was celebrated in 2007 — this first decade of the twenty-first century may mark a new departure in the occupation of space by mankind, or more precisely by the military. For some years now, projects for developing space weapons to control space have nourished international controversies. A Chinese anti-satellite test performed in January 2007, has only served to reinforce the general feeling that there is “weaponisation” of space. This feeling has quietly become widespread as a common consideration in the space community, as for the first time since the beginnings of space programmes, such perspectives might benefit from a more favourable political context. As an example, the new U.S. White House Space Policy unveiled in October 2006, while not breaking with earlier security-oriented policies, openly legitimates radical options should these become necessary for the security of the United States and its space assets. It is the open character and the general tone of the declaration, rather than its content that does not differ much from earlier documents. Up to now, such issues had been kept low profile on the political agenda and had never been promoted to the point of feeding possible domestic and international political arguments. This article intends to propose, as seen from the European perspective, an analysis of the reasons behind this development, to better judge the realities behind the political stance, and to provide some perspectives of possible consequences.

On 11 January 2007, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted its first successful anti-satellite (ASAT)military test, becoming the third country proving that it can destroy satellites in low-earth orbit (LEO). This event raised international concerns about the worsening of the space environment and the potential of inspiring other countries to work on future hostile space activities. The artificial collision is considered to be “one of the worst manmade debris-creating events in history”336 threatening civilian and military satellites in the future and, possibly, accelerating the weaponisation of space. Over the long run, this could lead to a costly and dangerous arms race in outer space which might draw in other space-faring nations. China has long been an advocate of arms control in space and has criticised theUnited States, above all, for working on “weaponising space”. Within the Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) talks at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) together with Russia, in 2001/2002 it proposed a draft treaty for banning weapons in space, though the January 2007 test event came as a surprise for many. Several questions have emerged from this situation: How developed is China’s ASAT capability? What does this event say about China’s technical and political intentions and motivations? How will other states and the international community react in the current situation? The paper examines the ASAT-tests, the Chinese explanations, the international reactions, and the influence on the debate on space security.

On 20 June 2007, a bill was submitted to the Japanese’s LowerHouse of Diet. The name of the bill is “Basic Law for Space Activities”, which is a call to establish a new space policy and decision-making structure. The intention of the bill is to achieve a changeover from the old “catching-up” strategy, which focused heavily on technological development, to a more user-oriented space policy. The outcome of the Upper House elections in July 2007 and the subsequent resignation of the Prime Minister Abe makes it difficult to predict when this bill will pass the Diet, but apart from some minor opposition from the left-wing parties, there is a general consensus among wide spectrum of political activists that Japan needs a new space policy.This article discusses the reasons for creating a new legal framework for Japanese space policy, and how it would change the space activities of Japan.

The results of modern science of climate change are persuasive, in that they include a large body of observational evidence characterizing changes that have already occurred. This science has developed to the point where we can connect the observed changes with the causes that are responsible for them. The resulting picture demonstrates that human activities dominate in causing the recently observed climate change.

Space entrepreneurship is a frequent topic of discussion today within the European and United States space communities. To someobservers, space and entrepreneurial activities may not seem complementary at first glance, particularly when considered in the context of a sector which seems to prefer costly large-scale projects under government leadership or major multinational companies building highly complex space systems. Traditional space industry typically views the entrepreneurial space sector with a combination of hope and interest in new approaches to technology development and risk management, as well as with misunderstanding, suspicion and unmet expectations. While some space startup firms have experienced market and financial success, outside of the satellite industry, most to date have not brought major changes to the space industry and the broader economy as expected.