Coping with Global Environmental Change, Disasters and Security

This third volume of the

Global Environmental and Human Security Handbook for the Anthropocene

(GEHSHA) focuses on issues of

Coping with Global Environmental Change

that are contributing to a

reconceptualization of security

in the 21

st

century that has evolved since the end of the Cold War and has significantly been influenced by the globalization process.

The reconceptualization of security has been triggered by the end of the Cold War, by the process of globalization, and by the gradual transition from the Holocene to the Anthropocene phase of earth history (Brauch 2008, 2009, chap. 1 by Brauch/Oswald Spring above). From a philosophical perspective, in the contemporary security discussion the “dual moment of prevention and compensation of genuinely social and technical uncertainties” (Makropoulos 1995: 745–750) becomes decisive.

Disaster risk management is a development strategy that is notably attracting the increasing concern of policymakers and the general public due to the current emphasis on various components of human and environmental security. From the scientific perspective, comprehension of disaster risk is often manifested by compartmentalization of knowledge; in contrast, from the political and social point of view, this situation leads to a fragmented concept of management. The result is decreased effectiveness in terms of disaster risk reduction and, thus, an integrative framework seems essenti.

Over the last two decades ‘vulnerability’ has become a topical issue in multidisciplinary studies concerning a broad variety of overlapping domains – agriculture, climate, development and poverty studies, disaster and risk management, economic geography, engineering, finance, information technology, military theory and policy, public health, security studies and sociological studies of disasters. Vulnerability is also applied both in a traditional, narrow approach and in a broadened interpretation of security.

The debt problem of poor countries has attracted considerable public attention in the 1990’s through the Jubillee 2000 campaign for debt cancellation. The United Nations’ Millennium Declaration and the associated

Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs) have played an important role in the recognition of debt as a global issue by focusing the world’s attention on the plight of the poorest, and making debt relief one of the development goals. In Monterrey in March 2002 the international community agreed that external debt relief could play an important role in financing development and accelerating progress toward the MDGs.

On 12 December 2003, the heads of state and government of European Union (EU) member states attending the European Council meeting at Brussels adopted the EU’s first ever European Security Strategy (ESS) – a 14-page paper with the title “A Secure Europe in a Better World”.1 The document had taken just seven months to produce since May 2003, when EU foreign ministers meeting at Kastellorizo on Rhodes asked the Union’s High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, to produce a first draft. The version emerging from his staff was welcomed by the Thessaloniki European Council on 20 June, and was subjected to debate both at public seminars and among member states (through the Political and Security Committee2 at Brussels) before a somewhat adapted version got the final seal of approval in December.

Whenever attention has been paid to alliances during the last two decades reference is exclusively or nearly exclusively made to the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). Consequently, except for historical works, NATO serves as the ideal type of alliance (Walt 1990). This presents a variety of problems. First of all, NATO “was always intended to be both more and less than a military alliance”(Howard 1999: 164). More in the sense that NATO has always been the most important avenue of transatlantic security dialogue and less in the sense that NATO is not a fighting alliance. During its entire duration it never had to use force for the defence of the member states’territory.

According to the

European Security Strategy

(ESS 2003) European security cannot be tackled without considering the security of neighbouring countries (chap. 6 by Bailes). Threats to the security in countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean can rapidly become security threats for the

European Union

(EU) as a whole, and can particularly affect countries of Southern Europe. In this context, the Euro-Mediterranean area has been described as a single security complex (Biscop 2003: 191) or as a system of security complexes (Bremberg Heijl 2007: 2). Similar considerations were also made from a sub-regional perspective for the Western Mediterranean (Haddadi 1999). Moving beyond this debate, this chapter attempts to highlight the threats affecting the Euro-Mediterranean area, or some countries that comprise it. It examines to what extent the European Union has succeeded in providing sufficient cooperation mechanisms for improving security conditions in the region.

Turkey has undergone major transformations and a number of ups and downs during the past two decades. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey was an outdated flank country, whose ‘strategic value’ to its Western allies was at best diminished. Yet, its location suddenly opened up new windows of opportunity to exploit in the newly emerging world (dis)order, although these, more often than not, also entailed risks and challenges. Turkey’s economic, social, and political transformations during the late 1980’s from a mixed economy to a more liberal approach, from a military tutelage to a multi party representation once again, and from an intensely secluded country to one that is ever increasingly interconnected with the world at large, had prompted it to try and play an influential role in its neighbourhood (Aydin 2003a).

This chapter looks at the influence of domestic political processes and public opinion in the framing of EU foreign policy. In doing so, policies which have been aimed at achieving regional security by means of promoting internal reforms are evaluated. The chapter emphasizes a mismatch between security concerns amongst policy-makers2 and public opinion.3 An increased concern on foreign policy-related issues (from domestic constituencies) it seems follows a similar pattern to the erosion of the ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg/Scheingold 1971) in the past decade.4 There is strong opposition in many

member states

(MS) towards the effects of policies which comprise the extension of the ‘four freedoms’ (of capital, labour, goods, and services). The latter are the main incentives offered by both enlargement and New Neighbourhood strategies. This is relevant inasmuch as it suffices for public opinion to constrain a few MS for

European foreign policy

(EFP) as a whole to be affected. Since most areas in EFP are intergovernmental, a single member can in principle block or alter a common position.5 Thus, the influence of domestic pressures should not be overlooked.

‘Security’ is a contested concept covering an expanding area through conceptual widening (up to climate change, unemployment, poverty, etc.), conceptual deepening (from state-centred to common international and human security), and conceptual expansion to various sectors of social and economic life (energy, water, health, food, etc.). The so-called Copenhagen School opened up the concept of security by introducing ideas such as ‘societal security’ and ‘securitization’ as a particular type of ‘speech act’ (Austin 1975), suggesting that the logic of security may be introduced and accepted in many issue areas beyond military matters (Buzan 1991; Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998; Williams 2003).

Since the end of WWII and since the adoption of the US National Security Act of 1947 (Czempiel 1966; Brauch 1976; Yergin 1977) issues of defence were framed, formulated and legitimated as issues of US national security. Thus, issues of international and regional (hemispheric, European, Asian and Middle East) security were perceived through the perspective of United States national security reflecting US national military, political and economic interests. In most official documents the specific meaning of ‘national security’ remains undefined or was defined to serve the specific purposes of the respective organization.

To understand the nature and orientation of Russia’s foreign policy it is very important to examine how this state identifies challenges to its security. This is also helpful for explaining how the national security discourse and ideas developed by various foreign policy schools are translated into concrete political initiatives and implemented by practitioners.

Russia’s security policy and perception of the 21st century cannot be understood without taking a glance at the preceding fifteen years or so (Sergunin 2008; see chap. 12; Bailes/Baranovsky/Dunay 2007). Although there are certain elements of continuity between the 15 years since the mid-1980’s to the end of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century, there are also major elements of discontinuity. Therefore historical references may be of limited relevance for the recent past and the near future.

With progressing globalization after the end of the Cold War, the

national security concept

(NSC) has experienced new situations and has faced new challenges. Globalization, as an important variable affecting national behaviour around the world, has deeply influenced the people’s understanding of national security to adopt a new perspective in addressing NSC issues, thus initiating relative changes in the NSC. On this background the Chinese government adopted a new security concept based on mutual trust and benefit, on equality and cooperation. Based on this guidance, the Chinese government launched diplomatic moves for a new security environment in the 21st century.

During the last half century, Western literature on International Relations (Haas 1964; Lindberg 1963; Haas/Schmitter 1964; Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998; Keohane/Nye 2001) has developed a number of dichotomies, the most important of which have been the high politics vs. low politics, geopolitics vs. geoeconomics, old security threats vs. new security threats, and the hard security vs. soft security dichotomies. These dichotomies are based on the assumption that it is possible to dissect the elements of the dichotomy, at least temporarily, and to focus on its second element, which will eventually influence the first in a positive way. For example, one of the most significant conventional arguments of the functional theory of integration has been that cooperation in the area of low politics may spill over to high politics. In the age of globalization, some theorists have argued that geo-economics has surpassed geo-politics, and that emphasis on the geo-economic issues will facilitate dealing with geo-political ones.

The objective of this chapter is to review, compare, and assess Arab perceptions of ‘soft security’ issues and threats. In achieving this objective, there are two main themes. The first is that the concept of ‘soft security’ is hardly acknowledged in the Arab discourse on security. Although Arab politicians and analysts refer to the issues subsumed under the ‘soft security’ label, the concept itself is hardly employed in Arab public discourse on security. This is because the concepts of ‘softness’ and ‘security’ do not match in Arab thinking as the Arab region is plagued by mostly military and territorial (hard) security issues (chap. 16 by Gamal Selim). The second is that the Arabs have borrowed the concept from the Western literature, and in that literature the concept was vaguely defined, which was reflected in the Arab endorsement of the concept.

Much of the violent and protracted conflicts characteristic of sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War years occurred in West Africa,1 particularly in countries of the

Mano River Union

(MRU).2 Apart from the fourteen years of intermittent conflict in Liberia, the West African sub-region also witnessed civil war in Sierra Leone; instabilities in Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger and protracted rebellions in the Southern Cassamance Province of Senegal; resource-related conflicts in Nigeria, ethnic conflicts among the Nanumba and Konkomba in northern Ghana; and political instability in Togo.

Since the late 1980’s, repeated cases of breakdown of states’ institutions and the concomitant internal wars in West Africa have called the attention of observers to the abysmal level of insecurity in this sub-region. Images of wanton killings, of mutilations and displacement of thousands of people alerted the world to the orgy of violence in the wake of states’ incapacity to protect its institutions. Endemic insecurity in West Africa is not restricted to state institutions but pervades almost all aspects of citizens’ lives. Political instability with a high degree of violence has accompanied these states since the post-colonial period. A calculation showed in 1991 that 485 post-colonial African rulers were threatened with a 60 per cent chance of being killed, imprisoned or exiled as a consequence of holding office (Wiseman 1993: 657–660). Restricted to the West African region, this percentage may dramatically increase.1 Prior to the series of state collapse and the attendant internal wars, most West African states have experienced military coups, civil wars or violent secession attempts involving thousands of civilian casualties. In most West African states, internal political struggles are sometimes akin to wars. Thus, internal sources of insecurity by far exceed external sources. In general, peoples and states in West Africa are confronted with a constant state of fear.

On 18–20 November 2007 the International Solidarity Conference on Climate Change Strategies for the African and Mediterranean Regions was held in Tunis (Tunisia).

Water is vital to sustain lives. Thus, its availability in the appropriate quantity and quality is crucial for a healthy society. The water resources available for use are only three per cent of the total available water. Due to the uneven distribution of usable water, some nations are deprived of the minimum amount, while other nations suffer in handling too much water.

Historic Palestine consists of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Palestine or the

Occupied Palestinian Territory

(OPT) as presented in this paper consists of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The OPT equals 23 per cent of the land of historic Palestine. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip are those parts of historic Palestine which were occupied by the Israeli army during the 1967 war between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The land area of the West Bank is estimated at 5,572 km

2

extending for about 155 km in length and about 60 km in width. The Gaza Strip, with an area of 367 km

2

extending for approximately 41 kilometres in length and approximately 7 to 9 kilometres in width (figure 22.1; Abdel Salam 1990; Haddad 1998).

This chapter discusses climate change impacts for the Eastern Mediterranean, with a particular emphasis on the

Occupied Palestinian Territories

(OPT) that comprise the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. According to the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC 2007a: 13), the average global temperature is projected to rise until 2100 by a range of 1.1–6.4

°

C, and the sea level has been projected to rise between 18 and 58 cm.

2

Data on the projected climate change at the regional scale are lacking (IPCC 1990, 1996a, 1998, 2001a, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d).

For the last three decades, the author has been investigating the impact of climate changes on the hydrological cycle, past, present and future, worldwide, in the Middle East and in particular on the water resources of the Israeli and Palestinian territories.2 These investigations have been based on analyses of the impact of climate change on the hydrological cycle and human settlements, from the time human beings arrived in the Middle East from Africa, to the present. The general conclusion was that warm periods in the past caused droughts and famine. As the present warming process is gaining momentum beyond past records, the impact may surpass that of the past, namely, its negative effects may mean a severe reduction in the water resources of these countries.

This chapter addresses one of several major obstacles to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process the dispute over Jerusalem - a complex controversial issue, which seems insoluble and the search for any hidden opportunities it may contain has proved elusive. The model proposed reflects the potential for shifting the political discourse in the holy land from the persistent conflict to address the common threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks both Palestinians and Israelis face and experience to various degrees. It explores the hidden opportunities for Jerusalem as a sustainable city on which all sides are proud and which all parties can co-exist and co-develop based on equality of opportunities and mutual respect and not on control and power.

There is no generally accepted definition of the Mediterranean nor are there any common criteria of the Mediterranean Sea, its space, region, climate or way of life. It is a ‘sea’ whose shores combine the three continents: Europe, Africa and Asia. There is a consensus that it is a ‘region’ that once has been a centre of the world that was the cradle of several high civilizations and of three monotheistic religions of Jews, Christians and Muslims.

The aim of this chapter is an assessment of the impact of

global environmental change

(GEC) on stability and security in Central Asia. Security thereby is not only understood as the non-appearance of interstate conflicts but also as the ability of states to manage economic and social crises and thereby to prevent violent conflicts and to guarantee human security as defined by the UNDP (WBGU 2007: 19–24) Therefore, in its conceptualization of the link between environment and security, this analysis follows the definition of security and conflicts of the WBGU.1 The evolving research question is if and how global environmental change might increase security risks in the region – risks of violent conflicts between states, but also risks for the survival of the population leading to destabilization. Before this question is assessed, a review of the current situation regarding conflicts is appropriate.

During the last decades China has faced serious environmental degradations due to extensive economic development. In particular China’s large emissions of greenhouse gases have raised international concerns about the environmental situation in China. The country faces a large amount of international criticisms due to its poor environmental performance and is perceived as one of the most polluted countries in the world. The 2008 Environmental Performance Index Report of Yale University, which evaluates indicators like people’s health, air and water pollution, ranks China as 104 of 149 countries. According to the World Bank, the majority of the world’s most polluted cities are located in China (Klein 2004: 21).

This chapter offers a conceptual overview to help unpack human vulnerability to natural disaster and climate change in the city. Vulnerability and its components are interpreted as applications of wider debates on social justice that emphasize the human dimension of security – the meeting of basic needs and human rights (Anand/Gasper 2007). But vulnerability is more than this; at its core is the interaction of social and environmental systems so that human security has to be seen within a socio-ecological lens. This positioning is felt most clearly on the ground where projects aimed at reducing vulnerability overlap comprehensively with those for sustainable development (UNDP 2004).

Before the 1980’s the study of risks and disasters was mainly focused on the features of hazards and on post-disaster reactions. Natural disasters were seen as the only result of natural forces: geophysical, hydrometeorological or biological hazards. Pre-disaster intervention was reduced to engineering techniques (construction of dikes, contention walls, etc.); risk management was reduced to disaster management: emergency warnings, search and rescue operations with command and control schemes. This has dramatically changed since more than 25 years, partly triggered by a shift in the dominant paradigm. This chapter will briefly examine how this happened.

The effects of natural hazard events of small or moderate size are not considered by many people as ‘disasters’, although they share the same origins and causes of large and extensive effects. The impact of these events cannot be underestimated, because in general terms, they typify the disaster risk problem of a city, region or country. This chapter does not debate risk regarding to extreme events with a long return period, but insular, real and daily risk that multiple communities are exposed to in rural areas and in small and large cities. The most of these disasters are the result of socio-ecological processes associated with environmental deterioration and are associated with persistent small hazard events such as landslides, avalanches, flooding, storms, and also lower scale earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.

According to the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC), the warming of global climate is now unequivocal. Over the last 100 years (1906– 2005), global temperature has increased by 0.74˚C. Global sea level has risen by 17 cm during the 20th century (Rosenzweig/Casassa 2007: 92). Estimates for projected global temperature increases from the 1980’s to the end of the 21st century range from 1.8˚C (1.1–2.9˚C) to 4˚C (2.4–6.4˚C) (assuming no additional mitigation measures apart from those already in place in 2000). Global average sea level is expected to rise by 18 to 59 cm by the end of the 21st century (Rosenzweig/Casassa 2007: 92).

Loss redistribution

2

is an embedded coping

3

mechanism that plays a significant role in sustaining low income populations during times of crisis. Mumbai provides evidence of existing and emerging loss redistribution practices that may be representative of slums in many other Third World mega cities. In Mumbai slum, populations typically have access to more than one method of loss redistribution, depending on a variety of socio-economic factors, to assist in the recovery process after floods. The study identifies these socio- economic factors that impact the type and number of sources available to affected households and in turn also serve as an indicator of resilience in these communities.

Megacities are not only concentrations of people, enterprises, growth and opportunities, but also nodes of inadequacies, crises, shocks, and vulnerabilities which are marked by complex socio-ecological processes as well as exceptional dynamisms of formal and informal settings. There has been phenomenal growth of megacities2 in the recent past which accommodate about 10 per cent of the world’s urban population (UNFPA 2007: 10). These are highly dynamic urban centres and their maintenance thereof relies upon chains of consumption that pull in resources like water, food, and power on one hand and generates huge volumes of waste on the other (Pelling 2007a: 1). Apart from being threatened by consequences of external events, megacities are also generators of hazardous consequences themselves and as such are ‘victim and culprit’ at the same time (Kraas 2007: 13). Today megacities are subjected to increasing risk and vulnerability due to overcrowded living conditions, infrastructural stress, escalating inequality, social segregation, conflicts, as well as failure of government to adequately care for environmental and social well-being.

The intricacies in the development of a country are leading to several debates which are worth mentioning and run through the whole process of public policy. Among these, the politics of development, the politics of displacement and inequalities along with vulnerability take a primordial position. Although the present work does not deal with all concepts involved in development and displacement in detail, it does deal with key issues which have changed the lives of millions who have borne the brunt of the development of the country and accepted the sacrifice of their belongings and putting themselves in the position of the vulnerable.

This famous quote by the Chinese Prime Minister Wei Zheng of the Tang Dynasty (618–907) uses the characteristics of water as a metaphor to describe the relationship between a ruler and his/her people. People are symbolized by water which can be utilized and be beneficial for the ruler; the ruler is symbolized by the boat which relies on the water to carry it. However, water can be an ambivalent double cross. Once the harmony between the water and the boat is disturbed, water brings destruction.

This chapter addresses the importance of involving and ensuring the active participation of individuals and communities in disaster mitigation and preparedness activities. The key question of this chapter is: What are the factors affecting action regarding mitigation of damage due to earthquakes and earthquake preparedness at the individual level in Istanbul? The chapter is based on the literature review carried out by the author for a study in Istanbul

3

.

Istanbul, the largest and the most populated city in Turkey, lies at the crossroad between Europe and Asia. This natural setting that has created the potency of Istanbul’s urban environment is, however, also a characteristic that threatens it. Located in an active earthquake zone, Istanbul’s history has been interrupted many times by earthquakes; and today, history may repeat itself as scientists predict that in the near future the city will experience a major earthquake.

Climate change and global warming have attained global dimensions with the recurrent discussions at the

United Nations

(UN) and in other international meetings. Global climate change, driven largely by anthropogenic activities, is a growing threat to human wellbeing in developing and industrialized nations alike. Significant harm from climate change is already occurring, and further damages are likely (Gwary 2008; Barnett/ Adger 2007; CHGE 2005; IPCC 2001a). Extreme weather events resulting in hurricanes, windstorms, tornadoes, droughts, fires, floods and other weather-related hazards account for a large proportion of the increased losses from natural disasters over the last decades. More alarming even than the size of past losses is the trend for losses to increase. More than 1.5 million people died in the past two decades because of extreme climatic events, and more than ninety per cent of those deaths have occurred in developing countries (IFRC-RCS 2002; Munich Re 2003).

The world is confronted with the impact of natural disasters on human lives and livelihoods on a tremendous scale. These disasters affected 184 million people globally each year, on average, between 1980 and 2008, with a range of 28 million to 661 million. The annual loss of nearly 74,000 human lives occurred on average during this same period, with a range of 10,000 to 460,000. During 2008, 1 out of 31 persons worldwide was affected by natural disasters. Climaterelated disasters caused 45,000 deaths each year and affected 178 million people, on average, between 1980 and 2008.

As humankind approaches an increase of 1˚C in the average global temperature compared to the pre-industrialized era, ongoing climate change is already altering the natural systems that support human societies all around the world. Unless effectively mitigated in the near future, an unfettered climate change will drive global dynamics that could transform entire world regions. The radical changes of natural environments that are expected to follow from an unmitigated global warming would be without precedent in human history and it would thus be highly questionable if local authorities, national governments, regional organizations, and international agencies were capable of peacefully steering the resulting social and economic consequences. Indeed, if global average temperatures continue to rise beyond 2 or 3˚C this would imply a historical global experiment with unknown outcomes. The restriction of global warming and its effects should thus be a central concern of forwardlooking world politics. As elaborated below, sustainable global development and international stability depend on the successful mitigation of climate change as well as on the effective management of its unavoidable consequences.

With growing indications of climate change, the expected impacts and risks pose a major challenge for society, foreign policy and security (Ott 2001). The issue is complex and covers highly uncertain future developments which preclude simple predictions from previous data. The recent reports by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC) point to new risks, but do not focus on the linkages between climate change and potential social tensions and conflicts (IPCC 2007a; Nordås/Gleditsch 2009). Worldwide, devastating impacts on food and water availability, flood and storm disasters and large-scale events, such as loss of the monsoon, breakdown of the thermahaline circulation, polar ice melting, or sealevel rise, could affect large populations. It is unclear yet how human beings and their societies will respond to the expected dramatic consequences of climate change and whether the social stress will lead to more security risks and conflicts or to more cooperation.

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998) argue that states and societies ‘securitize’ issues to highlight their urgency. This has been the case with the environment and particularly water.2 In this chapter a number of consequences of this phenomenon will be addressed. For example, what are the implications of this securitization on policy formulation both for the security and for the environment sector? Is the securitization process leading to policy priorities that are relevant from a security perspective or is the debate getting blurred? The threat posed to and by the environment differs from traditional threats to state security. Traditional threats deal with military and strategic issues while environmental challenges are seen as incrementally growing threats. The Climate Change issue which has really taken off during the last years, is of course also seen (or indeed branded) as en environmental security issue. The importance of climate change is further elevated as it is seen as affecting, in a destabilizing manner, also food security, water availability, and health issues. It is conceived as a future cause for environmental migrants. Thus, the main importance of climate change as a security issue is that it affects and furthers other environmental scarcities (IPCC 2007a). It is also evident that the issue has gained interest among the defence establishments (US National Security Council Memorandum, 27 March, 1998).

With the publication of the fourth assessment report of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC 2007, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) the international scientific community has seen a major shift in priorities. A few years ago the scientific debate was focussed on the detection and attribution of climate change. The emphasis has now shifted towards assessing the impacts of the changing climate on social and economic concerns to inform adaptation and mitigation policies worldwide.

This chapter offers a general survey of the physical characteristics and importance of the Nile Delta region of Egypt and of the vulnerability to potential impacts of climate change. The relatively low land elevation, increasing soil salinity due to salt water intrusion and the low resilience of the communities makes this region highly vulnerable to potential impacts of climate change. A vulnerability assessment based on a mapping of hot spots using remote sensing and GIS technologies is introduced. The main objective is to identify and quantify potential biophysical and socioeconomic losses according to various sea-level scenarios taking into consideration the well known delta subsidence rates. Results indicate high risks of direct inundation, salt water intrusion and socio-economic losses and call for proactive integrated planning for development of the coastal zone. The shortage of institutional capabilities, weak law enforcement and low population awareness are additional pressures that need to be addressed.

Tropical montane rain forests provide important ecosystem services, such as supply, purification and retention of fresh water, regional water and air quality regulation, carbon sequestration, genetic and pharmaceutical resources, natural hazard and erosion regulation, recreation and ecotourism, etc.3 This type of ecosystem is highly dependent on stable conditions of several climate variables and, therefore, highly sensitive to any changes in those variables. For that reason, these forests provide excellent monitoring sites for detecting threats by climate change and illustrate its potential consequences for natural ecosystems and ecosystem services in an impressive way (Loope/Giambelluca 1998; Foster 2001). Before discussing this topic, however, some principal terms used in this chapter have to be defined.

This chapter addresses manifold interactions between the natural environment and humankind affecting the land (or often used synonymously as ground and soil) as the provider of ecosystem services, water storage and food for living organisms (plants, animals, micro-organisms, and human beings).

Claims linking desertification with poverty and loss of security are often not supported by hard data (Dobie (2001). This is partly due to loose definitions and indiscriminate use of ‘desertification’, ‘poverty’, and ‘security’ – a result of meagre communication between natural and social scientists addressing phenomena driven by tightly interlinked biophysical and social processes, as well as due to disagreements within each of the two disciplines. As a result, the extent to which conflicts (often resulting in violence) are driven by poverty and poverty is driven by desertification, is controversial and poorly known.

Desertification – land degradation and loss of productivity in drylands resulting from human and climatic factors – is one of the greatest global challenges of our times, and correlates directly to poverty, food insecurity and degradation of human well-being. Desertification directly results in biodiversity changes and a decline in soil fertility, water availability and plant cover, which indirectly affect the livelihoods of dryland populations. Conservative figures estimate the extent of the desertified area ranging from 10 to 20 per cent of all drylands, while a much larger area remains at risk.1 Measurement of a persistent reduction in the capacity of ecosystems to supply services provides a robust and operational way to quantify land degradation, and thus desertification. Such a quantification approach is robust because these services can be monitored, and some of them are monitored routinely.

Egypt is one of the most arid lands in the world as 86 per cent of its total area is hyper arid while the remaining area is arid and semi-arid (Meigs 1953). Four agro-ecological zones are distinguished, namely, the Nile Valley, the North Coastal Zone, the Inland Sinai, the Eastern Desert and the Western Desert. As significant variations in ecosystem services are recognized among the four agro-ecological zones, desertification affects each one differently.

Mexico is situated between 14˚ and 32˚ latitude North within the tropical and subtropical regions. This wide geographic expansion contributes to the preponderance of arid and semi-arid climates in Northern Mexico covering almost 50 per cent of the country’s territory. The Northern region of Mexico is home to close 30 per cent of the total national population (table 51.2), of which more than 6 per cent live in rural areas.

The misuse and the overexploitation of resources are the main causes of desertification which according to the United Nations Convention is defined as: “deterioration of the lands in the arid, semiarid and semi humid dry areas due to different factors including climate changes and human activity” (UNCCD 1994, article 1a, 1995, 1995a). The definition highlights two fundamental aspects of desertification: a) desertification is not the creation of a desert but of soil degradation; and b) human intervention is a fundamental factor besides the role of climate conditions.

Although a few natural oases exist – for example the tufts of Doum palm trees in the Egyptian desert – the majority of the oases are human creations where humankind adapted to climatic fluctuations and preserved balance between its activities and the environment, until the 1950’s. Then climatic fluctuations occurred, which were noted through systematic weather measurements and recurring droughts in the North and the South of the Sahara.

The fundamental basis for security and peace in a territory is linked to the absence of internal and external conflicts. Situations of internal conflicts in modern societies normally have their immediate origin in social inequalities and are expressed in an unjust distribution of wealth. The causes that determine these inequalities may be derived from environmental situations, as is the case with the exhaustion of natural resources which assured the existence of a community; they may also be due to the abandonment or isolation of social groups who are then deprived of the possibility of developing their own capacities to access resources, as a result of administrative or political irredentism. They may even derive from the installation of external models of socio-economic exploitation, as is the case of 19th century colonialism, which drained the resources of territories without promoting the socio-economic development of their inhabitants.

The south-east of Spain is a semi-arid area suffering marked rainfall seasonality, with frequent and long dry seasons. Inappropriate human activities and developments in unsuitable areas have caused soil erosion and degradation that are expected to increase due to negative effects of climate change ranging from moderate to severe depending on the specific scenario. This chapter reviews current land-use changes and their effects on desertification1 taking a specific regional climatic change scenario into account from the

National Ministry of Rural and Marine Environment

(MARM 2007, 2008) and the

fourth assessment report

(AR4) of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC 2007, 2007a, 2007b) on agriculture and urbanization.

Integrated Water Resources Management

(IWRM) is today widely advocated by natural resources managers and the scientific community as the preferred approach to manage water. IWRM stresses the river basin as the single management unit and the integration of freshwater using sectors and stakeholders across society.

China is a developing country with the largest population in the world. Food security is not only important for the sustainable social and economic development of China, but also for its food security and for stable global food prices. According to the guideline for food and nutrition development by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, the average grain holdings in 2000, 2010 and 2020 should be 400, 415 and 420 kg per capita per year, respectively (General Office of the State Council PRC 2001). In China food security will be achieved when the average grain holdings reach these levels. However, with the rapid social and economic development the people’s living standard and their meat consumption are significantly increasing, why more grain will be needed.

This chapter addresses the question of security1 and sustainability2 of

water resource management

(WRM) in Bangladesh due to climate change and complex social and political factors including weak governance. It suggests that social networks should play an important role in ensuring security at the micro levels, and the promotion of people-centred water management. Bangladesh, a highly populated country located on the floodplains of the Ganges-Brahmaputra- Meghna Rivers, receives abundant monsoonal rain which is concentrated between June and September. Rapid population growth, economic growth imperatives, changing farming practices and the weak coordination of WRM have increased the gap between the demand and supply of water leading to a water crisis that threatens the stability of the country. It is increasingly being understood that climate change poses a serious challenge for future water resource management in South Asia as a whole and exacerbates existing environmental problems. Babel and Wahid (2008) showed that Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to declining freshwater supplies.

With the increasing evidence on climate change policy- makers and researchers are searching for ways to cope up with its impacts and consequences. Adaptation is particularly important for developing countries as impacts of climate change will deeply affect the geographical locations of developing countries (Walker/King 2008: 60–63). They are most vulnerable due to their limited economic capacity as: “the people who will be exposed to the worst of the impacts are the ones least able to cope with the associated risks” (Smit quoted in Adger/Huq/Brown/Hulme 2003: 180). The management of water resources will be most troublesome due to the unpredictability of the climate (Walker/King 2008: 55), thereby seriously affecting not only the availability of drinking water but also other sectors such as agriculture, sanitation and health. The vulnerability of the water sector is much worse for most developing countries as their policy frameworks are “less mature, with weaker institutions, and less capable of providing for adaptation to climate change” (Levina 2006: 6).

The

Iullemeden Aquifer System

(IAS), shared by Mali, Niger and Nigeria, consists of a number of sedimentary deposits containing two large aquifers: the

Continental intercalaire

(Ci)

3

superseded by the

Continental Terminal

(CT)

4

.

Maybe the most disturbing feature of the global influences discussed in this and previous volumes in this book series is that their impacts are not evenly distributed over the globe. For instance, as Úrsula Oswald Spring (chap. 62) points out below, while the benefits of using genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are likely to bestow especially on northern countries, their more problematic aspects are likely to be exacerbated by, and add to, the negative conditions prevailing in the South. As her analysis makes clear, only in an economically more equitable world economy and a more sustainable global agrofood system, GMOs may provide solutions to some of the more pressing challenges facing global food production.

After the first agricultural revolution ten thousand years ago, people have gradually increased the yield by crossing different varieties of crops. As a result of multiple adaptations five basic food crops have emerged: rice in Asia, wheat in the Fertile Crescent (originally from Ethiopia), maize and beans from Mesoamerica, and potatoes from South America that offers the nutritional base for 6.6 billion people. During the 21st century, agriculture will be confronted with great challenges. Due to population growth until 2050 more than nine billion people must be fed. Most of them will live in poor countries, still threatened with hunger (FAO 1999; 2000, 2008b). Most of these countries are also affected by

global environmental changes

(GEC), and they will face more floods and droughts, a decline in biodiversity, and in the fertility of soils. Due to a rapidly growing food demand due to biofuel and a gradually declining supply, additional land, water, and seeds for food purposes are needed (FAO/WHO 2003; FAO 2005; Ghosh/Jepson 2006).

Natural hazards and environmental disasters are major challenges that require a policy response from all African policy-makers that are responsible for the survival and future of their populations. This is particularly due to the extreme poverty which often forces their populations to overuse natural resources and causes an ecological imbalance. Hydro-meteorological hazards increasingly produce significant adverse effects as a result of human activities that increase the vulnerability of the ecosystem. In addition to these worrying developments, water-related natural hazards are projected to increase in intensity and frequency due to climate change and environmental pollution. Thus, activities to advance food security and sustainable development through international strategies and other poverty reduction instruments must take natural disasters and their impact into account in the medium and long run. Food security and sustainable development are closely linked to vulnerability due to climate change and natural disasters.

The developmental pathways of the society have been associated with changes in the utilization patterns of natural resources and environmental goods and services. Given the need for societies to develop, the key challenge has been to manage the available natural resources and preserve the environmental structure and function so that they continue to support societal development in a sustainable manner. Among a multitude of stressors that have emerged as offshoots of unsustainable development, one of the gravest repercussions has been the change in the climate of the earth (beyond natural variability). The change in the climate attributable to human activities has already begun to register impacts on the earth’s life-supporting ecosystems with serious implications for the society. Short-term and long-term changes in climatic variables can compound the impacts of existing stressors (such as rise in population and consequent increases in demand for space and other resources) on the environment and living systems.

In the Mexican states of Tlaxcala (figure 65.1; no. 29) and Veracruz (no. 30), two case studies cases were developed to assess the impacts and possible responses to climate change and climate variability on maize and coffee producers. These two types of producers have differences but also similarities.

According to the United Nations official statistics for 2002, there were one billion poor people in the world, 70 per cent of whom were women, a figure that reflects a serious problem of gender inequity and a harsh social inequality. Some 40 million of the world’s poor live in Mexico, 26 per cent of them in conditions of extreme poverty. Given this panorama, there is a clear and urgent need not only for actions designed to achieve an understanding of the multiplicity of the causes of poverty but, more importantly, to generate interventions by different sectors that will bring about a gradual transformation of this reality. This entails adopting a posture that orients discussion and exposes basic aspects of poverty. In particular, there is a need to analyse elements that affect women in particular.

Throughout human history societies have changed their environment by developing agriculture, settlements, practicing commerce and conquest and becoming increasingly industrialized and urbanized (McMichael 2002: 1145). Today we are in a historically unprecedented situation: the aggregate environmental impact of humankind has begun to alter aspects of the Earth system. The human-induced changes in the large-scale biosphere and atmosphere are called

Global Environmental Change

(GEC). They include stratospheric ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, land degradation, coral reef degradation, depletion of freshwater supplies, spread of invasive species, the disruption of nutrient cycles (e.g. nitrogen, sulphur, and phosphorus) and the dispersal of persistent organic pollutants. Furthermore, the increased concentration of human related atmospheric trace gases has lead to one of the most widely discussed of these environmental changes, namely climate change (Martens/Mc Michael 2002).

Disasters are often viewed as sudden onset events triggered by external shocks impacting on societies and causing major harm and losses. However, most disasters linked to hazards of natural origin – such as the Cyclone Nargis (May 2008) which devastated the Irrawady-Delta in Burma with more than 100,000 fatalities, the Hurricane Katrina (August 2005) that caused major losses and harm particularly in New Orleans, and the Indian Ocean Tsunami (December 2004) that left more than 230,000 dead behind – are characterized by a major crisis and partial collapse of communities and socio-ecological systems as well as by important changes and feedback processes during and after the disaster. To achieve a better understanding of disasters and to derive lessons learned for future risk reduction endeavours, a more comprehensive perspective on these regulation and coupling processes is needed.

During the 26 December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Sri Lanka was one of the hardest hit countries in the affected region. The tsunami impact was most severe in the island’s East and South. It was the first tsunami that occurred in Sri Lanka in living memory. Therefore, Sri Lanka was entirely unprepared for such an event.

For centuries Central American communities have been experiencing disasters which provoke fatalities, injuries, and losses of various kinds. During the conquest in the early 1500’s the Spanish conquerors experienced their first disaster when a hurricane on 11 September 1541 triggered a massive landslide that buried the town of Santiago de los Caballeros which was the seat of the Spanish government at the time in Central America. As a consequence, the town was relocated from the skirts of the Agua volcano (Guatemala) to the central part of the Panchoy valley, almost 10 kilometres away. Unfortunately, two centuries later, the new city of Santiago de los Caballeros was destroyed by a series of massive earthquakes in 1773 which provoked many fatalities, injuries, as well as losses of many kinds. As in the previous case, the Government decided to relocate the city to another valley farther away from the active Fuego volcano, and supposedly, farther away from earthquakes. Unfortunately, the destruction of villages, towns, and cities in Central America has been a rather frequent occurrence due to the location of Central America in a highly seismic zone which gives rise to active volcanoes. The situation is worsened when considering the fact that the region lies on the path of hurricanes which provoke floods and massive landslides.

This chapter examines the dynamics of entitlement and access, and the degree to which economic and social capital are substitutes during and after natural disasters. It explores how individuals manage a shock from a natural disaster by accessing a spectrum of social and economic assets, and it illustrates the importance of accounting for social capital and its affect on access to entitlements during and after shocks like natural disasters. This chapter discusses substitution of economic and social capital to explain in part why and how shocks affect certain groups disproportionately.

Discrimination represents a harmful as well as an unfair treatment of a person or a group, based on prejudice. Therefore it is related to a ‘rejection process’ of the other, emphasizing critical attributes such as race, sex, age, gender, social and marital status, class and caste, migrant or refugee status, religion, incapacity or handicap. These attributes are socially constructed and are results of the complexity of daily life and of existing power structures. Discrimination induces people to simplify their behaviour by identifying themselves with the ideology of the group and to reject the other. This often creates stereotypes of how to think, to believe, and to act. Thus, a system of values, ideas, beliefs, and practices influences discrimination, and often oversimplifies complex life situations.

This chapter deals with three major issues confronting humankind, political leaders and the scientific community: climate change, disaster management and international development, as examples of the need for an interdisciplinary and integrated approach. These are major intersecting issues: natural disasters destroy or impede development and climate change will enhance their impacts. These relationships seem to be increasingly recognized, particularly in the international domain. However, better integration of these intersecting issues is needed in science and policy and global response. Sustainable development and an expanded climate change adaptation strategy to include disaster risk reduction may be the key to bringing them together.

Human activities now match (and often exceed) the natural forces of the Earth System (Steffen/Sanderson/ Tyson/Jäger/Matson/Moore/Oldfield/Richardson/ Schellnhuber/Turner/Wasson 2004). Recent ice core data show that current levels of

carbon dioxide

(CO2) and methane are well outside the range of natural variability over the last 800,000 years (Luthi/Le Floch/ Bereiter/Blunier/Barnola/Siegenthaler/Raynaud/Jouzel/ Fischer/Kawamura/Stocker 2008). Roughly half of the world’s ice-free land surface has been altered by human actions. Humans now fix more nitrogen than does nature. Particles emitted by human activities alter the energy balance of the planet, as well as having adverse effects on human health. Human choices about how we use resources are at the heart of many of these changes. These may seem to be unrelated issues; however, over the last decades, we have gained a deeper understanding of the degree to which all of these separate issues are linked. The Earth System is a very complex coupled system with myriad feedbacks, and it has and inevitably can still exhibit rapid, globalscale responses to changes in environmental conditions (Costanza/Graumlich/Steffen/Crumley/Dearing/Hibbard/ Leemans/Redman/Schimel 2007).

Human actions dominate the Earth’s great biophysical and geochemical cycles and consequently lie at the very heart of every effort to come to terms with the phenomenology of global environmental change. Research on the so-called human dimensions of global change concerns human activities that alter the Earth’s natural environment, the sources or causes of those activities, the consequences of

global environmental change

(GEC) for societies and economies, and the responses of humans to the experience or expectation of global change. Human interferences with the Earth’s system are so significant that the recent era has been suitably named the ‘Anthropocene’. Human activity continues to intensify sharply and increases pressures on the Earth’s resources and, for instance, on the planet’s capability to assimilate/absorb wastes (e.g. Crutzen 2002). Thus, climate change is the most prominent, but only one of the various changes that humanity presently faces and which threaten social welfare. Global environmental change also encompasses changes in terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, and its full extent and complexity is only now being realized. Global environmental change research in recent years has increasingly recognized the importance of humans as the central elements of the Earth System and its cycles. This has given rise to the concept of socio-ecological systems, a frame of reference that serves as a model for all human dimensions research.

Biodiversity, or the variety of life on earth, makes up and sustains all life processes of the biosphere. Therefore, biodiversity contributes utilitarian values, such as ecosystem goods and services, option values for future use, as well as cultural values, such as educational, intellectual and recreational opportunities, aesthetic and spiritual enjoyment, and a sense of identity, to human well-being.

The UN

Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs) are simultaneously an inspiring and formidable challenge for society: within the next few years we must aim to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat deadly diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and construct a global partnership for development. At the same time, society is faced with other challenges such as global climate change, air pollution, decreases in global biodiversity, food and water resources, and how all of these issues tie into global security. Humankind does not have the luxury of solving these problems one at a time; they need to be resolved together. Solving these problems requires knowledge of how the coupled human- environmental Earth system works that is sufficiently broad and deep to allow us to accurately assess the causes of past and current changes and predict future ones.

Every day climate variability and change shapes the world, including the natural environment and its biodiversity on which society depends for water, food and other ecosystem services. Since the evolution of

homo sapiens

about 200,000 years ago, it is only in the last 10,000 years that we have moved from a hunter-gatherer existence to our modern society with its critical dependence on agriculture and exploitation of natural resources at an ever increasing rate. The relatively stable climate during the Holocene was an important component in making this transition possible (Burroughs 2005).

The IPCC Fourth Assessment on

Climate Change

2007

: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability

(IPCC 2007a) addressed three main issues: a) impacts of climate change which are observable now; b) future effects of climate change on different sectors and regions; and c) responses to such effects. The assessment included 12 key messages, which are summarized here.

In 2007 the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) completed its

fourth assessment report

(AR4). This report consists of three separate volumes on climate science, vulnerability to climate change and adaptation (chap. 79 by Parry/ Canziani/Palutikof/Hanson) and mitigation of climate change, respectively. The IPCC reports are thorough and comprehensive assessments of published literature, put together by multidisciplinary teams of the best experts from around the world. These reports are subject to extensive review by independent experts and governments. The Summary for Policymakers of the reports is approved by the member countries of the IPCC.

Under

United Nations

(UN) leadership, global climate change has been placed at the top of the international community’s agenda and, to every possible extent, mainstreamed in the departments, funds, and programmes of the UN and its specialized agencies. At the 13

th

Conference of Parties

(COP) of the

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) in Bali, Indonesia, 12 December 2007, UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-Moon stated: “The latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC)2 tells us that, unless we act, there will be serious consequences: rising sea levels, more frequent and less predictable floods and severe droughts, famine around the world, particularly in Africa and Central Asia, and the loss of up to a third of our plant and animal species.”

UNDP recognizes climate change as a key human development issue. Without immediate action, climate change will reverse decades of development achievements and undermine efforts to reach human security and achieve the

Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs). As the global development network of the United Nations, UNDP’s goal is to align human development and climate change responses through a coordinated mix of policy and financial instruments. To achieve this, UNDP is engaging in strategic partnerships to support the efforts of developing countries and vulnerable groups to significantly scale up mitigation and adaptation action. Effective action is possible and affordable (Stern 2006). The benefits of moving towards less carbon intensive yet sustainable economies are likely to be immense, but so would be the costs of inaction (UNDP HDR 2007/2008: 8).

As early as 1996, the

European Union

(EU) adopted a long-term target of limiting global temperature increase to a maximum of two degrees Celsius (Egenhofer/ van Schaik 2005: 2–3) above pre-industrial levels. This was reiterated over the years, most recently in the European Council of 18–19 June 2009 (European Council 2009: 11). According to the European Commission (2009a: 3) – making reference to the 4th Assessment Report by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC 2007, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d) – this would require developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25–40 per cent by 2020 and 80–95 per cent by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. At the same time, developing countries would need to limit emissions growth to 15–30 per cent below baseline by 2020 (European Commission 2009a: 5). The tool to achieve this are the so-called

Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions

(NAMAs) mentioned in the Bali Action Plan of December 2007 (UNFCCC 2007a: 3)

With its extremely large population and huge landmass, East Asia is among the world’s regions most vulnerable to – and increasingly responsible for – future climate change. This chapter briefly examines two issues that permeate debates about climate change policy and politics in the region: (1) the ecological and socio- economic impacts of climate change for the countries of East Asia, and (2) critical questions of international justice – what some prefer to call international equity or fairness – associated with climate change.

In Latin America and the developing Caribbean countries and island territories, coping with climate change is not yet part of the development agenda and takes in many countries a back seat in the government’s priorities that are more closely associated with economic growth and competitiveness, the trade agenda, poverty alleviation, uneven income distribution, and social marginalization and exclusion. The clear synergies between sound environmental policies, sustainable development, and the attainment of the

Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs) are not clearly established, just as the link between a social policy agenda and national security is just beginning to assert itself.

A hardening of the front lines between developed and developing countries occurred during the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen with both sides criticizing the other for taking the climate as hostage. The G77 chief negotiator Lumumba Di-Aping compared the behaviour of developed countries to the holocaust. Several countries, particularly the poorer nations, protested blackmailing when they were coerced to sign the Copenhagen Accord, because without signing they would have been unable to access adaptation funds from richer nations. Particularly the United States was blamed for the failure of the talks because President Obama “demanded concessions while offering nothing”. Furthermore, Denmark was highly criticized for convening a meeting of only 26 nations in the last two days of the conference that led to the Copenhagen Accord. Khor argues that it undermined the UN’s multilateral and democratic process of climate change negotiations. On the other side, developing countries with emerging economies like China and India were criticized for cooperating at Copenhagen to thwart attempts at establishing legally binding targets for carbon emissions, in order to protect their economic growth. In addition, African countries were criticized by

The Australian

for their behaviour in turning COP15 into “a platform for demands that the world improve the continent’s standard of living” which is out of place in environmental talks such as the meeting in Copenhagen. The same newspaper commented the comparison of the potential impact of climate change on Africans to the holocaust through the G77 chief negotiator Lumumba Di-Aping as “inane and offensive” and “demonstrates how the conference process was corrupted”. The newspaper criticized as well the opposition of Sudan, Nicaragua, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Tuvalu to “Obama’s agreement” as a “demonstration how Copenhagen was about old-fashioned anti-Americanism, not the environment”.

Climate change has emerged as one of the top security challenges of the early 21

st

century (Brauch 2009; chap. 41 by Bauer; chap. 42 by Scheffran; chap. 88 by Ohta). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated that “climate change is altering the geopolitical landscape,” as manifested by increased competition over Arctic resources, increased intra-state and interstate migration and rising sea levels. Similarly, U.S. Senator John Kerry argued that “global climate change poses a real and present danger of environmental destruction and human dislocation on a scale that we’ve never seen.”

Despite its potential to become a leader in international negotiations on climate change, Japan has not played an assertive role in this field since the third

conference of the parties

(COP 3) of the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) held in Kyoto in 1997. Focusing on Japanese climate change mitigation policy, this study uses the process-tracing method to examine the reasons why Japan relinquished its leadership and initiative internationally. Since overcoming severe pollution problems in the 1960’s and 1970’s, Japan has maintained a technological lead in pollution-abatement and energy-efficient technologies. This chapter demonstrates how unfavourable marginal abatement costs in comparison with those of EU member states and the United States have dictated a regression in Japan’s climate change policy discourse. A lack of strong and stable political leadership on climate change through this period has also allowed well-organized economic interests and the economy ministry to solidify an industry-oriented policy coalition. With the advent of the new Democratic Party of Japan-led administration in September 2009, however, Japan has begun to move back into its natural position as a vital force in international climate change negotiations.

Unlike in the Kyoto Protocol, emission reduction targets for individual countries in the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ contain a list of pledges without international negotiation. As a result, whether or not international negotiations on QERLOs (

Quantified emission reduction and limitation objectives

) can actually be adopted in a post-2012 climate change governance architecture remains uncertain. However, after the COP15 of the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, it is clear that several countries are concerned about a situation where only they would have to take on the ‘extra burden’ of reducing GHG emissions, implying additional costs compared with their economic competitors. The business and industrial sectors are particularly concerned about an agreement with unbalanced QERLOs between and among developed countries and emerging economies. Thus, many pledges on emission reduction targets under the ‘Copenhagen Accord’ were made under the condition that they are only bound to their commitment if others adopt comparable (or equal) emission reduction obligations.

Flash floods are a major natural hazard in the southeast of Spain. A semi-arid climate along with severe droughts with extreme rainfall events are the cause for a scarce vegetation cover. For geological reasons, the steep slopes near the sea have generated this situation (Romero Díaz/Maurandi Guirado 2000; Camarasa Belmonte 2002). Human occupation in this area was scarce and the land use limited to some dry land cultivations. But during the last 25 years, two new trends have increased the human risk from natural flood hazards.

No Prime Minister in the World will sleep well when the rate of GDP growth is below zero. The risk to lose the next elections is just too high. In richer countries, this holds also true for bad unemployment and inflation rates. Another example how indicators drive politics: There would be no Kyoto Protocol if our statistical offices had not the indicator ‘CO

2

emissions per capita’ in their pockets. At the right place, in the right moment, and under certain conditions, indicators play an overwhelmingly powerful role in politics, and may indeed decide the fate of governments. Could indicators play a role in preventing conflicts?

Can

Disaster and Conflict Early Warning

(D/CEW) systems be networked to untangle the multiple but interdependent crises that characterize complex emergencies, particularly in response to climate change? In other words, can continuous information gathering identify the socio-ecological ingredients of complex crises before they escalate into widespread violence? And if so, can early warning methodologies based on events-data analysis provide the common platform to network D/CEW for early response?

The tsunami of 26 December 2004 was a catastrophic disaster where fatalities could have been minimized if there had been an early warning system in operation and people in coastal areas would have been aware how to respond effectively to such a warning. The event caused over 250,000 fatalities, more than half of them in the Aceh province of Indonesia alone, and many others in countries as far away as Africa.

This chapter argues that a fundamental change in earth history is under way which requires a rethinking of the relationship between humankind and nature, including the political realm and international relations, that makes geopolitical approaches in the Hobbesian tradition obsolete. The Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen coined for this new period of earth history the term ‘Anthropocene’ (Crutzen 2002 and preface essay).

In the Anthropocene era of earth and human history we are confronted with opposite : Business-as-usual in a Hobbesian world where economic and strategic interests and behaviour prevail leading to a major crisis of humankind, in inter-state relations and destroying the Earth as the habitat for humans and ecosystems putting the survival of the vulnerable at risk (see the ‘market first’ and ‘security first’ scenarios of UNEP 2007). The need for a transformation of global cultural, environmental, economic (productive and consumptive patterns) and political (with regard to human and interstate) relations (see the ‘sustainability first’ scenario of UNEP 2007).