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2016 | OriginalPaper | Buchkapitel

12. Financial Crisis and Liquidity Trap Some Theoretical and Policy Perspectives

verfasst von : Mihir Rakshit

Erschienen in: Development in India

Verlag: Springer India

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Abstract

Perhaps, the most notable feature of the ongoing global financial and economic crisis is the prevalence of near-zero interest rates along with persistence of large, often-growing, unemployment over the last 5 years in practically all advanced countries. Such a situation figures as a theoretical curiosum in the old-fashioned Keynesian theory, but has been conspicuous by its absence in the mainstream macro economic paradigm ruling since the mid 1970s—a paradigm that constitutes a synthesis between the new classical and new Keynesian economics. However, since both the economic travails of Japan during the last two decades and the ongoing crisis have highlighted how intractable the trap generally is, it is worthwhile to go into the analytics of the phenomenon and examine the efficacy of alternative policy instruments for escaping from the trap. Accordingly, we recapitulate the Keynesian theory of the liquidity trap, indicate the nature of its modern incarnation and briefly note its implications for the macro economy. As a prelude to a more fruitful discussion of the subject, we take stock of some stylized facts associated with some major episodes of the trap. This paves the way for identifying its main sources and drawing some policy conclusions.

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Fußnoten
1
The phrase was coined by Robertson (1936) in his Quarterly Journal of Economic review article on the General Theory.
 
2
This glosses over a number of critical issues, remembering that when wage bargains are sectoral and in nominal terms, real wages cannot be determined through adjustments in labour market alone (Keynes 1936).
 
3
Figure 12.1a is adapted from Klein (1947). Since r, strictly speaking, refers to the real rate of interest, r 0 could be negative. Klein’s formulation presumes that prices are fixed and hence the expected inflation is zero. We shall presently take up issues concerning the nominal and real rates of interest.
 
4
At the prevailing price-wage configuration.
 
5
To use its more familiar nomenclature, due to Hansen (1949).
 
6
Since r corresponding to any i goes up.
 
7
Or rather, the real long-term rate of interest, as we have discussed earlier.
 
8
So that there is a one-way bet on capital losses in holding long-term bonds yielding a zero rate.
 
9
“…opinion about the future of the rate of interest may be so unanimous that a small change in present rates may cause a mass movement into cash” (Keynes 1936, p. 172).
 
10
As Keynes (1936) emphasizes.
 
11
Keynes regards the long-term interest rate as a “highly conventional” rather than a “highly psychological” phenomenon.
 
12
In this connection Keynes gives the example of the fall in the long-term rate in Great Britain after she abandoned the gold standard: “…the major movements were effected by a series of discontinuous jumps as the liquidity function of the public, having become accustomed to each successive reduction, became ready to respond to some new incentive in the news or in the policy of the authority” (Keynes 1936, p. 204).
 
13
Despite a near 75 % increase in monetary base over the five-year period 2001–06, the increase in Japan’s nominal GDP amounted to only 6 %. In the USA from Q4 08 to Q2 12 monetary base rose by more than 300 %, but the growth in nominal GDP was less than 11 %. See Woodford (2012).
 
14
See Economist (January 12–18, 2013) for the scenario in the UK.
 
15
And deceleration of growth in emerging and developing countries.
 
16
Based as it primarily is on the expectation that asset prices will continue to rise in the foreseeable future.
 
17
Remembering that when asset prices go up, while the amount of loans outstanding remains unchanged, there is an increase in the value of assets held.
 
18
That govern the terms and conditions of loans given by financial intermediaries.
 
19
Keynes (1936) observes that consumption is highly sensitive, especially in the USA, to capital gains and losses arising from changes in stock prices. Similar are the effects of home price inflation or deflation on household consumption.
 
20
As also the net asset to income ratio.
 
21
Note that though firms could easily issue shares during the bull run, debt financing is preferred for (a) preventing dilution of ownership of the controlling group; and (b) boosting returns, given the differential treatment of profits and interest payments under most tax systems in force.
 
22
Even though, thanks to inflated share prices, their accumulated debt amounts to a fraction of market capitalization.
 
23
Through the minimum cash reserve requirement, set by the central bank or dictated by the transactions demand for higher stocks of liquid assets when the balance sheet is larger.
 
24
The reason is that when households or firms buy assets through borrowing, a major part of the sale proceeds accrue (directly or indirectly) to non-bank financial intermediaries and create scope for further expansion of credit. The important point to note in this connection is that, the bubble is generally supported by a surge in credit outside the (commercial) banking sector both in absolute terms and in relation to the rise in bank credit.
 
25
Note that even if the central bank sterilizes the capital inflows, creation of non-bank credit is not choked off.
 
26
Defined as the ratio of total bank and non-bank credit in the economy to the supply of reserve money (Rakshit 1997).
 
27
So that the net wealth of the economy consists only of non-human and human resources.
 
28
Compared with which adjustments in the commodity and labour markets are fairly time consuming.
 
29
Triggered by both (self-fulfilling) expectations of further declines in asset prices and attempt on the part of business enterprises, financial firms and households to shed the assets before it is too late.
 
30
Or what Keynes (1936) calls the state of credit.
 
31
The rise in the ratio of household consumption and business investment to GDP is balanced by reductions in budget deficits and a rise in undistributed profits and net capital inflows (as ratios of GDP).
 
32
With some inflation in prices of goods and services during the bull run.
 
33
Given the ceiling on bank deposits covered by deposit insurance.
 
34
But not sufficient.
 
35
So that incomes generated in the non-housing sector at full employment ensure sufficiently high rent.
 
36
Induced by large output gaps.
 
37
Which included eschewing all forms of beggar-thy-neighbour policies.
 
38
Since all firms, especially the larger one, may not be constrained in securing finance for working capital.
 
39
As a fall in output and employment due to paucity of working capital in some sectors reduces demand for goods produced in other sectors that are not so constrained.
 
40
Hence this would also be true of the so-called Operation Twist (OT) under which the central bank’s purchases of long-term government securities are matched by sales of an equivalent amount of Treasury Bill, leaving the reserve money unchanged.
 
41
Through an increase in their prices.
 
42
Note that the Federal Reserve’s purchases of the securities benefit financial firms holding MBSs in the first round; but this may not induce the firms to provide new loans to high-risk borrowers.
 
43
And depressed rents.
 
44
See fn. 13.
 
45
As suggested by Romer (2012).
 
46
The fact that prices are expected to rise in the distant future is not of much help in easing the credit crunch faced by households and enterprises.
 
47
See for example IMF (2012).
 
48
Tighter credit reduces loan-financing of consumption and tends to make current income more important (in relation to life-time income) in governing consumption. Since poorer households face more severe credit constraint and have higher mpc, a (first-round) rise in GDP through additional employment will also lead to larger consumption out of the enhanced income.
 
49
Such expectations will be well-founded if the government expenditure remains high so long as private propensities to spend are depressed.
 
50
The capitalized value of the rise in future tax liabilities being equal to the magnitude of the reduction in current taxes.
 
51
See Appendix for a simple diagrammatic demonstration of why tax cuts raise current consumption even when households maximize their inter-temporal utility function, factoring in the government’s debt-service obligation in their budget constraint.
 
52
Due perhaps more to large imponderables and uncertainties concerning future economic prospects than to lack of telescopic faculty. Whatever the reason, they will not bother about longer term tax liabilities.
 
53
This would be so when the beneficiaries belong to low-income groups, but the incremental taxes are on the affluent.
 
54
As the value of government and private bonds held in their portfolio declines.
 
55
Even these countries are advised to keep in view the need for ensuring fiscal viability and improving economic fundamentals in the medium and the long run.
 
56
While fiscal retrenchment generates a budget surplus and reduces the amount of debt, the autonomous components of aggregate demand ensure that GDP soon bottoms out. Hence the fall in the debt-GDP ratio.
 
57
It is the absence of such autonomy that severely limits the fiscal policy options for the crisis countries in the euro area. We have commented on the issues arising in this context in an earlier study (Rakshit 2012), but in view of space limitations do not propose to go into it on the present occasion.
 
58
Or more technically, borrowing from the central bank which issues reserve money against the government bonds.
 
59
Among the laity the phobia is strengthened by the debt clock in the Time Square in the USA.
 
60
With a caveat we shall presently add.
 
61
As public investment in crucial areas declines.
 
62
Other than the poll tax.
 
63
Despite the zero policy rate and fiscal stimuli.
 
64
Alternatively, for a targetted boost to aggregate demand, the magnitude of the increase in government expenditure or of tax cuts will be lower.
 
65
Except that even under these conditions banks could be induced through especial schemes like funding for lending to extend loans for working capital.
 
66
We shall presently note other policy omissions and commissions responsible for economic stagnation of Japan.
 
67
So that even if it wanted to the central bank was in no position to raise prices and sustain their northward movement.
 
68
Since part of the tax concessions, especially those benefitting the upper income groups, is saved: for the relatively rich the Ricardian equivalence is likely to be operative.
 
69
An important reason why the fiscal consolidation and austerity programmes in Europe since mid 2010 has produced a larger than expected negative impact on GDP is that the debt-deficit targets were sought to be attained more through expenditure compression than tax increases.
 
70
So that the real value of debts as well as the ratio of payments for servicing debt to current incomes falls.
 
71
Other than housing.
 
72
And push up public debt.
 
73
This has resulted in a significant decline in the stock of human capital as the relatively aged, disappointed jobseekers leave the labour market, out-of-job young workers are deprived of the benefit of learning-by—doing and the unemployed in general suffer from serious erosion of their skill and morale.
 
74
So that apart from having a large multiplier effect, they are also more effective in reducing distress and erosion of human resources.
 
75
But what of the experience of Japan where the government did (off and on) undertake construction projects on a fairly large scale. One reason for the failure of these projects to crowd in private investment was lack of sustained and coordinated monetary-cum-fiscal stimuli to close the output gap and inducing inflation expectations. No less if not more important was poor planning in formulation and choice of the projects: it seems that the planners did not bother about whether the new facilities could be easily/profitably utilized by private enterprises—something which has led many an observer to describe the projects as roads and bridges to nowhere.
 
76
Despite the fact that their gestation period is generally longer than that of investments in infrastructure.
 
77
In crisis countries fiscal consolidation involves cutbacks in government expenditure along with tax increases, with a significantly higher weight for the former.
 
78
Than what would have occurred if only one country had undertaken fiscal consolidation.
 
79
Supported by mainstream economists who grossly underestimated the adverse consequences of fiscal consolidation implemented in unision all over the world.
 
80
The IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission.
 
81
So that any indifference curve will be symmetrical on the two sides of the 45°-line. Introduction of time preference strengthens the non-equivalence result.
 
82
Assuming that the liquidity trap remains in force even at F2.
 
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Metadaten
Titel
Financial Crisis and Liquidity Trap Some Theoretical and Policy Perspectives
verfasst von
Mihir Rakshit
Copyright-Jahr
2016
Verlag
Springer India
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2541-6_12

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