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Exploiting open functionality in SMS-capable cellular networks

Published:07 November 2005Publication History

ABSTRACT

Cellular networks are a critical component of the economic and social infrastructures in which we live. In addition to voice services, these networks deliver alphanumeric text messages to the vast majority of wireless subscribers. To encourage the expansion of this new service, telecommunications companies offer connections between their networks and the Internet. The ramifications of such connections, however, have not been fully recognized. In this paper, we evaluate the security impact of the SMS interface on the availability of the cellular phone network. Specifically, we demonstrate the ability to deny voice service to cities the size of Washington D.C. and Manhattan with little more than a cable modem. Moreover, attacks targeting the entire United States are feasible with resources available to medium-sized zombie networks. This analysis begins with an exploration of the structure of cellular networks. We then characterize network behavior and explore a number of reconnaissance techniques aimed at effectively targeting attacks on these systems. We conclude by discussing countermeasures that mitigate or eliminate the threats introduced by these attacks.

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      cover image ACM Conferences
      CCS '05: Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
      November 2005
      422 pages
      ISBN:1595932267
      DOI:10.1145/1102120

      Copyright © 2005 ACM

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      Publication History

      • Published: 7 November 2005

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