Henry Prakken
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a logical formalisation of accrual of arguments as a form of inference. The formalisation is given within the logical framework of Dung as instantiated by Pollock, and is shown to satisfy three principles that any treatment of accrual should satisfy. The formalisation of accrual as inference is contrasted to knowledge-representation treatments of accrual. Also, the formalisation is applied to some concepts from the theory of evidential legal reasoning.
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- A study of accrual of arguments, with applications to evidential reasoning
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