Jorge-Arnulfo Quiané-Ruiz
Patrick Valduriez
ABSTRACT
In peer-to-peer data management systems query allocation is a critical issue for the good operation of the system. This task is challenging because participants may prefer to perform some queries than others. Microeconomic mechanisms aim at dealing with this, but, to the best of our knowledge, none of them has ever proposed experimental validations that, beyond query load or response time, use measures that are outside the microeconomic scope. The contribution of this paper is twofold. We present a virtual money-based query allocation process that is suitable for large-scale super peer systems. We compare a non microeconomic mediation with micro-economic ones from a satisfaction point of view. The experimental results show that the providers' invoice phase is as much important as the providers' selection phase for a virtual money-based mediation.
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Index Terms
- Managing virtual money for satisfaction and scale up in P2P systems
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