Jaap Hage
ABSTRACT
This paper contains an informal introduction to a theory about legal reasoning (reason-based logic) that takes the notion of a reason to be central. Arguing for a conclusion comes down to first collecting the reasons that plead for and against the conclusion, and second weighing them. The paper describes how we can establish the presence of a reason and how we can argue whether the reasons for or the reasons against the conclusion prevail. It also addresses the topic of meta-level reasoning about the use of rules in concrete cases. It is shown how both rule-based reasoning and case-based reasoning are naturally incorporated in the theory of reason-based logic.
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Index Terms
- Monological reason-based logic: a low level integration of rule-based reasoning and case-based reasoning
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