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nEther: in-guest detection of out-of-the-guest malware analyzers

Published:10 April 2011Publication History

ABSTRACT

Malware analysis can be an efficient way to combat malicious code, however, miscreants are constructing heavily armoured samples in order to stymie the observation of their artefacts. Security practitioners make heavy use of various virtualization techniques to create sandboxing environments that provide a certain level of isolation between the host and the code being analysed. However, most of these are easy to be detected and evaded. The introduction of hardware assisted virtualization (Intel VT and AMD-V) made the creation of novel, out-of-the-guest malware analysis platforms possible. These allow for a high level of transparency by residing completely outside the guest operating system being examined, thus conventional in-memory detection scans are ineffective. Furthermore, such analyzers resolve the shortcomings that stem from inaccurate system emulation, in-guest timings, privileged operations and so on.

In this paper, we introduce novel approaches that make the detection of hardware assisted virtualization platforms and out-of-the-guest malware analysis frameworks possible. To demonstrate our concepts, we implemented an application framework called nEther that is capable of detecting the out-of-the-guest malware analysis framework Ether [6].

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      EUROSEC '11: Proceedings of the Fourth European Workshop on System Security
      April 2011
      53 pages
      ISBN:9781450306133
      DOI:10.1145/1972551

      Copyright © 2011 ACM

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      Publication History

      • Published: 10 April 2011

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