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Ghostbuster: A Fine-grained Approach for Anomaly Detection in File System Accesses

Published:22 March 2017Publication History

ABSTRACT

Protecting sensitive data against malicious or compromised insiders is a challenging problem. Access control mechanisms are not always able to prevent authorized users from misusing or stealing sensitive data as insiders often have access permissions to the data. Also, security vulnerabilities and phishing attacks make it possible for external malicious parties to compromise identity credentials of users who have access to the data. Therefore, solutions for protection from insider threat require combining access control mechanisms and other security techniques, such as encryption, with techniques for detecting anomalies in data accesses. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to create fine-grained profiles of the users' normal file access behaviors. Our approach is based on the key observation that even if a user's access to a file seems legitimate, only a fine-grained analysis of the access (size of access, timestamp, etc.) can help understanding the original intention of the user. We exploit the users' file access information at block level and develop a feature-extraction method to model the users' normal file access patterns (user profiles). Such profiles are then used in the detection phase for identifying anomalous file system accesses. Finally, through performance evaluations we demonstrate that our approach has an accuracy of 98.64% in detecting anomalies and incurs an overhead of only 2%.

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        CODASPY '17: Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
        March 2017
        382 pages
        ISBN:9781450345231
        DOI:10.1145/3029806

        Copyright © 2017 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 22 March 2017

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        CODASPY '17 Paper Acceptance Rate21of134submissions,16%Overall Acceptance Rate149of789submissions,19%

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