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- Sharing the cost of muliticast transmissions (preliminary version)
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Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
SPAA '04: Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architecturesIn this paper we consider the problem of sharing the costs of multicast transmissions in ad hoc wireless networks. Assuming that the receiving users are selfish, we provide strategy- proof mechanisms that are either optimally budget balanced or ...
Wireless Multihop Transmissions for Secret Sharing Communication
UIC-ATC-SCALCOM '14: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE 11th Intl Conf on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing and 2014 IEEE 11th Intl Conf on Autonomic and Trusted Computing and 2014 IEEE 14th Intl Conf on Scalable Computing and Communications and Its Associated Workshops (UIC-ATC-ScalCom)This paper proposes a novel routing protocol called neighbor-disjoint routing protocol in wireless multihop networks for secret sharing communication where data messages are transmitted along multiple wireless multihop transmission routes. Here, all ...
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
A crucial issue in non-cooperative wireless networks is that of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions to different users residing at the stations of the network. Each station acts as a selfish agent that may misreport its utility (i.e., the ...
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