Lin Zhang
ABSTRACT
Sensor attacks alter sensor readings and spoof Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) to perform dangerous actions. Existing detection works tend to minimize the detection delay and false alarms at the same time, while there is a clear trade-off between the two metrics. Instead, we argue that attack detection should dynamically balance the two metrics when a physical system is at different states. Along with this argument, we propose an adaptive sensor attack detection system that consists of three components - an adaptive detector, detection deadline estimator, and data logger. It can adapt the detection delay and thus false alarms at run time to meet a varying detection deadline and improve usability (or false alarms). Finally, we implement our detection system and validate it using multiple CPS simulators and a reduced-scale autonomous vehicle testbed.
- Hongjun Choi, Wen-Chuan Lee, Yousra Aafer, Fan Fei, Zhan Tu, Xiangyu Zhang, Dongyan Xu, and Xinyan Deng. 2018. Detecting attacks against robotic vehicles: A control invariant approach. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 801--816.Google Scholar
Digital Library
- Jairo Giraldo, David Urbina, Alvaro Cardenas, Junia Valente, Mustafa Faisal, Justin Ruths, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Henrik Sandberg, and Richard Candell. 2018. A survey of physics-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 51, 4 (2018), 1--36.Google ScholarDigital Library
- Tianjia He, Lin Zhang, Fanxin Kong, and Asif Salekin. 2020. Exploring Inherent Sensor Redundancy for Automotive Anomaly Detection. In 57th Design Automation Conference. ACM.Google Scholar
- Fanxin Kong, Oleg Sokolsky, James Weimer, and Insup Lee. 2019. State Consistencies for Cyber-Physical System Recovery. In Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Resilience (CPS-SR).Google Scholar
- Colas Le Guernic. 2009. Reachability Analysis of Hybrid Systems with Linear Continuous Dynamics. Theses. Université Joseph-Fourier - Grenoble I. https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00422569Google Scholar
- Raul Quinonez, Jairo Giraldo, Luis Salazar, Erick Bauman, Alvaro Cardenas, and Zhiqiang Lin. 2020. SAVIOR: Securing Autonomous Vehicles with Robust Physical Invariants. In 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20).Google Scholar
- Aviva Hope Rutkin. 2013. spoofers use fake GPS signals to knock a yacht off course. MIT Technology Review (2013).Google Scholar
- Francesco Sabatino. 2015. Quadrotor control: modeling, nonlinearcontrol design, and simulation. Master's thesis. KTH, Automatic Control.Google Scholar
- Yunmok Son, Hocheol Shin, Dongkwan Kim, Youngseok Park, Juhwan Noh, Kibum Choi, Jungwoo Choi, and Yongdae Kim. 2015. Rocking drones with intentional sound noise on gyroscopic sensors. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15). 881--896.Google Scholar
- David I Urbina, Jairo A Giraldo, Alvaro A Cardenas, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Junia Valente, Mustafa Faisal, Justin Ruths, Richard Candell, and Henrik Sandberg. 2016. Limiting the impact of stealthy attacks on industrial control systems. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 1092--1105.Google ScholarDigital Library
- Ruixuan Wang, Fanxin Kong, Hasshi Sudler, and Xun Jiao. 2021. HDAD: Hyperdimensional Computing-based Anomaly Detection for Automotive Sensor Attacks. In 27th IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS), Brief Industry Paper Track. IEEE.Google Scholar
- Chen Yan, Hocheol Shin, Connor Bolton, Wenyuan Xu, Yongdae Kim, and Kevin Fu. 2020. SoK: A Minimalist Approach to Formalizing Analog Sensor Security. In 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 480--495.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Lin Zhang, Xin Chen, Fanxin Kong, and Alvaro A. Cardenas. 2020. Real-Time Recovery for Cyber-Physical Systems using Linear Approximations. In 41st IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS). IEEE.Google Scholar
- Lin Zhang, Pengyuan Lu, Fanxin Kong, Xin Chen, Oleg Sokolsky, and Insup Lee. 2021. Real-Time Attack-Recovery for Cyber-Physical Systems using Linear-Quadratic Regulator. In 21st ACM SIGBED International Conference on Embedded Software (EMSOFT).Google ScholarDigital Library
- Youqian Zhang and KB Rasmussen. 2020. Detection of electromagnetic interference attacks on sensor systems. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P).Google ScholarCross Ref
Recommendations
Stochastic coding detection scheme in cyber-physical systems against replay attack
Highlights- A stochastic coding scheme is proposed to generate covariance difference of the compromised data under replay attack, which removes the performance ...
AbstractIn this paper, the security problems in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) against replay attack are considered. With replay attacks, attacker records and covers the transmitted data between the senders and receivers of the sensors. In ...
A dynamic encryption–decryption scheme for replay attack detection in cyber–physical systems
AbstractThis paper deals with the replay attack detection problem for a class of cyber–physical systems. A dynamic encryption–decryption scheme is proposed with the purpose of detecting the replay attacks launched by the malicious adversary. ...
A hybrid behavior- and Bayesian network-based framework for cyber–physical anomaly detection
AbstractIn recent years, the increasing Internet connectivity and heterogeneity of industrial protocols have been raising the number and nature of cyber-attacks against Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Such cyber-attacks may lead to cyber anomalies and ...
Highlights- Hybrid behavior- and Bayesian network-based cyber–physical anomaly detection.
- Hybrid anomaly detection framework based on both cyber and physical data from ICS.
- Identification of cyber, physical and cyber–physical anomalies in ICS.
Comments