Dorothy E. Denning
Abstract
A method for implementing secure personal computing in a network with one or more central facilities is proposed. The method employs a public-key encryption device and hardware keys. Each user is responsible for his own security and need not rely on the security of the central facility or the communication links. A user can safely store confidential files in the central facility or transmit confidential data to other users on the network.
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Index Terms
- Secure personal computing in an insecure network
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