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DOOM: a novel adversarial-DRL-based op-code level metamorphic malware obfuscator for the enhancement of IDS

Published:12 September 2020Publication History

ABSTRACT

We designed and developed DOOM (Adversarial-DRL based Opcode level Obfuscator to generate Metamorphic malware), a novel system that uses adversarial deep reinforcement learning to obfuscate malware at the op-code level for the enhancement of IDS. The ultimate goal of DOOM is not to give a potent weapon in the hands of cyber-attackers, but to create defensive-mechanisms against advanced zero-day attacks. Experimental results indicate that the obfuscated malware created by DOOM could effectively mimic multiple-simultaneous zero-day attacks. To the best of our knowledge, DOOM is the first system that could generate obfuscated malware detailed to individual op-code level. DOOM is also the first-ever system to use efficient continuous action control based deep reinforcement learning in the area of malware generation and defense. Experimental results indicate that over 67% of the metamorphic malware generated by DOOM could easily evade detection from even the most potent IDS. This achievement gains significance, as with this, even IDS augment with advanced routing sub-system can be easily evaded by the malware generated by DOOM.

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        UbiComp/ISWC '20 Adjunct: Adjunct Proceedings of the 2020 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing and Proceedings of the 2020 ACM International Symposium on Wearable Computers
        September 2020
        732 pages
        ISBN:9781450380768
        DOI:10.1145/3410530

        Copyright © 2020 Owner/Author

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        Association for Computing Machinery

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        Publication History

        • Published: 12 September 2020

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