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A security vulnerability analysis of SoCFPGA architectures

Published:24 June 2018Publication History

ABSTRACT

SoCFPGAs or FPGAs integrated on the same die with chip multi processors have made it to the market in the past years. In this article we analyse various security loopholes, existing precautions and countermeasures in these architectures. We consider Intel Cyclone/Arria devices and Xilinx Zynq/Ultrascale devices. We present an attacker model and we highlight three different types of attacks namely direct memory attacks, cache timing attacks, and rowhammer attacks that can be used on inadequately protected systems. We present and compare existing security mechanisms in this architectures, and their shortfalls. We present real life example of these attacks and further countermeasures to secure systems based on SoCFPGAs.

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  • Published in

    cover image ACM Conferences
    DAC '18: Proceedings of the 55th Annual Design Automation Conference
    June 2018
    1089 pages
    ISBN:9781450357005
    DOI:10.1145/3195970

    Copyright © 2018 ACM

    © 2018 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or affiliate of a national government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only.

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    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    • Published: 24 June 2018

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