nach oben

Journal of Business Economics

Erschienen in:

16.01.2017 | Original Paper

An experimental study on bribes, detection probability and principal witness policy

verfasst von: Alexandra Christöfl, Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger, Arleta Rasmußen

Erschienen in: Journal of Business Economics | Ausgabe 8/2017

Einloggen

Aktivieren Sie unsere intelligente Suche, um passende Fachinhalte oder Patente zu finden.

search-config

KI-gestützte Suche

Aus

Abstract

We present the results of a laboratory bribery experiment in which two bidders compete for a contract and make offers to an employee of a firm which can be accompanied by a bribe. The employee then decides who to award the contract to. The roles of both bidders and the employee are played by subjects in the laboratory. We test whether different probabilities of a bribe being discovered influence the honesty of a contract placing. In a further treatment we investigate the effect of the possibility of cooperating with the authority (principal witness) in combination with a leniency policy in the form of a reduced fine for the all players who cooperate with the authorities. We find that the presence of a leniency policy reduces the number of bribes offered, but at the same time makes the bribes that are offered more profitable for corrupt bidders who earn more, especially under the principal witness condition.

Vorheriger Artikel Empirical research on corporate social responsibility assurance (CSRA): A literature review

Nächster Artikel The influences of behavioral biases, barriers and facilitators on the willingness of forwarders’ decision makers to modal shift from unimodal road freight transport to intermodal road–rail freight transport

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

Journal of Business Economics

From January 2013, the Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft (ZfB) is published in English under the title Journal of Business Economics (JBE). The Journal of Business Economics (JBE) aims at encouraging theoretical and applied research in the field of business economics and business administration, promoting the exchange of ideas between science and practice.

Jetzt informieren

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Jetzt informieren

A recent discussion about the broad range of various types of risks can be found in Baule and Fandel (2016).

An extended abstract on this experiment was previously published in the Operations Research Proceedings 2012 (Christöfl et al. 2014). For this publication, we conducted additional experimental sessions increasing the sample size from 120 to 180 participants and substantially extended the analysis.

Following these 8 rounds, another experiment followed which we will not report in this paper.

For B ₁ and B ₂, the following restrictions are valid: (1) The offer o consisting of the official price p _i and the unofficial bribe b _i cannot be larger than the budget v:p _i + b _i ≤ v (2) The official price p _i of the project (without bribe b _i) must exceed the costs c:p _i – b _i ≥ c (3) Therefore the official price p _i lies between the costs c and the budget v:c ≤ p _i ≤ v (4) The unofficial part (namely the bribe) cannot be larger than the official price p _i and therefore b _i ≤ p _i is assumed.

Abbink K (2006) Laboratory experiments on corruption. In: Rose-Ackermann S (ed) International handbook on the economics of corruption. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 418–437

Abbink K, Hennig-Schmidt H (2006) Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. Exp Econ 9(2):103–121. doi:10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z CrossRef

Abbink K, Irlenbusch B, Renner E (2002) An experimental bribery game. J Law Econ Organ 18(2):428–454. doi:10.1093/jleo/18.2.428 CrossRef

Abbink K, Dasgupta U, Gangadharan L, Jain T (2014) Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes. J Public Econ 111:17–28. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012 CrossRef

Apesteguia et al (2007) Imitation: theory and experimental evidence. J Econ Theory 136:217–235CrossRef

Banerjee A, Mullainathan S, Rema H (2012) Corruption. http://www.nber.org/papers/w17968. Accessed 02 Apr 2014

Barr A, Serra D (2009) The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment. Exp Econ 12(4):488–503. doi:10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9 CrossRef

Baule R, Fandel G (2016) Editorial. J Bus Econ. doi:10.1007/s11573-016-0833-5

Büchner S, Freytag A, González LG, Güth W (2008) Bribery and public procurement: an experimental study. Public Choice 137(1–2):103–117. doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9315-9 CrossRef

Christöfl A, Leopold-Wildburger U, Rasmußen A (2014) Simulation of bribes and consequences of leniency policy. Results from an experimental study. In: Helber S, Breitner M, Rösch D, Schön C, von der Schulenburg JMG, Sibbertsen P, Steinbach M, Weber S, Wolter A (eds) Operations research proceedings 2012. Springer, Cham, pp 211–216

Engel C, Georg SJ, Yu G (2012) Symmetric vs. asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57476. Accessed 03 Apr 2014

European Commission (2014) EU anti-corruption report. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/corruption/docs/acr_2014_en.pdf. Accessed 21 Apr 2014

Ewelt-Knauer C, Knauer T, Lachmann M (2015) Fraud characteristics and their effects on shareholder wealth. J Bus Econ 85:1011–1047CrossRef

Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp Econ 10(2):171–178. doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 CrossRef

Flash Eurobarometer 374 (2014) Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_374_en.pdf. Accessed 01 Apr 2014

Frank B, Schulze GG (2000) Does economics make citizens corrupt? J Econ Behav Organ 43(1):101–113. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00111-6 CrossRef

Frank B, Lambsdorff JG, Mohnen PA (2010) Gender and corruption: lessons from laboratory corruption experiments. Eur J Dev Res 23(1):59–71. doi:10.1057/ejdr.2010.47 CrossRef

Hamilton L (2008) Statistics with STATA. Duxbury

Heineman BW, Heimann F (2006) The Long War against Corruption. Foreign Aff 85(3):75. doi:10.2307/20031968 CrossRef

International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency International, United Nations Global Compact, World Economic Forum (2008) Clean business is good business. The business case against corruption. http://www.weforum.org/pdf/paci/BusinessCaseAgainstCorruption.pdf. Accessed 21 Apr 2014

Lambsdorff JG, Frank B (2010) Bribing versus gift-giving—an experiment. J Econ Psychol 31(3):347–357. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.004 CrossRef

öStGB Österreichisches Strafgesetzbuch (2002) §41a, BGBl I 134/2002, Rechtsinformationssystem der Republik Österreich (RIS)

Rasmussen A, Leopold-Wildburger U (2015) Honesty in intra-organizational reporting. J Bus Econ 84:929–958CrossRef

Serra D (2012) Combining top-down and bottom-up accountability: evidence from a bribery experiment. J Law Econ Organ 28(3):569–587. doi:10.1093/jleo/ewr010 CrossRef

Special Eurobarometer 397 (2014) Corruption. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_397_en.pdf. Accessed 21 Apr 2014

Titel: An experimental study on bribes, detection probability and principal witness policy
verfasst von: Alexandra Christöfl
Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger
Arleta Rasmußen
Publikationsdatum: 16.01.2017
Verlag: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Erschienen in: Journal of Business Economics / Ausgabe 8/2017
Print ISSN: 0044-2372
Elektronische ISSN: 1861-8928
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-017-0846-8

Springer Professional

Abstract

Bitte loggen Sie sich ein, um Zugang zu Ihrer Lizenz zu erhalten.

Sie haben noch keine Lizenz? Dann Informieren Sie sich jetzt über unsere Produkte:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Journal of Business Economics

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Premium Partner