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Journal of Financial Services Research

18.07.2023

Multinational Lending Retrenchment after the Global Financial Crisis: The Impact of Policy Interventions

verfasst von: Miriam Goetz

Erschienen in: Journal of Financial Services Research

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Abstract

Did policy interventions contribute to the gradual segmentation of lending markets starting with the 2007 - 2008 global financial crisis? We investigate this question in an international Cournot duopoly model with equity constraints. Two symmetric multinational banks compete for corporate lending via local affiliates in two separate national lending markets. Their credit risk in each market is determined by their choice of monitoring effort, which is more costly for foreign lending. Under a binding equity constraint, our model predicts the following: Shocks to bank equity, regulatory standards and monetary policy, such as occurred during and after the crisis, increase the lending home bias of multinational banks. We interpret this retrenchment as a flight to informationally closer or better understood lending. Our results under a non-binding equity constraint are largely identical.

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During the period of 1995–2009, the share of foreign owned banks increased by 70% globally (Claessens and Van Horen , 2014). Lending by foreign owned banks has been found to widen and deepen local lending markets as well as provide additional channels of financing in case of an interbank market or local economic shock (see e.g. Allen et al. (2017), Schnabl (2012)).

Works such as De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) or Frey and Kerl (2015) document the post-crisis retrenchment of multinational lending.

Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) show that a greater geographical distance to a loan applicant increases the likelihood of the loan being rejected. Further, the quality of banks’ proprietary information on their existing borrowers decreases with the bank-borrower distance.

See Moody’s Analytics (2018) for an overview of current, advanced economy loan monitoring practices.

As shown by Karceski et al. (2005) and Sapienza (2002), the greater information cost of foreign or geographically distant banks persists even after an acquisition of or merger with a local bank. This can be attributed to a greater ‘hierarchial distance’ between borrower and loan officer within a larger banking organization (Stein , 2002).

Sette and Gobbi (2015) and others show a similar post-crisis retrenchment in lending to informationally distant borrowers within countries.

The existence of such a credit interest rate channel is evidenced by the sharp and persistent increase in banks’ corporate lending margins following the default of Lehman Brothers, see Fig. 2.

Recent contributions to the regulatory literature focus for instance on the cyclicality of the Basel regulations (Chami and Cosimano , 2010; Repullo and Suarez , 2012; Mankart et al. , 2019). Their dynamic modeling frameworks allow for positive equity buffers to emerge endogenously.

Empirical findings corroborate this result in that the lending supply of poorly capitalized banks reacts more severely to negative equity or regulatory shocks (see e.g. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette (2012), Fraisse et al. (2020)).

Head and Spencer (2017) give an overview of recent applications of oligopolistic models of international trade.

In our model, we abstract from entry costs in foreign markets as in Faia et al. (2021). This describes an integrated regional banking sector where affiliate subsidiaries are already established and entry costs are sunk.

One rationale for this relationship is that increased bank monitoring reduces the entrepreneurs’ moral hazard problem, inducing him to exert a greater managerial effort (Holmstrom and Tirole , 1997).

In the EU, most private firms report under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) of their home country. Accordingly, foreign bank affiliates receive financial statements and documentation from their local corporate borrowers in national GAAP. National GAAP rules can be significantly different across European countries (Nobes , 2011).

See Barth et al. (2013) for a recent global overview of deposit insurance schemes.

Due to their inherent opacity, small and young businesses have limited access to capital markets and rely largely on local bank credit for external financing (see Berger and Udell (1998) for a summary of the literature). As shown by Beck et al. (2018), even larger and mature firms are twice as likely to receive credit from domestic than foreign banks.

Equivalently, the greater cost of equity can be interpreted as the significant underpricing required in issuing new equity. Both interpretations capture the idea that equity capital is a particularly costly form of financing (see Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) or Hellmann et al. (2000) for similar assumptions).

Perfect correlation of credit risks is a common assumption in the regulation literature, see e.g. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) or Boyd and De Nicolo (2005).

For a binding equity constraint, these expressions hold with equality.

In our model, the local credit interest rates depend on the distribution of firms’ gross rather than expected revenue from investment (see Eq. 1). In consequence, the banks’ choice of local monitoring effort and thus credit risk is independent of the local credit volume and their share therein.

A binding constraint on banks’ overall lending volume can potentially give rise to an additional equilibrium in autarky \(\gamma _i=\gamma _j=1\). We find that our model does not support this. Banks’ choice of a greater monitoring effort in the domestic market leads to a greater marginal cost of domestic lending. The cost savings of the first unit of foreign lending subsequently overcompensate a possibly smaller unit revenue, eliminating the possibility of an autarky solution.

In the United States, banks experienced losses as early as 2007, most prominently from direct exposure to mortgage lending. European banks on the other hand experienced losses mostly through the exposure of their securities portfolios to US mortgage backed securities and stocks of US financial intermediaries. Investors priced this devaluation of investments into the banks’ market valuation starting with the Lehman Brothers default.

This is in line with the empirical finding of Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) of a general ‘flight to quality’ of banks during the crisis.

The negative relationship of equity requirements and credit risk is in opposition to the result of Hakenes and Schnabel (2011). This is due to our modeling of borrower monitoring, which eliminates the entrepreneurs’ choice of project risk.

Similarly, Cappelletti et al. (2019) find that banks respond to increases in equity requirements by shifting their lending to less risky counterparties within the corporate sector.

Unconventional expansionary monetary policy can be modeled as the reduction of a "shadow policy rate" as introduced by Lombardi et al. (2018).

Buch and Dages (2018) document an increase in the cost of equity for banks of all advanced economies during the crisis. This increase was most persistent for European banks, whose cost of equity returned to pre-crisis levels only in 2014.

While banks reduce their lending volume in both markets in response to an increase in \(\rho \), this reduction is less pronounced in the domestic market, leading to an increase in the lending home bias. Indeed, domestic lending \(L_d^{\dagger }\) only decreases only under the assumption of a moderate information cost differential \(b_f-b_d<2b_d\) while the decline of the foreign lending volume \(L_f^{\dagger }\) is unambiguous.

In the following, we make use of the inequality \(\sqrt{a+b}<\sqrt{a}+\sqrt{b}\).

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Titel: Multinational Lending Retrenchment after the Global Financial Crisis: The Impact of Policy Interventions
verfasst von: Miriam Goetz
Publikationsdatum: 18.07.2023
Verlag: Springer US
Erschienen in: Journal of Financial Services Research
Print ISSN: 0920-8550
Elektronische ISSN: 1573-0735
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10693-023-00414-6