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Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy 1/2014

01.03.2014 | Original Paper

What should classical liberal political economists do?

verfasst von: Peter J. Boettke

Erschienen in: Constitutional Political Economy | Ausgabe 1/2014

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Abstract

In 1964 James Buchanan famously asked “What Should Economists Do?” He argued that economists should focus their intellectual attention on exchange and the institutions within which exchange takes place. This paper reflects on Buchanan’s message and looks at the development of that argument, and its implications in the wake of post-socialist political economy on the one hand, and the post-financial crisis of 2008 on the other. Following Buchanan, the paper argues that classical liberal political economists must embrace the intellectual and practical challenges of the day, and bring a robust theory of political economy to bear on questions of justice, questions of freedom and responsibility, and questions concerning the invisible hand and the appropriate institutional framework which results in peaceful social cooperation and productive specialization in a society of free and responsible individuals.

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Metadaten
Titel
What should classical liberal political economists do?
verfasst von
Peter J. Boettke
Publikationsdatum
01.03.2014
Verlag
Springer US
Erschienen in
Constitutional Political Economy / Ausgabe 1/2014
Print ISSN: 1043-4062
Elektronische ISSN: 1572-9966
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-014-9155-1

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