Anne Gerdes
Abstract
This paper discusses whether we should grant moral consideration to robots. Contemporary approaches in support of doing so centers around a relational appearance based approach, which takes departure in the fact that we already by now enter into ethical demanding relations with (even simplistic) robots as if they had a mind of their own. Hence, it is assumed that moral status can be viewed as socially constructed and negotiated within relations. However, I argue that a relational turn risks turning the as if into if at the cost of losing sight of what matters in human-human relations. Therefore, I stick to a human centered framework and introduce a moral philosophical perspective, primarily based on Kant's Tugendlehre and his conception of duties as well as the Formula of Humanity, which also holds a relational perspective. This enables me to discuss preliminary arguments for moral considerations of robots.
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Index Terms
- The issue of moral consideration in robot ethics
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