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Published in:
2010 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
A Communication Based Model for Games of Imperfect Information
Authors : R. Ramanujam, Sunil Simon
Published in: CONCUR 2010 - Concurrency Theory
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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The standard way of modelling imperfect information in games is in terms of information partitions for players. In this view, each player is associated with an equivalence relation over the set of game positions. For multiplayer games of imperfect information defined in this manner it turns out that most of the algorithmic questions like determining the winning strategy and synthesis of an equilibrium profile are undecidable. In this light, we propose a model where the players’ information partitions are generated explicitly by means of communication. We define a notion of locally consistent equilibrium and suggest that this captures the intuition of stable behaviour of players better. We show that when communication is by means of public announcements, the question of whether locally consistent equilibrium profile exists is decidable.