Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Published in:
Compact Attribute-Based Encryption and Signcryption for General Circuits from Multilinear Maps Read chapter Read first chapter

2015 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

A Key to Success

Success Exponents for Side-Channel Distinguishers

Authors : Sylvain Guilley, Annelie Heuser, Olivier Rioul

Published in: Progress in Cryptology -- INDOCRYPT 2015

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

The success rate is the classical metric for evaluating the performance of side-channel attacks. It is generally computed empirically from measurements for a particular device or using simulations. Closed-form expressions of success rate are desirable because they provide an explicit functional dependence on relevant parameters such as number of measurements and signal-to-noise ratio which help to understand the effectiveness of a given attack and how one can mitigate its threat by countermeasures. However, such closed-form expressions involve high-dimensional complex statistical functions that are hard to estimate.
In this paper, we define the success exponent (SE) of an arbitrary side-channel distinguisher as the first-order exponent of the success rate as the number of measurements increases. Under fairly general assumptions such as soundness, we give a general simple formula for any arbitrary distinguisher and derive closed-form expressions of it for \(\mathsf {DoM}\), \(\mathsf {CPA}\), \(\mathsf {MIA}\) and the optimal distinguisher when the model is known (template attack). For \(\mathsf {DoM}\) and \(\mathsf {CPA}\) our results are in line with the literature. Experiments confirm that the theoretical closed-form expression of the SE coincides with the empirically computed one, even for reasonably small numbers of measurements. Finally, we highlight that our study raises many new perspectives for comparing and evaluating side-channel attacks, countermeasures and implementations.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
previous chapter Differential Fault Analysis of SHA-3
next chapter Non-malleable Extractors with Shorter Seeds and Their Applications
Footnotes
1
Capitals such as X denote random variables. The corresponding lowercase x denotes realizations of these random variables. We write \(\mathbb {P}\{A\}\) for the probability of an event A and \(\mathbb {E}\{X\}\) for the expectation of a random variable X.
 
2
It is known that for bit #1, the DoM is not sound: the same distinguisher value can be obtained for the correct key \(k=k^*\) and for at least one incorrect key \(k=k^*\oplus \texttt {0x9}\).
 
Literature
1.
Batina, L., Robshaw, M. (eds.): CHES 2014. LNCS, vol. 8731. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)
2.
Belgarric, P., Bhasin, S., Bruneau, N., Danger, J.-L., Debande, N., Guilley, S., Heuser, A., Najm, Z., Rioul, O.: Time-frequency analysis for second-order attacks. In: Francillon, A., Rohatgi, P. (eds.) CARDIS 2013. LNCS, vol. 8419, pp. 108–122. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)
3.
Bogdanov, A.A., Knudsen, L.R., Leander, G., Paar, C., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M., Seurin, Y., Vikkelsoe, C.: PRESENT: an ultra-lightweight block cipher. In: Paillier, P., Verbauwhede, I. (eds.) CHES 2007. LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 450–466. Springer, Heidelberg (2007) CrossRef
4.
Brier, E., Clavier, C., Olivier, F.: Correlation power analysis with a leakage model. In: Joye, M., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) CHES 2004. LNCS, vol. 3156, pp. 16–29. Springer, Heidelberg (2004) CrossRef
5.
Chakraborty, K., Sarkar, S., Maitra, S., Mazumdar, B., Mukhopadhyay, D., Prouff, E.: Redefining the transparency order. In: The Ninth International Workshop on Coding and Cryptography, WCC 2015, Paris, France, April 13–17, 2015
6.
Chari, S., Rao, J.R.: Rohatgi template attacks. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2002. LNCS, vol. 2523, pp. 13–28. Springer, Heidelberg (2003) CrossRef
7.
Cover, T.M., Thomas, J.A.: Elements of Information Theory, 2nd edn. Wiley-Interscience, July 18, 2006. ISBN-10: ISBN-10: 0471241954, ISBN-13: 978–0471241959
8.
Doget, J., Prouff, E., Rivain, M., Standaert, F.-X.: Univariate side channel attacks and leakage modeling. J. Cryptographic Eng. 1(2), 123–144 (2011)CrossRef
9.
Duc, A., Faust, S., Standaert, F.-X.: Making masking security proofs concrete. In: Oswald, E., Fischlin, M. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9056, pp. 401–429. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)
10.
Fei, Y., Luo, Q., Ding, A.A.: A statistical model for DPA with novel algorithmic confusion analysis. In: Prouff, E., Schaumont, P. (eds.) CHES 2012. LNCS, vol. 7428, pp. 233–250. Springer, Heidelberg (2012) CrossRef
11.
Ronald, A.: Statistical Methods for Research Workers. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh (1925)
12.
Gierlichs, B., Batina, L., Tuyls, P., Preneel, B.: Mutual information analysis. In: Oswald, E., Rohatgi, P. (eds.) CHES 2008. LNCS, vol. 5154, pp. 426–442. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) CrossRef
13.
14.
Heuser, A., Kasper, M., Schindler, W., Stottinger, M.: How a symmetry metric assists side-channel evaluation - a novel model verification method for power analysis. In: Proceedings of the 2011 14th Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design, DSD 2011, pp. 674–681. IEEE Computer Society, Washington DC (2011)
15.
Heuser, A., Rioul, O., Guilley, S.: Good Is not good enough - deriving optimal distinguishers from communication theory. In: Batina and Robshaw [1], pp. 55–74
16.
Kardaun, O.J.W.F.: Classical Methods of Statistics. Springer, Heidelberg (2005) MATH
17.
Kocher, P.C., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999) CrossRef
18.
Lomné, V., Prouff, E., Rivain, M., Roche, T., Thillard, A.: How to estimate the success rate of higher-order side-channel attacks. In: Batina and Robshaw [1], pp. 35–54
19.
Maghrebi, H., Rioul, O., Guilley, S., Danger, J.-L.: Comparison between side-channel analysis distinguishers. In: Chim, T.W., Yuen, T.H. (eds.) ICICS 2012. LNCS, vol. 7618, pp. 331–340. Springer, Heidelberg (2012) CrossRef
20.
Mangard, S.: Hardware countermeasures against DPA – a statistical analysis of their effectiveness. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) CT-RSA 2004. LNCS, vol. 2964, pp. 222–235. Springer, Heidelberg (2004) CrossRef
21.
22.
Moddemeijer, R.: On estimation of entropy and mutual information of continuous distributions. Signal Process. 16(3), 233–248 (1989)MathSciNetCrossRef
23.
Moradi, A., Mousavi, N., Paar, C., Salmasizadeh, M.: A comparative study of mutual information analysis under a gaussian assumption. In: Youm, H.Y., Yung, M. (eds.) WISA 2009. LNCS, vol. 5932, pp. 193–205. Springer, Heidelberg (2009) CrossRef
24.
Picek, S., Mazumdar, B., Mukhopadhyay, D., Batina, L.: Modified transparency order property: solution or just another attempt. In: Chakraborty, R.S., Schwabe, P., Solworth, J. (eds.) Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering. LNCS, vol. 9354, pp. 210–227. Springer, Heidelberg (2015)CrossRef
25.
Prouff, E.: DPA attacks and S-boxes. In: Gilbert, H., Handschuh, H. (eds.) FSE 2005. LNCS, vol. 3557, pp. 424–441. Springer, Heidelberg (2005) CrossRef
26.
Prouff, E., Rivain, M.: Theoretical and practical aspects of mutual information based side channel analysis. In: Abdalla, M., Pointcheval, D., Fouque, P.-A., Vergnaud, D. (eds.) ACNS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5536, pp. 499–518. Springer, Heidelberg (2009) CrossRef
27.
Prouff, E., Rivain, M., Bevan, R.: Statistical analysis of second order differential power analysis. IEEE Trans. Comput. 58(6), 799–811 (2009)MathSciNetCrossRef
28.
Rao, C.R.: Linear Statistical Inference and its Applications, 2nd edn. J. Wiley and Sons, New York (1973)MATHCrossRef
29.
Rivain, M.: On the exact success rate of side channel analysis in the gaussian model. In: Avanzi, R.M., Keliher, L., Sica, F. (eds.) SAC 2008. LNCS, vol. 5381, pp. 165–183. Springer, Heidelberg (2009) CrossRef
30.
Standaert, F.-X., Malkin, T.G., Yung, M.: A unified framework for the analysis of side-channel key recovery attacks. In: Joux, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479, pp. 443–461. Springer, Heidelberg (2009) CrossRef
31.
Thillard, A., Prouff, E., Roche, T.: Success through confidence: evaluating the effectiveness of a side-channel attack. In: Bertoni, G., Coron, J.-S. (eds.) CHES 2013. LNCS, vol. 8086, pp. 21–36. Springer, Heidelberg (2013) CrossRef
32.
Veyrat-Charvillon, N., Standaert, F.-X.: Mutual information analysis: how, when and why? In: Clavier, C., Gaj, K. (eds.) CHES 2009. LNCS, vol. 5747, pp. 429–443. Springer, Heidelberg (2009) CrossRef
33.
Whitnall, C., Oswald, E.: A fair evaluation framework for comparing side-channel distinguishers. J. Cryptographic Eng. 1(2), 145–160 (2011)CrossRef
Metadata
Title
A Key to Success
Authors
Sylvain Guilley
Annelie Heuser
Olivier Rioul
Copyright Year
2015
Book
Progress in Cryptology -- INDOCRYPT 2015

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-26616-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-26617-6

Copyright Year: 2015

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26617-6_15

Premium Partner

    Image Credits