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2013 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

A Note on Communication Structures

Author : Vito Fragnelli

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

Several power indices were introduced in order to account for different aspects of decisional situations. In this note we analyze how to deal with those situations, commonly arising in politics, in which the agents have some incompatibilities. We present some comments on existing power indices and discuss how communication structures and restricted games may allow a better evaluation of the power of the parties when incompatibilities play a relevant role. Also the question of the probability of a coalition to form is discussed.

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Title: A Note on Communication Structures
Author: Vito Fragnelli
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35928-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-642-35929-3

Copyright Year: 2013
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_24