A Two-Faced Russia? Civilian Interests and Great Power Politics in the High North

See for example: Lavrov (2016), Patrushev (2015), Patrusjev (2014), Putin (1999, 2007, 2014), Shoigu (2018a).

In the Russian foreign policy concept of 2000 Russia is described as a ‘great power, one of the most influential centers in the modern world’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2000). In Russia’s 2009 National Security Strategy towards 2020 Russia is described as a ‘world power’ (mirovaya derzhava) (President of the Russian Federation 2009). Russia’s National Security Strategy from 2015 states that Russia’s long-term strategic national interests are to consolidate the Russian Federation’s ‘status as a leading world power’ in a ‘poly-centric world’ (Rossiskaya Gazeta 2015: § 30).

A detailed list of the influx of resources to modernise equipment can be found in Cooper (2016). Also see: Defense Intelligence Agency (2017).

Thus, they argue that Russia’s nuclear forces consists of roughly 318 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), with approximately 1138 warheads. Submarines: 10 operational nuclear ballistic submarines (SSBN) (6 Delta IV, 1 Delta III, 3 Borei class), each with 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) with a maximum loading of more than 700 warheads. This amount may have been reduced to 600 warheads due to New START implementation. Strategic bombers (Tu-160 (Blackjack), Tu-95MS (Bear)): 60–70 (50 deployed under New START) with a maximum loading of 786 warheads [on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM)]. The number may be lower due to New START. On top of this, Russia has a number of non-strategic nuclear weapons, approximately 1.830 warheads. In 2018 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assessed that the air force controlled some 500 warheads, the air defence had some 300 warheads in its inventory, the army had some 140 warheads and the navy up to around 810 warheads (Kristensen and Norris 2018).

Among the more critical voices on Russia’s presumed enhanced capabilities is (Renz 2014).

One of the successes is Novatek’s Yamal LNG project, where subsidiaries of the China National Petroleum Corporation own 20% alongside France’s Total (10%), Novatek (50.1%) and the Silk Road Fond (9.9%).

According to new Russian rules, a foreign state must send a notification of a ship travelling along the NSR at least 45 days in advance and include a description of the ship, its objective, route and period of sailing as well as data on the ship’s motor, the name of the captain etc. (Staalesen 2019c). Additional limitations have been placed on foreign warships (Sudakov 2019).

The remaining around 40% of Russia’s sea-based strategic nuclear weapons are placed at the Russian Pacific Fleet’s SSBN’s, which are based at Vilyuchinsk at Kamptjatka. They also occasionally operate in Arctic Waters (Åtland 2018).

The 200th is a Separate Motor Rifle Brigade that includes a main battle tank unit, which has T-80BVMs adapted for Arctic conditions and three motorised rifle units in BTR-82A, artillery and air defence assets. The 80th is a Separate Motor Rifle Brigade with Soviet era MT-LBV vehicles adapted for Arctic conditions (Army Recognition 2018). The 80th has a battalion of 122-mm 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers adapted for Arctic conditions and is supported by a small number of Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 rescue helicopters. It is also supported by two air surveillance regiments, namely the 331st and 332 Radio-Technical Regiments in Severomorsk and Arkhangelsk (Boulègue 2019: 17–18).

Army recognition counts 38 surface vessels and 42 submarines (Army Recognition 2018). Jane’s says 41 submarines and 37 surface vessels in the Northern Fleet compared to 21 submarines and 52 surface ships in the Pacific Fleet. Russianships.info (2019) lists 37 active surface vessels in the Northern Fleet and 41 submarines (Russianships.info 2019). In comparison, in the late 1980s the Northern Fleet of the Soviet Union had 172 submarines, including 39 SSBNs, 46 cruise missile submarines and 87 attack submarines (Klimenko 2016: 18).

Due to New START the warhead loading on the missiles on Delta IV and Borei submarines may have been reduced (Kristensen and Korda 2019).

Kristensen and Korda says up to ten boats (Kristensen and Korda 2019). Other sources speak of up to 14 Borei and Borei II (Borei A) nuclear submarines (Gady 2019).

Furthermore, Russia’s Northern Fleet has six active Akula-class submarines, four Sierra I-III-class (SSGN) (nuclear guided missile submarine) (Kondor), four Victor III-class, one Lada-class submarine and seven Kilo-class diesel electric submarines (Novosibirsk), where the Rostov on Don fired Kalibr missiles at targets in Syria in the Mediterranean on 8 December 2015 (Jane’s 2019).

The short-range air defence systems are mostly the Pantsir S-1 or Tor M2DT. The Tor M2DT is designed specifically for Arctic conditions, and according to the Russian Ministry of Defence, 12 such unites were delivered to the Arctic forces in 2018 (Moscow Times 2018b). Also the Pantsir S-1 now comes in an Arctic version, which is to be delivered to Russia’s Arctic forces (Army Recognition 2019).

The S-400 is often described as having a 400-km range and being able to hit a range of targets at all heights and speeds. However, the 40N6 missile with the purported 400-km range is not yet operational and has failed several tests. More likely, the range should be set between 200 and 250 km, at medium to high altitudes against large, high-value targets such as AWACS surveillance aircraft or aircraft for transport. Effective range against ‘agile fighter jets and cruise missiles operating at low altitudes can be as little as 20–35 km’ (Dalsjö et al. 2019: 10).

Back in 2016, the Swedish Defence Research Agency argued in a report that ‘[a]ir defence assets are scarce and covering the entire region is a tall order’ (Persson 2016: 82). To some extent, this is still the case, taking the large distances into account. For a similar view, see: Boulègue (2019: 25).

For a similar opinion, see Danish Defence Intelligence Services (2018).