Skip to main content
Disciplines
Automotive Business IT + Informatics Construction + Real Estate Electrical Engineering + Electronics Energy + Sustainability Insurance + Risk Finance + Banking Management + Leadership Marketing + Sales Mechanical Engineering + Materials
Events
DE
EN
Books
Journals
Topic Page
Marketing
Start single access now
Access for companies
EXTENDED SEARCH
Log in
Top
Published in:
Open Science as-a-Service for Research Communities and Content Providers Read chapter Read first chapter

2019 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Applying Auctions to Bank Holding Company Software Project Portfolio Selection

Author : David S. Gerstl

Published in: Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Large banks in the United States are often organized as bank holding companies controlling one or more subsidiaries. Their inorganic growth has led to duplicated capacity. In pursuit of cost savings, many holding companies provide shared services, including software development. Demand for development resources generally exceeds supply, leading to the need for a centralized project selection process. The selection methodology chosen is sometimes based on a resource constraint problem, using projected financials provided by the subsidiaries. This solution architecture is susceptible to misaligned incentives. We propose the use of a combinatorial auction to assist in project selection and more closely align the incentives of executives to those of the bank. We discuss appropriate auction formats for the contest based on the economic characteristics of the problem and explore impediments to implementation.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 390 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe




 

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now
previous chapter Open Science as-a-Service for Research Communities and Content Providers
next chapter Preventing Collusion in Cloud Computing Auctions
Literature
1.
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P.A., Roth, A.E.: The New York City high school match. Am. Econ. Rev. 95(2), 364–367 (2005)CrossRef
2.
Ausubel, L.M., Baranov, O.V.: Market design and the evolution of the combinatorial clock auction. Am. Econ. Rev. 104(5), 446–451 (2014)CrossRef
3.
Ausubel, L.M., Cramton, P.C., Milgrom, P.R.: The clock-proxy auction: a practical combinatorial auction design. In: Cramton et al. [10], Chap. 5, pp. 115–138
4.
5.
Ausubel, L.M., Milgrom, P.R.: The lovely but lonely Vickrey auction. In: Cramton et al. [10], Chap. 1, pp. 17–40
6.
Avraham, D., Selvaggi, P., Vickery, J.I.: A structural view of U.S. bank holding companies. Econ. Policy Rev. 18(2), 65–81 (2012)
7.
Bartal, Y., Gonen, R., Nisan, N.: Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions. In: Proceedings of the Ninth Conference TARK, pp. 72–87. ACM (2003)
8.
Bettinelli, A., Cacchiani, V., Malaguti, E.: A branch-and-bound algorithm for the knapsack problem with conflict graph. INFORMS J. Comput. 29(3), 457–473 (2017)MathSciNetCrossRef
9.
Chen, J., Askin, R.G.: Project selection, scheduling and resource allocation with time dependent returns. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 193(1), 23–34 (2009)CrossRef
10.
Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., Steinberg, R. (eds.): Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, Boston (2006)MATH
11.
Day, R.W., Cramton, P.: Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions. Oper. Res. 60(3), 588–603 (2012)MathSciNetCrossRef
12.
2009 executive job market intelligence report. Technical report, ExecuNet (2009)
13.
14.
Ghasemzadeh, F., Archer, N., Iyogun, P.: A zero-one model for project portfolio selection and scheduling. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 50(7), 745–755 (1999)CrossRef
15.
16.
17.
18.
Krysta, P., Telelis, O., Ventre, C.: Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 53, 721–744 (2015)MathSciNetCrossRef
19.
Lehmann, D., Müller, R., Sandholm, T.: The winner determination problem. In: Cramton et al. [10], Chap. 12, pp. 297–318
20.
Leyton-Brown, K., Shoham, Y., Tennenholtz, M.: An algorithm for multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In: AAAI/IAAI, pp. 56–61 (2000)
21.
Marshall, R.C., Marx, L.M.: The Economics of Collusion: Cartels and Bidding Rings. MIT Press, Cambridge (2012)CrossRef
22.
Meier, I., Tarhan, V.: Corporate investment decision practices and the hurdle rate premium puzzle. In: 2006 Annual Management European Financial Management Association (2006)
23.
Nisan, N.: Bidding languages. In: Cramton et al. [10], Chap. 9, pp. 215–231
24.
Parkes, D.: Iterative combinatorial auctions. In: Cramton et al. [10], Chap. 2, pp. 41–78
25.
26.
Pinto, J.K.: Project Management: Achieving Competitive Advantage. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River (2010)
27.
Roth, A.E.: Who Gets What—and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston (2015)
28.
29.
Shou, Y.Y., Huang, Y.L.: Combinatorial auction algorithm for project portfolio selection and scheduling to maximize the net present value. J. Zhejiang Univ. Sci. C 11(7), 562–574 (2010)CrossRef
30.
31.
Thaler, R.H.: Anomalies: the winner’s curse. J. Econ. Perspect. 2(1), 191–202 (1988)CrossRef
32.
33.
Metadata
Title
Applying Auctions to Bank Holding Company Software Project Portfolio Selection
Author
David S. Gerstl
Copyright Year
2019
Book
Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services

Print ISBN: 978-3-030-13341-2

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-13342-9

Copyright Year: 2019

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-13342-9_2

Premium Partner

    Image Credits