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2015 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

57. Assessing the Performance of Estimators Dealing with Measurement Errors

Authors : Heitor Almeida, Murillo Campello, Antonio F. Galvao

Published in: Handbook of Financial Econometrics and Statistics

Publisher: Springer New York

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Abstract

We describe different procedures to deal with measurement error in linear models and assess their performance in finite samples using Monte Carlo simulations and data on corporate investment. We consider the standard instrumental variable approach proposed by Griliches and Hausman (Journal of Econometrics 31:93–118, 1986) as extended by Biorn (Econometric Reviews 19:391–424, 2000) [OLS-IV], the Arellano and Bond (Review of Economic Studies 58:277–297, 1991) instrumental variable estimator, and the higher-order moment estimator proposed by Erickson and Whited (Journal of Political Economy 108:1027–1057, 2000, Econometric Theory 18:776–799, 2002). Our analysis focuses on characterizing the conditions under which each of these estimators produce unbiased and efficient estimates in a standard “errors-in-variables” setting. In the presence of fixed effects, under heteroscedasticity, or in the absence of a very high degree of skewness in the data, the EW estimator is inefficient and returns biased estimates for mismeasured and perfectly measured regressors. In contrast to the EW estimator, IV-type estimators (OLS-IV and AB-GMM) easily handle individual effects, heteroscedastic errors, and different degrees of data skewness. The IV approach, however, requires assumptions about the autocorrelation structure of the mismeasured regressor and the measurement error. We illustrate the application of the different estimators using empirical investment models. Our results show that the EW estimator produces inconsistent results when applied to real-world investment data, while the IV estimators tend to return results that are consistent with theoretical priors.

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Footnotes
1
Naturally, if extraneous instruments are available, they can help solve the identification problem. See Rauh (2006) for the use of discontinuities in pension contributions as a source of variation in cash flows in an investment model. Bond and Cummins (2000) use information contained in financial analysts’ forecasts to instrument for investment demand.
 
2
Lags of the well-measured variable may also be included in the instrument set if they are believed to also contain information about the mismeasured one.
 
3
See, among others, Biorn (2000), Wansbeek (2001), and Xiao et al. (2008).
 
4
Examples are Whited (2001, 2006), Hennessy (2004), and Colak and Whited (2007).
 
5
The results for the Arellano–Bond GMM estimator are similar to those of the OLS-IV estimator. To save space and because the OLS-IV estimator is easier to implement, we focus on this estimator.
 
6
See Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) for comprehensive reviews. We note that the presence of financing frictions does not necessarily imply that the cash flow coefficient should be positive. See Chirinko (1993) and Gomes (2001) for arguments suggesting that financing frictions are not sufficient to generate positive cash flow coefficients.
 
7
First, the measurement errors, the equation error, and all regressors have finite moments of sufficiently high order. Second, the regression error and the measurement error must be independent of each other and of all regressors. Third, the residuals from the population regression of the unobservable regressors on the perfectly measured regressors must have a nonnormal distribution.
 
8
More specifically, these conditions are as follows: (z i , χ i , u i , ε i ) is an independent and identically distributed sequence; u i and the elements of z i , χ i , and ε i , have finite moments of every order; (u i , ε i ) is independent of (z i , χ i ), and the individual elements in (u i , ε i ) are independent of each other; E(u i ) = 0 and E(ε i ) = 0; E[(z i , χ i )′(z i , χ i )] is positive definite; every element of β is nonzero; and the distribution of η satisfies E[(η i c)3] ≠ 0 for every vector of constants c = (c 1,⋯,c J ) having at least one nonzero element.
 
9
See Erickson and Whited (2002) Lemma 1 for the definition of their proposed influence function.
 
10
A more recent paper by Xiao et al. (2008) also shows how to relax the classical Griliches–Hausman assumptions for measurement error models.
 
11
Formally, one can show that C(x it , x ) = ∑ χχ + ∑ εε , E(x it , y ) = ∑ χχ β + ∑ t χη , and E(y it , y ) = β′ ∑ χχ β + ∑ t xn β + β H ′(∑ θ xn )′ + σ uu + σ ηη .
 
12
In particular, if ∣tp∣, ∣θp∣ > τ, then (B1) and rank (E[χ ip χ itθ )]) = K for some pt ≠ 0 ensure consistency of OLS–IV B, \( {\widehat{\beta}}_{xp\left( t\theta \right)} \), and (B2) and the same rank condition ensure consistency of \( {\widehat{\beta}}_{xy\left( t\theta \right)} \). In the same way, if ∣pt∣, qt > τ, (B1), (D1), (D2), and rank (E[(Δχ ipq )′χ it )]) = K for some pqt ensure consistency of OLS-IV B, \( {\widehat{\beta}}_{x(pq) t}, \) and (B2), (D1), (D2), and the same rank condition ensure consistency of \( {\widehat{\beta}}_{y(pq) t} \).
 
13
In models with exogenous explanatory variables, Z i may consist of sub-matrices with the block diagonal (exploiting all or part of the moment restrictions), concatenated to straightforward one-column instruments.
 
14
See Propositions 1* and 2* in Biorn (2000) for a formal treatment of the conditions.
 
15
The mean squared error (MSE) of an estimator \( \widehat{\theta} \) incorporates a component measuring the variability of the estimator (precision) and another measuring its bias (accuracy). An estimator with good MSE properties has small combined variance and bias. The MSE of \( \widehat{\theta} \) can be defined as \( \mathrm{Var}\left(\widehat{\theta}\right)+{\left[\mathrm{Bias}\left(\widehat{\theta}\right)\right]}^2 \). The root mean squared error (RMSE) is simply the square root of the MSE. This is an easily interpretable statistic, since it has the same unit as the estimator \( \widehat{\theta} \). For an approximately unbiased estimator, the RMSE is just the square root of the variance, that is, the standard error.
 
16
Robustness checks show that the choice of a standard normal does not influence our results.
 
17
To our knowledge, all but one of the empirical applications of the EW model use the data in level form. In other words, firm-fixed effects are ignored outright in panel setting estimations of parameters influencing firm behavior.
 
18
The results using the median are similar.
 
19
We focus on the OLS-IV estimator hereinafter for the purpose of comparison with the EW estimator.
 
20
Since estimation biases have the same features across all well-measured regressors of a model, we restrict attention to the first well-measured regressor of each of the estimated models.
 
21
Our simulation results (available upon request) suggest that introducing heteroscedasticity makes the performance of the EW estimator even worse in these cases.
 
22
The results for w it = z it are quite similar to those we get from setting w it = γ i . We report only one set of graphs to save space.
 
23
We note that if the instrument set uses suitably long lags, then the OLS-IV results are robust to variations in the degree of correlation in the MA process. In unreported simulations under MA(1), we show that the OLS bias is nearly invariant to the parameter θ.
 
24
The empirical cumulative distribution function F n is a step function with jumps i/n at observation values, where i is the number of tied observations at that value.
 
25
However, financial constraints are not sufficient to generate a strictly positive cash flow coefficient because the effect of financial constraints is capitalized in stock prices and may thus be captured by variations in q (Chirinko 1993; Gomes 2001).
 
26
Fama–MacBeth estimates are computed as a simple standard errors for yearly estimates. An alternative approach could use the Hall–Horowitz bootstrap. For completeness, we present in the appendix the actual yearly EW estimates.
 
27
In the next section, we examine the robustness of the results with respect to variation in the instrument set.
 
28
All of the F-statistics associated with the first-stage regressions have p-values that are close to zero. These statistics (reported in Table 57.10) suggest that we do not incur a weak instrument problem when we use longer lags in our instrumental set.
 
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Metadata
Title
Assessing the Performance of Estimators Dealing with Measurement Errors
Authors
Heitor Almeida
Murillo Campello
Antonio F. Galvao
Copyright Year
2015
Publisher
Springer New York
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7750-1_57