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Published in:
2005 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Atomic Selfish Routing in Networks: A Survey
Authors : Spyros Kontogiannis, Paul Spirakis
Published in: Internet and Network Economics
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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In this survey we present some recent advances in the literature of atomic (mainly network) congestion games. The algorithmic questions that we are interested in have to do with the
existence
of pure Nash equilibria, the
efficiency
of their construction when they exist, as well as the
gap
of the best/worst (mixed in general) Nash equilibria from the social optima in such games, typically called the
Price of Anarchy
and the
Price of Stability
respectively.