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2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Attacks on Secure Logging Schemes

Author : Gunnar Hartung

Published in: Financial Cryptography and Data Security

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

We present four attacks on three cryptographic schemes intended for securing log files against illicit retroactive modification. Our first two attacks regard the LogFAS scheme by Yavuz et al. (Financial Cryptography 2012), whereas our third and fourth attacks break the BM- and AR-FssAgg schemes by Ma (AsiaCCS 2008).

All schemes have an accompanying security proof, seemingly contradicting the existence of attacks. We point out flaws in these proofs, resolving the contradiction.

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For efficiency reasons, schemes where each secret key can be computed from the previous one, and where there is only single, compact key for verification are desirable. However these properties are not strictly required.

The original scheme in [22] includes the value \(e_j\) in the signature. We have omitted this, as \(e_j\) can be recomputed by the verifier.

For this reason, our attack does not carry over to the underlying forward-secure signature scheme by Bellare and Miner [3]. There, the values \(r_j\) are chosen uniformly and independently at random, which prevents our attack.

As with our attack on the BM-FssAgg scheme, our attack does not carry over to the underlying forward-secure signature scheme by Abdalla and Reyzin [1], since the values \(r_j\) are chosen independently at random in their signature scheme.

Our attacks can be easily generalized to work with any \(t+1\) consecutive aggregate signatures \(\sigma _{1,k}, \ldots , \sigma _{1,k + t+ 1}\) or even with any \(t\) pairs of directly consecutive aggregate signatures \((\sigma _{1,k_1}, \sigma _{1,k_1 + 1}), \ldots , (\sigma _{1,k_t}, \sigma _{1,k_t+ 1})\).

Our implementation of the schemes is only intended to provide a background for our attacks. We did therefore not attempt to harden our implementation against different types of attacks at all.

The number of supported epochs \(T\) may be unrealistically low. But since \(T\) does not influence the time required for executing our attacks, a small \(T\) is sufficient for our demonstration.

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Title: Attacks on Secure Logging Schemes
Author: Gunnar Hartung
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-70971-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-70972-7

Copyright Year: 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70972-7_14

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