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Published in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 3/2021

07-08-2020 | Original Research

Auditor response to changing risk: money market funds during the financial crisis

Authors: Kyle D. Allen, Drew B. Winters

Published in: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | Issue 3/2021

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Abstract

Audits provide monitoring for investors. The collapse of markets across the financial crisis made assets more difficult to value, which increased risk for auditors. The money markets were at the center of the financial crisis increasing audit engagement risk on money market funds, which at the time of the crisis were highly opaque. Measuring the response to increased engagement risk with audit fees, this study finds that auditors increase their fees for the riskiest class of funds. However, no evidence was found that audit fees increased as funds increased their holdings in the riskiest class of securities.

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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
The weighted average maturity (WAM in Table 1) is less than 45 days.
 
2
Anderson and Gascon (2009) note that heightened financial market uncertainty caused lenders to shift away from CP and into default-free securities. Commercial paper outstanding was $2.2 trillion in July 2007 at the beginning of the crisis. Commercial paper outstanding was $1.2 in December 2009 at the end of the crisis.
 
3
See Xu et al. (2013), Desai et al. (2016) and Zhang et al. (2011).
 
4
See Sikka (2009).
 
5
The PCAOB is a private-sector not-for-profit corporation created by the Sarbanes–Oxley act of 2002 to oversee the audits of public companies and further the public interest of accurate and independent audit reports.
 
6
Specifically, he testified on April 6, 2011 before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment.
 
7
SFAS 157 was issued September 2006 and began effective for fiscal year-ends after November 15, 2007.
 
8
Bell and Griffin (2012) suggest auditors face significant challenges and risks when auditing high-uncertainty fair value estimates.
 
9
Robinson et al. (2018) find that managerial discretion may have distorted values of level 3 assets held by banks.
 
10
Ball (2009) suggests that the financial crisis was the first big test for auditors under Sarbanes–Oxley.
 
11
Doty (2011) notes deficiencies related to insufficient evidence from auditors when using third party pricing sources to value financial instruments.
 
12
It is possible that a recession can drive audit fees down while maintaining quality. However, empirical research suggests this is difficult to do in practice (Ettredge et al. 2014a, b; Asthana and Boone 2012; Blankley et al. 2012).
 
13
Goldie et al. (2018) identify PWC as an audit specialist in bond mutual funds. They find higher audit fees for bond funds associated with PWC audits. Their sample period is 2005 through 2009, which includes the financial crisis.
 
14
Doogar et al. (2015) suggests auditors had the ability to recognize changes in risk, but that limitations in regulations may have prevented them from addressing it in an appropriate manner.
 
15
MMFs typically invest in the wholesale market, which means large dollar units. Large means $1 million, which is the common unit size for negotiable CDs, repos, and commercial paper. Federal agency debt trades in $500,000 unit size. Treasury bills are the exception and trade in $100 units. The Treasury wants all investors to be able to buy its debt.
 
16
From July 2007 through December 2009, the amount of financial CP outstanding declined from $781 bil. to $593 bil., which is about a 24% decrease.
 
17
Taylor and Williams (2009) note that BNP Paribus’ halting redemptions in these funds is generally recognized as the beginning of the financial crisis. At the time of the BNP Paribus action the amount outstanding in the ABCP market was about $1.2 trillion and by August 2008 (the month before Lehman filed for bankruptcy) the amount outstanding in ABCP had declined by $500 billion (Akay et al. 2013). By the end of the financial crisis in December 2009, the amount of ABCP outstanding had declined to $452 bil., which is about a 62% decrease across the financial crisis.
 
18
Since the Lehman bankruptcy is a key event in the financial crisis, we need to mention Lehman’s use of repo 105 and repo 108 transactions. These transactions were used by Lehman to window-dress its balance sheet in the months leading up to it bankruptcy. These transactions relate to the amount of collateral Lehman provided and did not reflect general market conditions. Accordingly, this is unlikely to affect the price of other repos. See, Griffiths et al. (2012) for a discussion of these transactions.
 
19
Using the natural log of audit fees is common practice in the audit fee literature. An alternative method to natural logs to control for outliers is to winsorize the data. We estimate all of our regression models with winsorized (at various levels) dollar audit fees as the dependent variable. The winsorized data yields similar results to the natural log of audits fees. We do not report the winsorized results in the interest of brevity.
 
20
The variables are defined in “Appendix”.
 
21
Recall from footnote #13 that Goldie et al. (2018) identify PWC as an audit specialist in bond mutual funds and that as a bond audit specialist they receive higher audit fees. Their sample period is 2005 through 2009, which includes the financial crisis.
 
22
We specifically referred to these recent studies: Ettredge et al. (2014a, b), Goncharov et al. (2014), and Goldie et al. (2018).
 
23
Prime funds have 39% of their audits done during the busy season, while Government funds have 34% of their audits done during the busy season.
 
24
2008 saw the TARP to bailout banks. Also, the Fed implemented AMLF to support Prime MMFs holding ABCP [see, Akay et al. (2013)] and CPFF to purchase ABCP (Fairbanks et al. 2019). This support could explain that increase in ABCP in bank affiliated MMFs, but exploring this increase is beyond the scope of this paper.
 
25
See, Wall Street Journal, 8/20/2018, CPAs fight to Protect part of the Turf.
 
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Metadata
Title
Auditor response to changing risk: money market funds during the financial crisis
Authors
Kyle D. Allen
Drew B. Winters
Publication date
07-08-2020
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting / Issue 3/2021
Print ISSN: 0924-865X
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7179
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-020-00918-5

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