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2023 | Book

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Averting Nuclear War

Authors: Kyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Book Series : Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications

Part of: Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" , Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

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About this book

This timely book offers a comprehensive examination of the current state of nuclear stability postures worldwide, effectively highlighting their inherent limitations. Through their analysis, the authors illustrate how the seemingly contradictory perspectives of deterrence optimists, disarmament idealists, and warfighting pessimists can be reconfigured into a unified approach towards achieving regional and global peace. They suggest that these strategies can be reconciled as complementary, rather than substitute approaches, to achieve the common goal of nuclear stability.

To achieve this objective, the book employs a game-theoretical framework to analytically define the conditions for nuclear war. Drawing from extensive observations of significant crises, the model incorporates identifiable systemic regularities that influence the strategic decision-making process during severe crises and establish the prerequisites for different levels of nuclear confrontation. Additionally, by tracing the strategic-technological trajectories of nuclear powers, the authors present a novel analysis that explores the potential for stable coexistence to replace unstable confrontation between global powers, ultimately fostering nuclear peace.

The author's theoretical explorations lead to the policy conclusion that establishing a nuclear oligopolistic hierarchy, under the leadership of preponderant global powers committed to a no-first-use pledge, presents the most effective international system for enhancing both regional and global nuclear stability. This book aims to surpass the Cold War origins of current nuclear strategy and develop a comprehensive policy framework that guarantees enduring nuclear stability in the contemporary world.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction
Abstract
The introduction of nuclear weapons of mass destruction (NWMDs) has altered the landscape of modern warfare, as these weapons possess the potential to inflict greater harm on societies than traditional ones. In response to this formidable challenge, two distinct policies—Deterrence and Disarmament—have been proposed to prevent nuclear war. Though united in their aim to maintain peace, they diverge in their approaches to nuclear warhead deployment, delivery, and proliferation. Conversely, current warfighting strategies emphasize the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield to forestall the escalation of a nuclear conflict. In this book, we explore these arguments and examine each strategy within the context of nuclear risk, culminating in the synthesis of these viewpoints into a new policy framework paradigm aimed at achieving nuclear stability.
Kyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler
Chapter 2. Deterrence
Abstract
While nuclear-armed rivals engage in significant strategic competition for the sake of deterrence, the applicability of Cold War-era nuclear lessons is increasingly subject to scrutiny. The path toward stability is ambiguous at best, and as long-standing political contests remain unresolved, the ability to regulate and constrain the pursuit of nuclear capabilities grows ever more elusive.
In response to these challenges, the landscape of deterrence has been reshaped by structural shifts, occasioned by the widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons, technological advancements in warhead sophistication and miniaturization, and enhancements in the precision and velocity of delivery vehicles. As the core assumptions of traditional deterrence are challenged by these evolving conditions, the boundaries within which deterrence might foster stability have become increasingly constrained. This chapter conducts an analytical exploration of the changes in deterrence postures in response to these multifaceted developments.
Kyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler
Chapter 3. Disarmament
Abstract
Although early efforts to prevent nuclear weapon use relied on the fear of mutually assured destruction, supporters of disarmament argue that fear alone is not enough to prevent accidental or mistaken attacks. Those who advocate for disarmament believe that the only way to eliminate even the slightest chance of nuclear use is to achieve “Global Nuclear Zero,” where all nuclear weapons are eliminated from the world. However, there is no clear plan for this goal, and as nuclear capabilities continue to advance and spread, achieving Global Nuclear Zero becomes less likely. Instead, alternative approaches, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), have been widely accepted by both nuclear and non-nuclear states on a global scale. Regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (RNWFZ) have also been established to limit nuclear proliferation within certain areas of the world, reflecting a multifaceted approach to a complex and enduring challenge.
Kyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler
Chapter 4. Warfighting
Abstract
With the increase in nuclear proliferation, more countries have gained access to nuclear weapons, making deterrence both less stable and more tenuous. The purpose of a nuclear warfighting posture is to reduce the cost of war or to diminish the likelihood of its escalation within a country’s borders, thereby rendering nuclear threats more credible. Warfighting strategies emphasize the significance of nuclear superiority, which is bolstered by technological advancements. This focus provides manageable war plans or even compellence, setting it apart from more traditional punitive deterrence doctrines. Advocates for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited conflicts underscore the importance of precision and control in both deployment and targeting. Recent events have shown that tactical nuclear weapons and their modernization remain complex and contentious subjects. Debates continue over their role in deterrence and the potential consequences of their use, reflecting the ongoing challenges in managing a rapidly evolving strategic landscape.
Kyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler
Chapter 5. Conditional Deterrence: Modeling Nuclear Stability
Abstract
Policy decisions about nuclear weapons are frequently driven more by political factors than strategic considerations, a trend that may be attributed to a lack of clear theoretical frameworks. This chapter contributes to the understanding of nuclear stability and the role of nuclear weapons in contexts that previous research has not thoroughly explored. Utilizing a rational choice approach, our new conditional deterrence model examines both structural and motivational factors, revealing that situations where parties are in a balance of terror can provoke conflict rather than peace. Conversely, the notion of conditional anarchy offers a more optimistic view, highlighting that stability in deterrence is influenced by both cooperative and competitive elements, with an emphasis on maintaining the status quo as a key factor in fostering peaceful relations. These findings provide insight into the current international nuclear order, revealing a complex interplay of collaboration and self-interest.
Kyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler
Chapter 6. Findings
Abstract
Considering perspectives on deterrence, disarmament, and warfighting, this chapter begins by summarizing previous evaluations of nuclear stability and then present our own unique findings. Concluding the analysis, we provide recommendations to strengthen nuclear stability and prevent devastating consequences. Our findings from conditional deterrence analysis emphasize the need for major global powers to prioritize not only their own national security but also that of regional powers within the international hierarchy system. Such a commitment emerges as crucial, as satisfied and preponderant powers play an instrumental role in the perpetuation of the current world order. Nevertheless, the construction of such a system, free of chance, remains a long-standing challenge.
Kyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler
Chapter 7. Conclusion
Abstract
In the face of potential nuclear conflict, devising a comprehensive strategy to ensure global stability becomes paramount. Our work of conditional deterrence proposes the formation of a nuclear oligopolistic hierarchy, to be governed by leading global powers that explicitly pledge to adopt a no-first-use (NFU) policy regarding nuclear weapons. Crucially, this hierarchy must function without the constraints of a veto structure, thus facilitating the provision of security assurances to all non-nuclear regional actors and fostering a broader sense of international security. We recognize, however, the significant challenges inherent in establishing such an oligopolistic coalition of major great actors, chiefly stemming from political disagreements and divergent interests among them. Despite these constraints, our study advances the argument that selective nuclear cooperation between competing global powers is not only achievable but also vital. By focusing on areas of common interest and mutual concern, such collaboration can effectively counter the growing threat posed by expanding nuclear arsenals and increasingly sophisticated weaponry.
Kyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler
Backmatter
Metadata
Title
Averting Nuclear War
Authors
Kyungkook Kang
Jacek Kugler
Copyright Year
2023
Electronic ISBN
978-3-031-38688-6
Print ISBN
978-3-031-38687-9
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38688-6