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Social Choice and Welfare
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 3/2022

20-10-2021 | Original Paper

Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items

Authors: Gildas Sédry Fopa, Issofa Moyouwou, Joseph Siani

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 3/2022

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Abstract

For cost allocation problems with an existing set of indivisible public resources with heterogeneous individual needs and non-rivalry access, an axiomatization is provided for the allocation rule that proportionally charges agents for a given resource with respect to their counting liability indices. The main result we obtain holds in the class of cost allocation rules that are additive in cost and simply combines a new independence property together with the well-known axioms of consistency and independence of supplementary items.
previous article Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond
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Footnotes
1
To let \({\theta ^{\pi }_i\left( {\mathcal {D}}^{N},r\right) }\) be defined everywhere, we have extended its definition to redundant resources by assuming that all agents in a profile are equally liable for redundant resources. This does not alter the counting rule since Hougaard and Moulin (2014) also assume that the cost of each redundant resource is equally split among agents.
 
2
Interested readers are referred to the supplementary material joined to this paper.
 
3
In contrast with the usual statement of mergeability, all agents in S remain in the profile.
 
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Metadata
Title
Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items
Authors
Gildas Sédry Fopa
Issofa Moyouwou
Joseph Siani
Publication date
20-10-2021
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 3/2022
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01368-1

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