Advertisement
Published in:
2011 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Beyond Provable Security Verifiable IND-CCA Security of OAEP
Authors : Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Yassine Lakhnech, Santiago Zanella Béguelin
Published in: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2011
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.
Select sections of text to find matching patents with Artificial Intelligence. powered by
Select sections of text to find additional relevant content using AI-assisted search. powered by
OAEP
is a widely used public-key encryption scheme based on trapdoor permutations. Its security proof has been scrutinized and amended repeatedly. Fifteen years after the introduction of
OAEP
, we present a machine-checked proof of its security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks under the assumption that the underlying permutation is partial-domain one-way. The proof can be independently verified by running a small and trustworthy proof checker and fixes minor glitches that have subsisted in published proofs. We provide an overview of the proof, highlight the differences with earlier works, and explain in some detail a crucial step in the reduction: the elimination of indirect queries made by the adversary to random oracles via the decryption oracle. We also provide—within the limits of a conference paper—a broader perspective on independently verifiable security proofs.