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Memory Forensics of a Java Card Dump Read chapter Read first chapter

2015 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Bounded, yet Sufficient? How to Determine Whether Limited Side Channel Information Enables Key Recovery

Authors : Xin Ye, Thomas Eisenbarth, William Martin

Published in: Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This work presents a novel algorithm to quantify the relation between three factors that characterize a side channel adversary: the amount of observed side channel leakage, the workload of full key recovery, and its achievable success rate. The proposed algorithm can be used by security evaluators to derive a realistic bound on the capabilities of a side channel adversary. Furthermore, it provides an optimal strategy for combining subkey guesses to achieve any predefined success rate. Hence, it can be used by a side channel adversary to determine whether observed leakage suffices for key recovery before expending computation time. The algorithm is applied to a series of side channel measurements of a microcontroller AES implementation and simulations. A comparison to related work shows that the new algorithm improves on existing algorithms in several respects.

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previous chapter Algorithms for Outsourcing Pairing Computation
next chapter On the Security of Fresh Re-keying to Counteract Side-Channel and Fault Attacks
Footnotes
1
The cases are considered separately if incrementing or decrementing is impossible, i.e. \(e_j =1\) or \( e_j =256\) for Eqs. (5), (6) and (7).
 
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Metadata
Title
Bounded, yet Sufficient? How to Determine Whether Limited Side Channel Information Enables Key Recovery
Authors
Xin Ye
Thomas Eisenbarth
William Martin
Copyright Year
2015
Book
Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-16762-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-16763-3

Copyright Year: 2015

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16763-3_13

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