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Published in:
2009 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Breaking and Repairing Damgård et al. Public Key Encryption Scheme with Non-interactive Opening
Author : David Galindo
Published in: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2009
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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We show a simple chosen-ciphertext attack against a public key encryption scheme with non-interactive opening (PKENO) presented by Damgård, Kiltz, Hofheinz and Thorbek in CT-RSA 2008. In a PKENO scheme a receiver can convincingly reveal to a verifier what the result of decrypting a ciphertext
C
is, without interaction and without compromising the confidentiality of non-opened ciphertexts. A special interesting feature of PKENO is that a verifier can even ask for opening proofs on invalid ciphertexts. Those opening proofs will convince the verifier that the ciphertext was indeed invalid. We show that one of the schemes by Damgård
et al.
does not achieve the claimed security goal. Next we provide a fix for it. The repaired scheme presents essentially no overhead and is proven secure under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model.