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Public Choice

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01-09-2012

Buchanan and Tullock’s apple

Author: Keith L. Dougherty

Published in: Public Choice | Issue 3-4/2012

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When I was a graduate student at the University of Maryland, my professors would argue about which books were the five most important in formal political theory. Their lists included classics that affected a wide audience, not just works that were technically advanced. Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action (1965), and Anthony Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy (Downs 1957) frequently made the list. Others were discussed, but Buchanan and Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent always seemed to be in the top five. …

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Arrow, K. (1951). Social choice and individual values. New York: Wiley.

Dougherty, K. L., & Edward, J. (2004). The Pareto efficiency and expected costs of k-majority rules. Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 3, 161–189. CrossRef

Dougherty, K. L., & Edward, J. (2005). A nonequilibrium analysis of unanimity rule, majority rule, and Pareto. Economic Inquiry, 43, 855–864. CrossRef

Dougherty, K. L., & Edward, J. (2009). Odd or even: assembly size and majority rule. The Journal of Politics, 71, 733–747. CrossRef

Dougherty, K. L., & Edward, J. (2011). The calculus of consent and constitutional design. New York: Springer. CrossRef

Dougherty, K. L., & Edward, J. (2012). Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis. Public Choice, 151, 655–678. CrossRef

Dougherty, K. L., Pitts, B., Moeller, J., & Ragan, J. (2012). An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule. Public Choice. doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9901-0.

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper.

Head, J. G. (1974). Public goods and public welfare. Durham: Duke University Press.

Heckelman, J. C., & Dougherty, K. L. (2010). Majority rule versus supermajority rules: their effects on narrow and broad taxes. Public Finance Review, 38, 738–761. CrossRef

Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Riker, W. H. (1962). Review of the calculus of consent by James M. Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 6, 408–411. CrossRef

Rogowski, R. (1974). Rational legitimacy: a theory of political support. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sen, A. K. (1979). Collective choice and social welfare. New York: North-Holland.

Tsebelis, G. (1990). Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Title: Buchanan and Tullock’s apple
Author: Keith L. Dougherty
Publication date: 01-09-2012
Publisher: Springer US
Published in: Public Choice / Issue 3-4/2012
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9985-1

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Other articles of this Issue 3-4/2012

From the Open Society to The Calculus of Consent: a long journey

James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and The Calculus

States without romance

Methodological and normative individualism in The Calculus

The unanimity rule revisited: the case of revisions of hybrid constitutions

Personal reflections on the influence of Buchanan, Tullock, and The Calculus of Consent

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