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Published in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management 4/2006

01-12-2006

Business groups and their types

Author: Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra

Published in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management | Issue 4/2006

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Abstract

We clarify what business groups are and analyze their various types. We first distinguish business groups from other types of firm networks based on the strategic relationships among companies; business groups are defined as those networks that exhibit unrelated diversification under common ownership. We then separate business groups into three types based on their ownership: family-owned, widely-held, and state-owned. We argue that each type has different agency costs and diversification logics. As a result of these differences, their performance varies, with family-owned business groups outperforming widely-held ones, and these in turn outperforming state-owned business groups.

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Metadata
Title
Business groups and their types
Author
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra
Publication date
01-12-2006
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Asia Pacific Journal of Management / Issue 4/2006
Print ISSN: 0217-4561
Electronic ISSN: 1572-9958
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-006-9012-5

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