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Published in:
Conception of Cartels: Definition and Diversity Read chapter Read first chapter

2015 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

3. Cartel Markets

Authors : Jurgita Bruneckienė, Irena Pekarskienė, Andrius Guzavičius, Oksana Palekienė, Jūratė Šovienė

Published in: The Impact of Cartels on National Economy and Competitiveness

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

During different stages of business cycles cartelists are acting differently. During a boom period cartel members have better guarantees of benefit from collective action. An economic boom associated with high profit would lead to higher cartel benefits. The game theory models argue that cartels are usually stable and tend to integrate at the boom phase of a business cycle, because a high price level and high corporate profitability encourage companies to follow the agreements. During a decline period making benefit of this action less certain cartels could break down.

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previous chapter Cartel Occurrence and Operation in Market
next chapter Legal Regulation of Cartels
Footnotes
2
According to Bradūnas, Mikelionytė, and Petrauskaitė (2010), high market concentration and control of suppliers are likely to favour cartel formation even in the bread market.
 
3
An investigation in the meat processing market was initiated and terminated in 2007. In 2010, an investigation was launched in the food product manufacturing and sale industry. The investigation is still in progress.
 
4
In 2005, an investigation was initiated in the area of trade networks activities. The investigation was terminated.
 
5
In the academic literature, the terms “market power” and “monopoly power” are often used as synonyms. However, ABA (2005) identified a difference suggesting that monopoly power is to be regarded as a stronger form of market power.
 
6
Usually CR4 and CR8 are used in antitrust investigations.
 
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Metadata
Title
Cartel Markets
Authors
Jurgita Bruneckienė
Irena Pekarskienė
Andrius Guzavičius
Oksana Palekienė
Jūratė Šovienė
Copyright Year
2015
Book
The Impact of Cartels on National Economy and Competitiveness

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-17286-6

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-17287-3

Copyright Year: 2015

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17287-3_3