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Published in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management 1/2008

01-03-2008

Change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance

Authors: Toru Yoshikawa, Jean McGuire

Published in: Asia Pacific Journal of Management | Issue 1/2008

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Abstract

Previous studies on Japanese corporate governance were largely based on the agency theory framework, and can be seen as attempts to understand the unique monitoring mechanisms in the Japanese context. This paper briefly reviews prior research and then discusses the recent changes in the environment that have been affecting Japanese corporate governance. Our central argument is that there is both change and continuity in Japanese Corporate Governance. We also present emerging research from an institutional theory perspective. In this line of research, corporate governance is treated as part of a nation’s institutional framework and hence, researchers need to understand unique institutional arrangements that affect corporate governance practices and their change or continuity.

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Footnotes
1
Kabushiki Bunpu Chosa (Stock distribution survey), 2004.
 
2
In Asia, Japan is not alone in this regard. In China, Peng (2004) finds that outside directors do not contribute to improvement of firms’ financial performance.
 
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Metadata
Title
Change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance
Authors
Toru Yoshikawa
Jean McGuire
Publication date
01-03-2008
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Asia Pacific Journal of Management / Issue 1/2008
Print ISSN: 0217-4561
Electronic ISSN: 1572-9958
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-007-9064-1

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