2010 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
Author : Biung-Ghi Ju
Published in: Handbook on Approval Voting
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
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Individual preferences often take simple structures in some restricted environments. The so-called universal domain assumption in the three impossibility results by Arrow (1951), Sen (1970a,b), and Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) have been scrutinized and (partially) abandoned in numerous later studies, which do not intend to identify well-behaved social welfare functions that “would be universal in the sense that it would be applicable to any community” (Arrow 1951, p. 24). Important breakthroughs have been made in this line of research: Gaertner (2002) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on domain restrictions.