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2022 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

6. Constraints Diluting the Effectiveness of Board Independence

Authors : Shveta Singh, Monika Singla

Published in: Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance

Publisher: Springer Nature Singapore

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Abstract

The current chapter deals with the analysis of third broad objective of the study. This objective is related to the empirical analysis of factors which can explain the ineffectiveness of independent directors in India.

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Title: Constraints Diluting the Effectiveness of Board Independence
Authors: Shveta Singh
Monika Singla
Publisher: Springer Nature Singapore
Book: Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance
Print ISBN: 978-981-19-2459-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-981-19-2460-6

Copyright Year: 2022
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-2460-6_6