1 Introduction
2 A framework to bridge the micro–macro gap
Meaning of context | Level of analysis | |
---|---|---|
Firm level | Aggregate level | |
Context as container | Quadrant A Context by sampling: sampling FFs and/or non-FFs in a contextual setting Context by comparing: Comparing FFs and/or non-FFs operating in two or more contextual settings | Quadrant C Context by sampling: Sampling all FFs or a representative group of FFs in a contextual setting in order to explore or determine their contributions to the employment outcomes Context by comparing: Comparing two or more contextual settings by sampling all or a representative group of FFs in order to determine their contributions to employment outcomes |
Context as a covariate | Quadrant B Context by theorizing: Measuring contextual dimensions in order to determine their impact on FFs and/or non-FFs | Quadrant D Context by theorizing: Measuring contextual dimensions in order to determine their impact on FFs or a representative group of FFs and their contributions to employment outcomes |
3 Methodology
Business Source Complete | Scopus | Manual | Exclusion | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Automatic search—keywords search in title/abstract | 82 | 144 | 227 | ||
Manual search—key journal | 20 | 247 | |||
No. of duplicates | −59 | 188 | |||
After reading Title/Abstract | −47 | 141 | |||
After reading entire articles | −74 | 67 | |||
Final sample | 67 |
4 Literature review on family firms’ employment outcomes
4.1 Firm level
4.1.1 Context as a container—firm level
4.1.2 Context by sampling
Author | Journal | Sample/Country | Theoretical framework | Research design | Independent variable | Moderator | Mediator | Family firm operationalization | Employment outcomes | Main findings |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Aoi et al. (2015) | Journal of Family Business Management | Listed family and non-family firms/Japan | / | Quantitative | Family ownership. Fraction of board members from founding family in the board. CEO from founding family | / | / | Family ownership (> 10% equity) and/or a family member serving on board of directors as members chair or vice-chair | Employee relations as pillar of composite corporate social performance index | Compared to family counterparts, non-family firms are found to achieve better employee relations. However, when industry is controlled for, family ownership and family CEO together positively affect the employee relationship pillar |
Barnett et al. (2009) | Family Business Review | Family and non-family firms/USA | Identity theory and social identity theory | Quantitative | Career role salience; family role salience | Family firm status | / | Self-reported definition of family firms | Employment growth | Family firm status positively moderates the relationship between business owner’s career salience and firm growth |
Bassanini et al. (2013) | ILR Review | Family and non-family firms/France | / | Quantitative | Family ownership | / | / | Family ownership (main category of shareholders is either a family or an individual) | Wages level-Downsizing | Family-owned businesses pay lower wages to employees than non-family businesses on average. In contrast, the former have higher job security |
Bennedsen et al. (2018) | Journal of Financial Economics | Family and non-family firms/Denmark | – | Quantitative | Family management | / | / | Family management: (1) two board members are related to the CEO by blood or marriage or (2) any three board members are related (even if none of them is CEO) | Absenteeism | The family status of the firm is negatively correlated with absenteeism meaning that family firms are in a better position to elicit cooperative behaviour from employees |
Becchettti and Trovato (2002) | Small Business Economics | Family and non-family firms/Italy | Gibrath law | Quantitative | Family ownership | / | / | Family ownership (at least 50% of equity) | Employment growth | In addition to size and age, financial constraints and access to foreign markets are major determinants of small and medium-sized family enterprises |
Blanco-Mazagatos et al. (2018) | Journal of Business Research | Unlisted family firms/Spain | Human Capital Theory | Quantitative | HR practices for family and non-family employees | Generational stage | / | Family ownership (> 50%), governance and succession intention | Organizational human capital (OHC) | Both family and non-family employees' skill- and motivation-enhancing practices improve OHC. Generational stage exerts positive influence on aforementioned relationships |
Block (2010) | Family Business Review | Family and non-family listed firms/USA | Social identity and Agency theory | Quantitative | Family ownership. Family management | / | / | Family ownership and management (CEO or Chairman is from family) | Downsizing | Family ownership reduces the likelihood of downsizing to preserve corporate reputation preservation, while family management has no effect |
Cameron et al. (2009) | Journal of Human Resources in Hospitality & Tourism | Small family-owned business/Australia | / | Qualitative | / | / | / | / | Employment retention | Small family businesses in rural areas can successfully adopt human resource management to strengthen their relationships with employees to retain staff |
Coad and Timmermans (2014) | European Management Review | Family and non-family entrepreneurial dyads/Denmark | / | Quantitative | Family ownership | / | / | Family status of the firm, uniquely based on family relationships | Employment growth | Family entrepreneurial teams show lower employment growth than non-family counterparts |
Colombo et al. (2014) | Journal of Small Business Management | Family and non-family firms/Italy | SEW approach | Quantitative | Family ownership; non-family members in entrepreneurial team; multiple generations in ET | Changes in sales | / | Family ownership (at least 50% of equity) | Downsizing | In entrepreneurial ventures with family ownership, the relationship between changes in sales and changes in employment is weaker than in their counterparts without family ownership. The involvement of multiple generations further weakens this relationship |
Dailey and Reuschling (1980) | Journal of General Management | USA | / | Qualitative | / | / | / | / | Termination | Human resource management in family-owned businesses is characterized by lack of objectivity and formal policies regarding employee termination and retirement |
Damiani et al. (2018) | Economia Politica | Listed and non-listed family and non-family firms/Italy | / | Quantitative | Family firm status; performance- related pay for employees (PRP) | / | / | Family ownership (> 50% of shares) | Competitiveness | Family firms that adopt wage-incentives obtain greater gains in terms of competitiveness than non-family counterparts |
Deng (2018) | Asia Pacific Business Review | Single family firm/China | Social capital theory/Social exchange perspective/Organizational support | Qualitative | / | / | / | / | Employee retention | By embedding familiness in human management practices, a family firm can enhance employees’ organizational commitment, which in turn positively affects the retention of migrant workers |
Diwisch et al. (2009) | Small Business Economics | Family firms/Austria | / | Quantitative | Generation | / | / | / | Employment growth | Family firms that have either planned or already transferred ownership and control show a significant and positive impact on employment growth compared to firms without any succession plan |
Eddleston et al. (2013) | Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice | Family firms/USA | / | Quantitative | Strategic planning | Generational involvement | / | Self-definition of family firms and at least two family members involved in the business | Employment growth | Family firm growth is influenced by strategic planning and succession in place. While the relationship is positive in first-generation firms, neither forms of planning lead to growth for second-generation firms. Their positive influence re-emerges in third-generation family firms |
Ensley et al. (2007) | Journal of Business Research | Family and non-family firms/USA | Upper Echelons Theory | Quantitative | Long-term stock option dispersion; short-term pay dispersion | / | Potency; cohesion; affective conflict; cognitive conflict | Essence approach | Employment growth | Pay dispersion in top management teams of family firms negatively affects team cohesion, effectiveness, and conflicts, which in turn harms employment growth. The detrimental effect of pay dispersion is higher in family firms than in their non-family counterparts |
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2018) | Human Resource Management | Only family firms/Spain | Behavioral agency theory | Quantitative | Firms size; sales trend | Non-family dominance of TMT | / | Family ownership (> 50% of shares) and management | Employee risk bearing | Family firms dominated by non-family members in the TMT are more likely to introduce incentive pay schemes than family firms dominated by family members in the TMT. This tendency is aggravated in firms bigger in size and declines when trend sales is negative |
Hu and Schaufeli (2011) | Career Development International | Three family-owned business/USA | / | Quantitative | Past job downsizing; anticipated downsizing; current remuneration | / | Burnout; work engagement | / | Turnover intention | Using the Job Demands-Resources (JD-R) model, the authors show that job insecurity negatively affects employees’ turnover intentions. This relationship is mediated by the workers perceived well-being |
Kappes and Schmid (2013) | Corporate Governance: An International Review | Family and non-family firms/Germany | Agency theory | Quantitative | Family ownership; family management; generation | / | / | Family ownership (at least 25% of firms' voting right) and management (a member of the founding family represented on management/supervision board) | Downsizing | Family firms actively managed by their founder and/or the founder’s show longer time horizons— reflected in employee-related investments—than non-family firms |
Khanin et al. (2012) | Family Business Review | Family firms/USA | Embeddedness | Qualitative | Superior job alternatives; family embeddedness; work centrality | / | Job satisfaction | Founder's vision and intention to secure cross-generational sustainability | Turnover intention | By reconciling two different institutional domains (the family and the business), family-business embeddedness positively influences job satisfaction, which in turns reduces family employee turnover |
Khanin (2013) | Business Horizons | Single family firm/USA | / | Qualitative | / | / | / | / | Turnover intention | The causes and intensity of turnover intentions are ascribed to two divergent forces—namely, centripetal and centrifugal—that respectively positively or negatively influence the turnover intentions of family firms’ employees |
Kim and Lee (2018) | Asia Pacific Business Review | Listed family and non-family firms/Korea | Agency theory | Quantitative | Family status of the firm; Chaebol family firms | / | / | Family ownership (at least 5% of firms' equity) | Employee relations | Whereas family and non-family firm do not differ in terms of employee relations, Chaebol family firms have higher employee-related performance than non-Chaebol family firms |
Kölling (2020) | Bullettin of Economic Research | Family and non-family owned and managed firms/Germany | / | Quantitative | Family status of the firm | / | / | Family firm (> more than one owner working in the firm) | Labour demand volatility | Family firms show lower labour turnover, hence implicit contract. However, only small firm display this distinctive behaviour. When the analysis is restricted to the establishments with more than 20 employees, most of the differences disappear |
Levie and Lerner (2009) | Family Business Review | Family and non-family firms/U.K | Agency theory and Resource-based View (RBV) | Quantitative | Family ownership. Family management | / | / | More than 50% of equity owned by the family and at least 2 family members in managerial position | Employment growth | Family and non-family businesses achieve the same performance despite employing different internal resources. The social capital endowment of family firms offsets their weaknesses in human and financial capital |
Madison et al. (2018) | Journal of Business Research | Private family firms/U.S.A | Agency and Organizational justice theory | Quantitative | HR professionalziation | Bifurcated monitoring | / | Family ownership and at least two family members working in the firm | Financial performance | The success of HR professionalization on firm’s performance is contingent upon perceived organizational justice. Indeed, when the asymmetric treatment of family and non-family employees occurs (i.e., bifurcation bias), the beneficial effect of HR professionalization weakens |
Mahto et al. (2020) | Journal of Business Research | Private family firms/U.S.A | Social identity theory | Quantitative | Value similarity; family bonds; decision-making homogeneity | Family member commitment | Opportunity costs | / | Turnover intentions | The opportunity costs of staying moderate the relationship between family commitment and turnover intentions of family employees. However, when the opportunity costs are very high, family members show interest in exploring job opportunities elsewhere |
Martí et al. (2013) | Journal of World Business | Family and non-family firms/Spain | SEW approach | Quantitative | Family ownership. Venture capital ownership | / | / | Companies whose ultimate largest shareholder is a family or individuals closely linked to a family group | Employment growth | Venture capital–backed family firms under-perform compared to their non-family counterparts only when venture capital holds a minority of the stake. In this circumstance, a mismatch between the traditional management style of the family with that introduced by the venture capitalists negatively affects growth |
McLarty and Holt (2019) | Family Business Review | Family firms/U.S.A | SEW approach | Quantitative | SEW importance | Employees’ dark personality | / | / | Employee task performance | When supervisors in family firms prioritize SEW, a positive environment results which mitigates the adverse effect of employees’ dark personality – in the form of narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism – on performance |
McLarty et al. (2018) | Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice | Family firms/U.S.A | Social exchange theory; socioemotional wealth approach | Quantitative | Supervisor family member | Organizational commitment; SEW importance | / | / | Employee task performance | Organizational commitment is more job performance when there is a congruence between the supervisor family status and the importance they place on SEW goals |
Neckebrouck et al. (2018) | Academy of Management | Family and non-family firms/Belgium | Stewardship Theory | Quantitative | Family ownership; family management | / | / | Family holds more than 50 percent of the shares of the firm, and at least two board members share the same surname | Downsizing and Voluntary Turnover | Family firms are better financial stewards than non-family counterparts. However, they are worse organizational stewards, as reflected in higher voluntary turnover. Dismissal rate does not differ according to family status |
Pittino et al. (2016) | Journal of Family Business Strategy | Family and non-family firms/Austria and Hungary | Social Exchange Theory | Quantitative | Family firm status | high-performance work practices (HPWP) | / | Family ownership (absolute majority of equity) | Employees retention | Family firm status has a positive effect on employee retention. When high performance work practices (HPWPs) are adopted, a family effect combines with formal practices, positively affecting the retention of valuable employees |
Pittino et al. (2019) | European Management Review | Private family firms/Belgium | Upper Echelon Theory | Quantitative | Family ownership; family management | Generational involvement | / | Family ownership (percentage of shares owned by family in control) and management (family presence in the TMT as percentage of total number of managers in the company) | Employment growth | Increased generational involvement, by raising cognitive diversity and opening the family TMT to unexplored opportunity, fosters employment growth |
Powell and Eddleston (2013) | Journal of Business Venturing | Lone-founder SMEs/USA | Work-family enrichment and Social support | Quantitative | Affective family-to-business enrichment; family-to-business enrichment; family-to-business support | Female entrepreneur | / | / | Employment growth | Family-to-business support is positively related to entrepreneurial success is stronger for female than male entrepreneurs |
Rutherford et al. (2008) | Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice | Family firms/USA | Familiness | Quantitative | Power; experience; culture | / | / | Family firm's definition based on the same surname shared by at least two officers or directors | Employment growth | The relationship between familiness (i.e., power, experience, and culture) and financial and non-financial measure of business performance is assessed. The analysis does not show any influence of familiness on employment growth |
Stavrou et al. (2007) | Journal of Business Ethics | Family and non-family listed firms/USA | Stakeholder theory | Quantitative | Family ownership | Performance | / | Family ownership (at least 5% of firms' voting rights) and management (at least two directors have a family relationship) | Downsizing | Family firms are less likely to downsize than non-family firms irrespective of financial performance considerations |
Stenholm et al. (2016) | Journal of Small Business Management | Family and non-family firms/Finland | Discovery Theory | Quantitative | Innovation orientation; proactive orientation; risk-taking orientation | / | Entrepreneurial activity | At least 50% of equity owned by a single family and perception of being a family firm | Employment growth | While proactive entrepreneurial orientation affects the growth of both family and non-family firms, innovation orientation influences the growth of family firms only |
Sultan et al. (2017) | Journal of Family Business Management | Family and non-family firms/Palestine | high performance organization (HPO) | Quantitative | / | / | / | Family perception of being family firm; Family ownership (> 50%) and management (firm managed by members drawn from founding family) | Employee quality as dimension of HPO framework | Family firms have lower employee quality scores than their non-family counterparts |
VanDalsem (2019) | Journal of Economics and Business | Listed family and non-family firms/U.S.A | / | Quantitative | Family firm status | Stock repurchase | / | Family ownership (more than 20% of stockholder votes) and management (if a founding family member is either a CEO or board chairperson) | Investment in employment | Family firms are less likely to repurchase shares than non-family firms. Whereas a stock repurchase is associated with a decrease in investment in employees, family firms engaging in repurchase are found to sacrifice employees-related expenses a lesser extent than non-family counterparts |
Vardaman et al. (2017) | Entrepreurship Theory & Practice | Single family-owned firm/USA | Social identity theory | Quantitative | Family and non-family degree centrality; family and non-family simmelian ties; organizational identification | / | / | / | Employee Turnover | Centrality in both family and non-family friendship networks reduces turnover among non-family employees |
4.1.3 Context by comparing—firm level
Author | Journal | Sample/Country | Theoretical framework | Research design | Independent variable | Moderator | Mediator | Family firm operationalization | Employment outcomes | Main findings |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Arijs et al. (2018) | Journal of Family Business Strategy | -/U.S.A & Belgium | Signalling Theory | Quantitative | Instrumental and symbolic components of family business employer brand | / | / | / | Job pursuit intentions | In the two countries, participants show different perceptions of family business brand. In particular, in USA instrumental attributes show a higher influence on job pursuit intentions towards family firms |
Backman and Palmberg (2015) | Journal of Family Business Strategy | Family and non-family firms/Sweden | / | Quantitative | Family status of firm | Metropolitan; urban; rural area | / | Family ownership (one or more family members owning majority of shares) and management (one or more members are in management position) | Employment growth | Regional context affects the performance of family firms, with family-owned businesses in rural areas exhibiting higher employment growth than non-family firms |
Baú et al. (2019) | Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice | Family and non-family firms/Sweden | Embeddedness | Quantitative | Family firm status | Urban area; local embeddedness | More than 2 family members own and are involved managerial position | Employment growth | Local embeddedness positively affects employment growth of family firms, and this is more pronounced in rural areas | |
Karlsson (2018) | Journal of Family Business Strategy | Family and non-family listed firms/Sweden | Resource-based view (RBV) | Quantitative | Family firm status | / | / | Family ownership (majority of decision-making rights) and management (at least one family member in governance of firm) | Employment growth | Family firms show comparative employment growth advantages relative to non-family firms in rural areas. These arise because family firms’ higher social capital seems to be particularly valuable in regions with low population density |
4.1.4 Context as a covariate
Author | Journal | Sample (Country | Theoretical framework | Research design | Independent variable | Moderator | Mediator | Family firm operationalization | Employment outcomes | Main findings |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Amato et al. (2020) | Baltic Journal of Management | Listed and non-listed family and non-family managed firms/Spain | Embeddedness | Quantitative | Family firm status | Municipality size; global financial crisis | / | Family management (more than one family member in managerial positions) | Employment growth | Family-managed firms located in large urban areas have higher employment growth than non-family firms. During the global financial crisis, family firms in small municipalities showed a lower reduction of employment than non-family counterparts in the same area |
Amore et al. (2017) | Journal of Corporate Finance | Listed family-firms/Italy | Agency theory | Quantitative | Marital leadership | Industry shocks | / | Family ownership (at least 50% of equity or 25% if firm is listed) | Turnover | Firms led my married couples exhibit lower employee turnover and higher labour productivity than companies with lone or multiple non-family leaders and companies with lone or multiple family leaders |
Bach and Serrano-Velarde (2015) | Journal of Corporate Finance | Family and non-family listed firms/France | Implicit contract theory | Quantitative | Dynastic transition | Labour market relations; labour market conditions | / | Family ownership and management | Downsizing—Wages level adjustment | At the time of CEO transition, family-promoted CEOs are associated with fewer job losses of the incumbent workforce and less wage renegotiation than non-dynastic CEOs. This difference is greater in the presence of friction in industrial relations |
Bennedsen et al. (2019) | The Review of Corporate Financed Studies | Family and non-family listed firms/multiples countries | / | Quantitative | Family ownership | Labour Market Regulation | / | Family ownership (25% of voting rights via direct and indirect family shareholding) | Labour volatility | Family firms outperform non-family counterparts in countries with weaker market labour regulations. Additionally, labour volatility of family firms is lower in unregulated markets |
Bernhard and O'Driscoll (2011) | Group and Organization Management | Small family-owned business/Germany | / | Quantitative | Transformational leadership; transactional leadership; passive leadership | / | Psychological ownership | Firms that are 100% owned and managed by a single business owner-manager employing less than 50 workers | Turnover intention | Psychological ownership positively mediates the relationship between the owner-manager leadership style and non-family employees’ turnover intentions |
Bjuggren (2015) | Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization | Family and non-family listed and non-listed firms/Sweden | / | Quantitative | Family ownership | Industry shocks | / | Family ownership (at least 50% of equity) | Downsizing | Employment in family-owned businesses is less sensitive to unanticipated sales and value-added shocks at industrial level |
Bjuggren et al. (2013) | Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship | Listed and non-listed family-firms/Sweden | / | Quantitative | Family ownership | / | / | Family ownership (at least 20% of the votes) | Employment growth | The main analysis reveals that family ownership reduces a firm’s probability of high-growth. This negative relationship disappears for medium and large firms and when a longer time period is considered |
Block et al. (2018) | Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice | multiple countries | Occupational choice theory | Quantitative | Female; education; entrepreneurial intention | Labour market institutions | / | / | Individual preference to work in a family firm | National labour market institutions influence individuals’ preference to work for a family firm. In particular, this choice is positively related to a high degree of labour market flexibility, centralized wage determination, and low labour-employer cooperation |
Chen et al. (2014) | Corporate Governance: An International Review | Family and non-family firms/multiple countries | SEW approach | Quantitative | Family ownership | Country's regulatory environment | / | Family control | Employment growth | Family-controlled firms show higher employment growth rates than non-family-controlled firms. The impact of a poorer regulatory environment on workforce growth rate reduction is higher in family firms than in their non-family counterparts |
Ellul et al. (2018) | Review of Financial Studies | Listed family and non-family firms/multiplecountries | / | Quantitative | Family ownership: | National unemployment insurance | / | Family firms are defined as those where a family blockholder is the largest shareholder, has at least 25% of cash flow rights, and is present in the firm’s management | Employment growth | Compared to their non-family counterparts, family firms offer more employment stability in countries with less generous national unemployment insurance |
Ernst et al. (2012) | International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management | Non-listed family and non-family firms/The Netherland | Agency theory & Stewardship theory | Quantitative | Family ownership; family management | Firm’s age | / | At least two of the following criteria: 1) a single family owns more than 50% of the equity; 2) a single family exercises considerable influence on the business or succession decisions; 3) at least two members of the board of directors or advisors are from one family | Employment growth | Firm’s age moderates the relationship between family firm and employee growth in an inverted U-shaped relationship between family involvement and firm’s growth |
Kang and Kim (2020) | Management Science | Family and non-family listed firms/USA | Agency theory | Quantitative | Family status of the firm; | Tax changes at state-level | / | Family ownership (> 5%) and governance (at least one family member on the board or management) | Employee relations | Family firms invest more in employee relations than non-family firms when an exogenous shock such as reduction in state inheritance and state taxes occurs |
Kim et al. (2020) | Journal of Business Ethics | Family and non-family listed firms/USA | Place-basedness theory | Quantitative | Family status of the firm | Population density | / | Family ownership (at least 5% of firms' equity) | Downsizing | Family firms are less inclined to downsize when located in less-populated area where the negative socio-economic consequences (i.e., externalities) would be higher |
Lee (2006) | Family Business Review | Family and non-family listed firms/USA | / | Quantitative | Family ownership; family management | / | / | Family ownership (founding family or descendants hold shares) and management (founding family or descendants on the board of directors) | Employment growth | Family-owned businesses have higher employment rates than non-family counterparts. Family management is shown to foster employment stability during economic slowdowns |
Mueller and Philippon (2011) | American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics | Family and non-family-controlled firms (multiple countries | / | Quantitative | Cooperative labour relations | / | / | Family ownership (if a single family is the largest shareholder) and generation (1st generation and beyond) | Fraction of firms controlled by families/Fraction of total market capitalization controlled by 5 top families | Labour conflicts explain differences in ownership across countries. In particular, countries with hostile labour relations have more family ownership than countries with cooperative labour relations |
Santoro et al. (2020) | Small Business Economics | Small family firms/Italy | Organizational resilience | Quantitative | Employee-level resilience | Entrepreneur resilience | / | Family ownership and management | Growth and profit performance | All of employee-level dimensions of resilience (i.e., behavioural, cognitive and contextual) affect firm performance positively when the entrepreneur has a propensity towards resilience |
Sraer and Thesmar (2007) | Journal of the European Economic Association | Family and non-family listed firms/France | / | Quantitative | Firm-founder management; founder’s heirs management; professional CEO management | Industry shocks | / | Family ownership (more than 20% of voting right) | Wages level-Downsizing | On average, family firms pay lower wages to employees than non-family firms. In contrast, the lower reactivity of employment levels to industry shocks suggests that family firms provide insurance to their workforce |
Tabor et al. (2020) | Journal of Business Ethics | Family firms U.S.A | Conservation of resources theory | Quantitative | Work-family conflict | Spiritual leadership | / | Family ownership and at least two family members employed in the firm | Organizational commitment | Spiritual leadership exacerbates the negative effect of work-family conflict on employees’ organizational commitment. Additionally, whereas spiritual leadership has positive effects on family employees, it is detrimental for non-family employees leading to high work-family conflict |
Van Essen et al. (2015) | Corporate Governance: An International Review | Family and non-family listed firms/multiple countries | Institutional theory | Quantitative | Family-controlled firm | / | / | Family ownership (at least 5% of voting rights and is the largest owner) | Wages level-Downsizing | Family firms are more resilient than non-family firms since family firms are less likely to downsize or decrease wages in both crisis and pre-crisis periods |
4.2 Aggregate level
4.2.1 Context as a container—aggregate level
Author | Journal | Sample/Country | Theoretical framework | Research design | Independent variable of interest | Moderator | Mediator | Family firm operationalization | Employment outcomes | Main findings |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Astrachan and Shanker (2003) | Family Business Review | Family firms/USA | / | Quantitative | / | / | / | Family control over strategic decision- Owner's intention to pass on firm to future generation—Multiple generations in firms | Workforce employed | Depending on the definition adopted, family firms represent the major contributor to the US economy in terms of workforce, business tax returns, and GDP |
Andersson et al. (2018) | Small Business Economics | Listed and non-listed family firms/Sweden | / | Quantitative | / | / | / | Family ownership (at least 50% of equity or 25% if firm is listed) and governance (at least one family member in the board) | Workforce employed | By using register data on the population of Swedish firms, family firms contribute for over one third of all employment and GDP. They are also common in industry and vary in size |
Bjuggren et al. (2011) | Family Business Review | Listed and non-listed family-firms/Sweden | / | Quantitative | Family ownership | / | / | Family ownership (at least 50% of equity or 25% if firm is listed) | Workforce employed | Contributions of family-owned businesses amount to one-fourth of total employment and one-fifth of GDP in Sweden |
Holm et al. (2018) | Population, Space and Place | Kinship ties of which family firms account for a type/Sweden | / | Quantitative | Population density | / | / | More than 2 family members | Kinship density in the workplace | In investigating the determinants of kinship density, the study shows a negative association with population density. Family firms represent a particular type of kinship tie especially common in small workplaces |
4.2.2 Context as a covariate—aggregate level
Author | Journal | Sample/Country | Theoretical framework | Research design | Independent variable of interest | Moderator | Mediator | Family firm operationalization | Employment outcomes | Main findings |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Mueller and Philippon (2011) | American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics | Family and non-family-controlled firms (multiple countries | / | Quantitative | Cooperative labour relations | / | / | Family ownership (if a single family is largest shareholder) and generation (1st generation and beyond) | Fraction of firms controlled by families/Fraction of total market capitalization controlled by 5 top families | Labour conflicts explain differences in ownership across countries. In particular, countries with hostile labour relations have more family ownership than countries with cooperative labour relations |
5 Future research: Where can we go from here?
Meaning of context | Contextualization approaches | Level of analysis | |
---|---|---|---|
Firm level | Aggregate level | ||
Context as a container | Context by sampling | How does the degree of familiness (demographic and essence dimensions) affect firm employment outcomes? Do employment outcomes follow a specific pattern in emerging and transition economies? Does the family firm and employment outcome relationship vary according the definition of family firm adopted? To what extent do family firms resort to temporary workers? How does the relationship between family firm and employment outcome transfer to firm performance such as financial performance or productivity? How do family firms deal with labour inefficiencies losses after downsizing? | What is the percentage of employment that family firms generate across contexts and time? To what extent do family firms contribute to maintaining/creating employment at local, regional, and country level? What is the family firm’s contribution to employment creation in the local production systems (e.g. industrial districts, innovative milieu)? To what extent is the family firm a positive or negative disruptive agent in terms of employment across contexts? How and under what conditions are family firms able to alter regional processes (such as spillovers, information exchange, social interaction etc.) underlying local and regional employment growth? |
Context by comparing | Do the employment outcomes in family and non-family firms differ according to location, local production systems, regions, or countries? Do employment outcomes for family firms differ according to the location in developed versus emerging countries? Do employment outcomes between family and non-family firms and among family firms differ across countries assuming different formal and informal institutional context? Do employment outcomes between family and non-family firms and among family firms vary according to their regional settings or located within clusters? Do employment outcomes between family and non-family firms and among family firms differ according to the degree of labour unionization across industries? | Does the level of employment creation and employment growth among local production systems and regional contexts vary according family firm density? Is the disparity in the employment rate across local, regional, and national levels related to family firm density? Does the aggregate family firm effect (such as family firm density) affect aggregate employment outcomes? Is family firm density associated with the employment growth in manufacturing industry? To what extent does this relationship differ in the service sector? To what extent the relationship between family firm density and employment growth in particular industries differ between developed and emerging economies? Does family firm density and employment growth vary among countries/regions with different degrees of labour market flexibility? | |
Context as a covariate | Context by theorizing | Do family characteristics alter the employment outcomes in family firms? How do family contextual dimensions (micro-context such as family size, type of family, and ethnicity) affect employment outcomes in family firms? Do socio-spatial and temporal-spatial dimensions affect employment outcomes in family firms? How do proximity dimensions affect family firm -employment outcomes? How do external shocks such as economic crises affect employment outcomes in family firms across contexts? What are the roles that family identity and social embeddedness play in family firms in terms of employment outcomes across spatial–temporal context? What is the reaction of family and non-family firms to environmental uncertainty (external shocks affecting sales volatility) in terms of temporary and permanent workers? To what extent do formal and informal institutional contexts moderate the family firm—employment outcomes? | Do spatial–temporal dimensions affect the relationship between the aggregate family firm effect (such as embeddedness) and local, regional, and national employment outcomes? To what extent do structural changes in the labour market moderate the relationship between aggregate family firm effect and employment growth at local, regional, and national level? Do family firms contribute to local, regional, and national resilience? Does this contribution come from employment creation, maintenance of employment, or less employment destruction? Does political uncertainty affect the relationship between family firm density and employment growth at local, regional and national level? Is the relationship between family firm density and employment growth moderated by economic volatility? Is this moderation the same across geographical areas? Did the adhesion to monetary regimes (i.e., European Monetary Union) or supranational organizations influence the relationship between family firm density and employment at regional and national level? |