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2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Cooperation in Multicriteria Repeated Games

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Abstract

In classical Game Theory a rational player’s goal is to maximize its payoff by choosing a strategy that is best response to the opponent’s strategy. This theoretical presumption leads to mutual defection in dilemma games. Despite theoretical prediction in real life situations players tend to cooperate. Our goal is to develop a model that overcomes some of the limitations of classical models. We investigate the emergence of cooperation for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in a spatial framework with multicriteria payoffs. We propose a multicriteria model where a second criterion, that reflects the identity of a player, is introduced. Numerical experiments show that the second criterion promotes cooperation without any external interactions. The proposed model allows the interaction of different type of players which leads to more realistic outcomes.

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Metadata
Title
Cooperation in Multicriteria Repeated Games
Authors
Réka Nagy
Mihai Suciu
Dan Dumitrescu
Copyright Year
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69710-9_8

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