Advertisement
Published in:
2008 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Cores and Related Solution Concepts
Published in: Models in Cooperative Game Theory
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.
Select sections of text to find matching patents with Artificial Intelligence. powered by
Select sections of text to find additional relevant content using AI-assisted search. powered by
In this chapter we consider payoff vectors
x
= (
x
i
)
i
∈
N
∈ ℝ
n
, with
x
i
being the payoff to be given to player
i
∈
N
, under the condition that cooperation in the grand coalition is reached. Clearly, the actual formation of the grand coalition is based on the agreement of all players upon a proposed payoff in the game. Such an agreement is, or should be, based on all other cooperation possibilities for the players and their corresponding payoffs.